## III THE CATEGORIES

## Psuedo-Thomas' Modes of Being

In this section, I return to the <u>Summary of the Entire Aristotelian</u>
<u>Logic</u> to examine in some detail Pseudo-Thomas' doctrine concerning the
categories. I shall not examine the content of these treatises for their
own sake, but only to the extent necessary to show how Pseudo-Thomas' distinctive position on the nature of logic makes an appreciable difference
in his doctrine. That it does make such a difference is apparent merely
from Pseudo-Thomas' statements that categories can be considered both as
supreme genera and as realities, and that it is necessary to divide being
to achieve scientific knowledge of categories.

For Pseudo-Thomas, the necessity for considering the categories arises from the fact that terms, which are parts of a proposition, signify substance, quantity, or something in one of the other categories. The necessity for considering the predicables arises from the further fact that a category, as he considers it, is nothing but an organization of predicables in a categorical order. At the end of his last treatise on the categories, Fseudo-Thomas summarizes what he has done. The categories, he says, pertain to the first operation of the intellect, in which there is no composition by means of a copals. Now, the things which belong to this first operation can be considered in two ways: first, with respect to the very things understood; second, with respect to the modes of signifying them. The first, he says he has now completed, for everything which pertains to the first operation is signified through the ten categories. The second remains to be done in the treatises on the propo-

Tr. II, chap. i. 2Proce. 3 Told.

sition, the argument, and demonstration.1

In view of these statements, it is surprising that Fseudo-Thomas formally defines each of the predicables. except accident. in terms of predication-for example. "Genus is that which is predicated substantively of many things differing in species. 2 Again, he begins the general treatment of the categories by dividing univocal. equivocal. and denominative modes of predicating. Again, he begins his treatise on the last six categories by explaining that since the categories are ordinations of predicables, they are known by means of denomination—that is, one of the modes of predication. These statements seem strange, because we expect that Pseudo-Thomas, in these treatises, will consider things which are underatood in the first act of the intellect rather than predication. Yet his statements indicate that he uses predication as a point of departure for his treatment of predicables and categories. Is he placing predication prior to things simply understood? If he does hold that predication is presupposed by the understanding of its elements, is he not relating the simples of understanding to the complexes of discourse for explanation, rather than relating them to principles more elementery than themselves?

Now it seems to me that Pseudo-Thomas' treatment is intelligible if we attend carefully to what he says and to what he does. The statements in the treatises on the categories, in referring to predication, refer back to the predicables, for when Pseudo-Thomas begins to treat the categories, immediately after he divides the three modes of predication, his first statement is that because they are supreme genera, the categories can be densidered in either of two ways: as to the thing which founds the intention, and as to the intention of universality itself. The heart of the problem, then, lies in the first treatise. If we examine that treatise, however, we discover that the definitions of the predicables in

Tr. VI, chap. xviii. The modes of signifying simple objects understood are considered immediately in tr. VII, chaps. i-ii, on the noun and verb.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Tr. I, chap. ii. <sup>3</sup>Tr. II, chap. 1. <sup>4</sup>Tr. VI, chap. 1.

The reference is explicit in tr. VI, chap. i.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Tr. II, chap. 1.

Predication is prior to the things simply understood. in that the whole is prior to its parts; it is for this reason that Pseudo-Thomas analyses demonstration in order to discover what to treat. On the other hand. in logical reduction, things simply understood are prior to predication, in that the parts are prior to the whole; for this reason, Fseudo-Thomas treats the definitions of predicables, which are given in terms of predication, as problems for analysis. Objects of understanding are signified by the parts of a proposition; therefore, these objects must be undorstood in order to explain the proposition. In his treatment of the categories, then, Fseudo-Thomas does not use predication to explain the categories, but to discriminate the things understood and signified for a treatment whose legical relevance is guaranteed by the way in which they are indicated. The treatment itself must explain the objects understood by showing how they are constituted by the first act of the intellect: however, to show how objects understood are constituted by the first act of the intellect, statements must be made about its presuppositions—the nature of things and the nature and workings of the intellect itself.

From this point of view, the difference in the content of the first chapters of the first two treatises is significant. Both the treatise on the predicables and the treatises on the categories refer to knowledge and to being; however, the former begins its explanations in terms of the nature of the intellect, while the latter begins its explanations in terms of a division of being. The two differ in emphasis, then, since the dis-

Tr. I, chap. 11. 2 Told., chap. 111. 3 From.

