CHRISTIAN MORAL PRINCIPLES

Chapter 8: The Modes of Responsibility Which Specify the First Principle

Question C: What is the third mode of responsibility?

1. The third mode is this: One should not choose to satisfy an emotional desire except as part of one’s pursuit and/or attainment of an intelligible good other than the satisfaction of the desire itself. Violations occur when a person deliberately chooses to act upon impulse, habit, or fixation on a particular goal. The proposal one adopts in making such a choice appeals by promising some sense of inner harmony through tension-reduction. Thus, one’s reason for acting is the very satisfaction of the emotional desire rather than some intelligible good whose instance has features which arouse the desire. A choice to act on this basis sets aside whatever reason there was for restraint, and the action at least wastes time and energy one might otherwise use for the pursuit of goods in line with upright commitments. In deliberately settling for mere emotional satisfaction, one’s choice is not that of a will toward integral human fulfillment.

2. A person sometimes is aware that his or her desire, instead of pointing to some reason to choose to satisfy it, offers only its own satisfaction as a reason for choosing. Yet one can be drawn—and perhaps almost driven—to choose, for example, by a quasi-compulsive desire, by habitual routine, or by a particular goal on which one’s heart is fixed. (It sometimes happens that goals which were reasonable at the outset lose their point with the passage of time yet retain their emotional appeal.) This is not the same as the situation in which one spontaneously does reasonable things without having reasoned about them. Nor is it the same as cases in which one acts for an intelligible good and gains emotional satisfaction in its concrete, sensibly pleasant aspects.

3. This mode is violated by the person who sees no point in having another drink, or smoking, or eating a rich dessert, or spending the evening in idle chatter, yet does so in response to an urge. Again: People spend much of their daily lives unreflectively following routines; sometimes doing so is pointless, yet they choose to continue to follow the routine merely for the sake of the feeling of security and accomplishment they gain from doing so. Again: Some people work hard to enjoy a constantly rising standard of living, yet they know that more wealth and material things will yield no more real satisfaction.

4. Some deny the truth of this mode. Their argument is based on the principle that the pleasure accompanying an act shares in the act’s own moral quality, good or bad. From this they conclude that if what one does is not otherwise wrong, choosing to do it for the sake of pleasure alone does not make it wrong. The principle is sound, but the conclusion does not follow. The principle applies to acts whose moral quality already is settled, whereas the conclusion concerns possible choices whose moral quality is in question.

5. Moreover, one violates this mode only by making a choice. One has no choice to make unless one hesitates and deliberates, and so one never has occasion to act for the mere satisfaction of an emotional desire unless there is some reason for restraint. Thus, whenever one violates this mode, one acts despite some reason or other. The reason might not be weighty, but any reason inherent in what one chooses for making the choice is better than none, for any such reason will have a basis in intelligible goods.

6. The virtuous disposition corresponding to this mode is most appropriately called “self-control” (see S.t., 1–2, q. 61, aa. 2, 4; 2–2, q. 141, aa. 1–2). Violators are not in control of their own lives but are slaves to nonrational motives. Self-control includes at least some aspects of many traditionally recognized virtues, such as temperance, modesty, chastity, and simplicity of life. Also, if “discipline” is used to refer to a virtuous disposition rather than an imposed regimen, a person free from positive nonrational motivation can be called “disciplined.” The opposed vice includes at least certain aspects of lustfulness, gluttony, greed, jealousy, envy, shortsightedness, impetuosity, and so on.

7. The foundation for this mode, too, is deepened by divine revelation before Jesus. God makes human persons aware that, being made in his image, they should share in his excellence. Also, in clarifying the reality of free choice and moral responsibility, revelation sharply distinguishes what one does by reasonable choice from what one is moved to do by nonrational drives and habits. Moreover, the life proposed by the Jewish law requires self-discipline.