Tr. I. chap. i; tr. II. chap. i.

cussion of the predicables emphasizes the cognitive origination of things understood, while the examination and division of the categories emphasizes their metaphysical origin. These emphases are not exclusive, however, since the treatise on the predicables must show the cognitive origination of objects for understanding from the things themselves, and it must explain the distinction among these objects insofar as they are caused by understanding on foundations in things themselves; the treatises on the categories must use the metaphysical conditions of things themselves to explain the division and inter-relations of the objects understood insofar as they are caused by the things.

Expressed more diffusely, the objects understood have a double cause: things outside the mind and the intellect itself. Things outside contribute a solid nucleus—the real nature. This is posited in the receptive intellect simply by the agent intellect unwrapping the nature already present in experience under spatial-temporal conditions and placing it in the receptive intellect. The intellect them begins to act, for it reflects upon what it has; in this first awakening, it sees doubly, for it sees the nature in itself and it also sees the nature in many things outside. The nature in itself now is an object for the intellect—that is, a first intention. To represent the condition of the nature understood as really being in many individual things, the intellect forms and attaches to it the character of universality—that is, a second intention.

It seems to me to follow that the object understood is a compound of the nature and the second intentions which the intellect has attached to it to represent its relationship with the individual things in which it is present. Pseudo-Thomas never treats the two parts of this compound altogether separately. However, in discussing the prodicables, he is interested in the contribution which the second-intentional clothing makes to this compound; while in treating the categories, he is interested in the contribution which the first-intentional nucleus makes to this compound.

Tr. I, chap. i. For the reality of the nature which is first intention, tr. II, chap. i; for the identity of the nature in the intellect and in things, tr. I, chap. iv; for the distinction between the nature possessed by the intellect and the nature as object, tr. VII, chap. iv, bearing in mind that the form posited in the intellect is treated (tr. I, chap. i) indifferently as form and act of understanding.

In treating the predicables, then, Pseudo-Thomas does not consider the effects of the natures themselves on the organization of the intellectual reals, but he considers the distinct objects understood just as objects understood—that is, he refers them only to individual things, whatever those individuals might be, and to other objects understood. However, the reference to other objects understood is only insofar as they too are considered in the same way—that is, according to second intentions. Now we must see how he does this.

First, Pseudo-Thomas considers the origination of genus, escoles, and difference—that is, he explains how the intellect forms these second intentions and clothes the first-intentional natures in them. The basis of the origin on the part of individual things is merely their agreement and disagreement with each other; the intellect sees this as grounded in the natures it sees to be there in them. If a nature is one which the intellect sees only one individual to have, the intellect assigns it the intention of singularity; if the nature is one which many individuals have, but these do not agree in any less common universal, the intellect assigns it the intention of species; if the nature is one which many individuals have, and they also have different species, the intellect assigns it the intention of genus. If the nature is one which many individuals have, and if it is considered as the ground of their disagreement with other individuals with which they have a nore universal nature in common, then the intellect assigns that nature the intention of difference.

How, all this is quite simple and it would go well enough, except that the units with which the intellect is dealing—that is, the first intentions in the intellect—do not correspond to the units outside—that is, the individual things. Yet Pseudo-Thomas is assuming that the form is really the same in the things and in the intellect. Consequently, he must explain how each nature in the intellect can be distributed to many individuals and how many natures in the intellect can be in the same individual. To do this, he introduces three principles. First, the doctrine of letitude of forms explains that any nature more than specifically com-

Tr. I. chaps. 11-iv.

Tr. I. chap. iv.

Toid., chap. 11.

loid.

aon really is not a complete nature—that is, the specific nature is the real unity—and that specific natures really are only parts of individual things. Second, the distinction between the form of the part and the form of the whole explains that the specific nature as it is understood corresponds to a complete individual in such a way that it needs only be limited to this or that to become fully singular, but the form in the thing has scatching real—that is, a matter—in which it is. Third, a distinction between three different ways in which the same form can be considered explains how it can be signified abstractly, or by a concrete adjective or nown. If the form is just considered in the intellect, it is signified abstractly—since it is not then taken as limited to any matter; if it is considered in the things as perfecting them, it is signified by a concrete now; if it is considered in the things as being preserved in them, it is signified by a concrete adjective.

Next, Feeder-Thomas explains how the genera and species form a hierarchy from the most general genus to the most special species. At the top, if an individual were not to agree with something in substance, then it would agree only in entity; however, since being cannot be a genus, substance is the highest genus. He explains why being cannot be a genus; the reason is that a genus aust have differences dividing it which do not already include it in their understanding, but there are no differences that do not include being. I think there are two implications in this. First, Pseudo-Thomas apparently thinks of individual substances as the most real things; second, he apparently considers being a nature which is common to things, but common not by being separate from and determinable by other natures, but by being diffused throughout the other natures and included in each of them.

Next Pseude-Thomas treats the accidental predicables—property and accident. She explains that real being divides between substance and accident, but he does not wish to treat the predicables from that point of view. The systematic reason for this seems to me to be that such a treatment would bring into consideration the differences among the natures which

Told., chap. iii. Told., chap. ii. Told., chap. iv. Told., chaps. vi-viii. Told., chap. vi.

are nuclei of the objects understood, whereas the function of the treatise on the predicables is only to consider these as to the second intentions and their origination, since the objects must be formed before they can be organized into categories. Consequently, Facudo-Thomas considers first the predications by which accidental natures may be discriminated. 1 He then explains them according to the way they are related to the causality of their subjects. Properties are caused by the principles of their subdecta: 2 however, their subjects do not depend on them as upon ocuses, but as upon something without which they cannot be. Accidents are not caused by specific principles of their subjects; honce, things having such natures can be without them, at least so far as their specific matures are concerned. These explanations show thy things can be simply understood without their properties or accidents, why they cannot be understood to be without their properties, and why they can be understood to be without their accidents-at least, when they are understood specifically, although certain accidents caused by individual principles belong to those individuels as though they were properties. The one thing Pseudo-Thomas does not explain is exactly how he is regarding these natures which are clothed in the intentions of property and accident. I think his position could be put this way: a property is a nature seen to be present with and following from a specific nature already seen to be in a group of individuals specifically the same; en accident is a nature seen to be present with a previously-understood specific nature, but not as following from it.

Pseudo-Thomas thus has explained the objects understood insofar as these objects are formed by the intellect clothing natures in second intentions. As I understand this explanation, he has not appealed to intrinsic differences in the natures, but simply to the relation of the natures to individual things and to other natures similarly considered. By this means, he has been able to explain certain differences in predication and the differences between the abstract and concrete, substantive and ad-

Thid. State.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>He says (<u>Ibid.</u>, chap. vi): "Videmus quasdam operationes, quae conveniunt semper omnibus quae aunt eiusdem speciei; sicut attrakere forrum semper convenit augmeti."

jective ways of signifying natures. He also has been able to distinguish the objects into two groups: the substantial and the accidental ones. The substantial objects are derived merely by comparing static individuals with each other and following their agreements and differences in a given nature. The accidental objects are derived by comparing dynamic individuals with one another—that is, taking into account causality—and following the agreements and disagreements in a given nature by a group of individuals already known to be of a certain substantial nature. In this treatise, being has not been treated extensively; I think that Facudo—Thomas has only dealt with it sufficiently to show that considered as a nature, it is not adequately distinct from the other natures; but since it is included in all the natures, being does not receive a second intention of its own.

Having treated the objects understood insofar as they are formed by the intellect, facudo-Thomas must next consider them insofar as they are organized—that is, placed into relation to each other—according to their own intrinsic requirements. In other words, the point of view new shifts from second intentions to first, from the discovery of the distinct objects by the intellect to the discovery of the categorical order of these objects, and from explanation without considering the intrinsic differences of the objects to explanation of these differences in terms of the centributions shigh things make to the objects understood—that is, the natures themselves.

tation. There is univocal predication, in which a single word is applied to many individuals with the same meaning—that is, with the same definition. I take it that Facudo-Thomas means here by "ratio essentiarum" an object understood that involves an essential nature. There is equivocal predication, in which the word is the same but the definition is different. In some equivocal predications, the predication is analogous; this is the case when the definition signified by the name is not in the thing to which the name is applied, but is in acasething causally related to it. Finally, there is denominative predication, in which the word is the same and the definition is the same, but the nature is an accidental rather than an essential one, the concrete name being derived from an abstract

accident. In terms of objects of understanding, the problem is how to explain the origin in being of many supress genera, among which there are different substantial and accidental natures.

Pseudo-Thomas, begins by saying that the categories or supreme general can be considered either as to the intentions or as to the things. In the first way, the category is a being of reason; in the second way, it is a real being. This is explained by several distinctions within being in its greatest universality. The result of the distinctions seems to me to be that there appear two types of being: first, real being, which is characterized by solidity in itself and the possibility of being possessed by something us by a subject, at least by the intellect; second, the being of reason, which is characterized by being a more object of thought, having no solidity in itself, and being incapable of being in anything as in a subject. The nucleus of the object of thought, the nature, which is first taken from things and placed in the intellect, is a real being; the intentions in which that nature has been clothed are more objects of thought.

Since it is the explanation of the object understood from the point of view of the nature that concerns Pseudo-Thomas here, he next explains how real being which is objectively in the scal is divided, because this is necessary for a scientific knowledge of the categories. The division cannot be by differences, since there are no differences contracting being. Being must be divided by modes them. These modes are things conceived—in one way in relation to themselves and in another way in that they are conceived; they are not derived from different bases in an exist-

Tr. II. chap. i.

Thid. The following is a summary of the division Pseudo-Thomas gives. "Ene per se" is divided, since certain is in the scul and certain outside it. Being is in the scul either effectively, subjectively (as in a subject), or objectively. In the first two ways, being in the scul is real—that is, "real" meaning "res," not from "reor, revis," but from "rabus, rata, ratum." In the third way, as being is in the scul objectively, it can be commissed either as to what is understood or as to what belongs to it in this condition. The former is a thing; the latter is an intention. Nothing answers to an intention outside the scul except as a remote foundation; in this way, "is" is attributed to non-beings. Intentional being is not anywhere in a subject; if it were, it would be an accident.

ing thing, but from the different habitudes under which it is understood. I think Pacudo-Thomas means by this that the modes which divide being are netween in the intellect, the real components of the objects understood.

The natures can be locked at either in themselves or insefar as they are conceived—that is, insofar as they contribute to the objects understood. It is the latter that Pseudo-Thomas considers. Insofar as they contribute to the concept, the modes are distinct; however, the things are not really divided according to these modes, for the modes only are grounded in diverse habitudes of things. I think this means that each of the natures is related to complete individuals; the individuals are not divided among the categories, but the natures are divided, insofar as they contribute to the concept, because the individuals can be considered in different relationships.

The modes are: 1) to be by itself—substance; to be in another—accidents; 2) to be to itself—substance, quatity, and quality; to be to another—the other naven categories. He promises to explain how these differ and he remarks that being primarily is saved in substance, and is said of the others only inasmuch as they are something of the substance. For this reason, "being" is predicated analogously of the categories.

Now, Preude-Thomas seems to have begun by considering the realities or natures which are components of objects understood as to what they all have in common—real being. Real being thus becomes an underlying principle of community; it pervades all individual things and all the natures themselves. Thus he explains, at the beginning of his treatment of substance, that being primarily is understood of everything. To explain how the natures differ, therefore, he cannot appeal to differences of being, since being is undifferentiated in itself. If I have not misunderstood him, he appeals to something in individuals cutaide the mind. Individuals, however, are units which do not correspond to the division of the natures. Consequently, he must explain the grounding of the division of the natures by appealing to different relationships in which individuals can be considered.

Thid. Chap. 14.

on this basis, Feeudo-Thomas next treats substance in detail. Substance is being existing by itself. The definition is explained by indicating that being is understood first, and then substance, and then body, and so on. "By itself" means not in another as in a subject of inherence. It negates being a part and it also negates being a nature considered just in itself—that is, abstractly. The existence to which the definition refers is the actual existence of an individual; this existence is a really diverse thing from the essential being or reality of the nature. The nature to which individual existence accrues also is said to have some actuality of its own—that is, the actuality of essential being.

The point of this analysis seems to be that a substantial nature is derived from individual beings, considered simply as things cutside by themselves, without any comparison to anything else. To perform the analysis, however, Pseudo-Thomas has used the notions of being and distinction both with respect to the individuals outside and with respect to the natures in the intellect. Real being, then, seems to have a strange adaptability, for it can be treated as a nature itself, as a constituent of all the natures, and as a pervasive ground which includes the individuals both in their divisions from each other and in their merging of natures which are divided in the intellect.

Pseudo-Thomas next explains primary substance as what is neither in a subject nor predicated of a subject. The explanation is in terms of two meanings of substanding—to accidents and to universals. Primary substances are first in both respects; they are under all of the universals and they properly have accidents. In this analysis, it seems to me that Pseudo-Thomas cimply follows out the results of his treatment of substance. To the extent that individual things are taken to be substances, they have in themselves all the natures, and they ground all of the intentions the intellect forms. To the extent that substantial individuals are unified, in their own being, they have the accidents. Substantial natures in the intellect are divided from accidental natures, only to be unified with them by reference to individuals.

The final point in this discussion is a reference to the Porphyrian

lbid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, chap. 111.

tree. At the bottom of the tree, Feeudo-Thomas places three things: the individual scrething, the substantial thing, and the determinate singular. The primary substance, which includes existence and is part of universal being, here appears to be doubly relative—to other individuals like itself and to the intellect, which can designate it as a singular.

Pseudo-Thomas finally treats the properties of substance. He argues that it is not susceptible to being more or less and that it cannot have a contrary—that is, something opposite itself in a common subject—but that it can receive contraries by changing. The argument reduces these properties to metaphysical principles, explaining them in terms of forms and participation; the explanation involves a further use of the principle of latitude of forms to show why some forms can be more or less in their subjects and others cannot. The analysis is fundamental to the treatment of the properties of the other categories; consequently, it should be examined very carefully in a full inquiry into Pseudo-Thomas' theory. However, for my purposes, it suggests no new problem; it morely adds to the massive evidence that Pseudo-Thomas is reducing the categories to prior principles.

The treatise on quantity carries on the explanation of the objects understood, grounding their constituent natures in things themselves. The chapter on place is a good example. Place is defined as the surface of an ismobile containing body. Since there is no vacuum in nature, every body must be surrounded by another, except the last sphere, which Pasudo-Thomas dismisses. The inner surface of the container, then, is place. However, place may not be the nearest surface of the mearest container, for if that is moving, it cannot locate what is in it. Consequently, if the universe were a sphere containing only one small body, and all the rest were vacuum, that body would still be in place, since it would be located with respect to the sphere. Pasudo-Thomas, then, not only reduces the categories to metaphysical principles in general, but even in their specific divisions.

To begin the discussion of quentity, after laying down a division and definitions, Pseudo-Thomas distinguishes between the unity which is the indivision of being and the unity which is multiplied by quantity.

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<sup>2</sup> Told., chap. iv.

<sup>3</sup>gr. III, chap. vi.

Not everything has the latter unity. for the quantitative unity belongs to the continuous. I Moreover, the unity which is multiplied by number adds the espect of serving as a measure of number. However, the derivation of quantity follows the pattern of the derivation of being, for corresponding to the transcendental derivation-being-division-unity-aultitude-is the derivation of quantity-the continuon, its division, discrete unity, and finally macher. 2 In this way. Pseudo-Thomas keeps the unity of being, which is more extensive than the material individuals, while permitting a multiplicity of individual things.

At the came time, however, he has said that quantity is not really enything besides substance, but is merely the extension of substance. How, then, is a quantitative nature divided from substantial natures in its foundation? On the one hand, the fact that quentity only belongs to corporeal substance distinguishes it from being. On the other hand, the fact that quantitative unity is a measure of the discrete permits it to be at once a distinct nature, as a reality in the thing understood, and distinot only by relationship in individuals. But what is this difference in relationship which grounds the model difference of quantity and permits it to be considered as an accident accruing to things already possessing the substantial mature of body? According to my earlier interpretation. Pseudo-Thursas fundamentally distinguishes the accidental from the substantial natures, because the comparisons involved in forming accidental predicables depend on some nature already being understood to belong to the same things and some new dynamic factor being taken into consideration. It seems to me that the basis for the distinction, then, is that quantitative natures are received only if substantial natures are understood and only if some causal aspect is considered. In this case, the dynamic fector is not in the things, but in the mind with a foundation in things, for numerical unity is a measure insofar as it grounds counting.4 Continuous quantity itself is explained by certain imaginary operations. 5

The treatise on quality begins by defining it in general as that by

Proude-Thomas has explained previously that body cannot be underetood without the continues, which is its property. (Ir. I. chep. viii.) <sup>3</sup>Tr. II. chap. 1.

Tr. III, chap. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Thid., chap. iii.

Agr. III, chap. 1.

which people are said to be such-like. The point of this definition is the reduction of the abstract "quality" to the gredicable, concrete "suchlike." Pseudo-Thomas then treats the four species of quality, explaining each in some detail, and showing their differences by reference to principles in things. Finally, he explains hor quality is predicated denominatively. I do not believe there is any exectal difficulty in this treetise, for the descriptions of the various species of quality seem to differentiate them by reference to various species of things and to separate them as natures in terms of various dynamic considerations. It is interesting that Pseudo-Thomas seems to appropriate denominative predication to quality, remarking that quantity can be predicated in the abstract. His dootrine here is not clear; it seems to me that what he means is that quantity can be predicated either univocally or denominatively. depending upon whether it is considered as a pure nature or not—this would ground mathematics as a formal science—but that quality always is predicated denominatively. If so, presumably the reason would be that the dynamic factors which separate quantitative natures from substance are outside the things, although grounded in them, while the dynamic factors which sepsrate quality from substance always are in things themselves.

Pseudo-Thomas begins his treatise on relation by distinguishing real relations from relations of reason and relations according to being from relations according to statement. The latter are natures of any category which also can be categorized as relations. Real relations according to being are those which things have without any act of the intellect. The necessity for these distinctions here is obvious, since Pseudo-Thomas is analyzing an intellectual universe whose structure consists in relations which are not in the things at all. Moreover, he is treating all of the natures as relative, for the very basis of the distinction of the categories is some relationship of the individuals; consequently he must distinguish between relations understood as such, and the things understood to which relations are applied.

The analysis of relation proceeds by giving the conditions for real

Agr. IV, chap. i. State. obaps. it-v. State. chap. vi. Agr. obap. i.

relations, explaining how relations are founded in the three absolutely categorized sets of natures, explaining that the categorized relation only differs from its foundation by its term, and explaining that the being of relatives is wholly from their foundations. Finally, Pseudo-Thomas states the properties of relations, grounding them on the conditions which apply to their foundations and terms. Relations, then, are reduced doubly, for they are reduced both to a comparative relationship in individuals and, for their essential being, to the prior categories.

Pseudo-Thomas corries his analysis into the last six categories, explaining each of them at length. He considers that these categories involve no new natures, but that they indicate things according to natures which really are in things other than thomselves. He seems to be in some doubt how to parform the basic reduction, for he gives two different opinions concerning the relationships which are involved. The problem is complicated because the relations threaten to develop an infinite regress if the categories themselves both involve and are based upon them.

For my purpose, which serely is to illustrate how Pseudo-Thomas' dectrine of the nature of logic affects these treatises, this analysis should be sufficient. Pseudo-Thomas here reduces the objects of understanding, which are signified by terms in propositions, to the prior principles of the intellect and individual things. In carrying out this reduction, Pseudo-Thomas explains many distinctions of predication. Not only does be explain the nature of the object understood, as a composite of first and second intentions, but he explains the division of both first and second intentions, and he shows the ground for each distinction of predication. In none of this analysis has he accepted the object understood as an intelligibility simple and unquestionable; rather, he treats it consistently as a fact for which a reason must be found.

The main questions which might be asked of Pseudo-Thomas are two. First, how is he able to use predications in explaining the elements of predication—that is, how can be treat as facts the objects understood

Told. Chap. iv. Told., chap. ii. Told., chap. iii.

Thid., chap. iv. Told., chap. v.

The VI. Told., chap. i.

which are constituents of factual statements? It seems to me that the only possible answer would be that the analysis is self-applicable indefinitely. Second, what becomes of the apparently stable limits if the applyou is indefinitely self-applicable? This is a problem, since the obfacts understood, which initially seem stable, are seen to be relative to prior principles. The natures in the intellect, which have the stability of essential being, are nevertheless relative to individuals and their habitudes. But what of the individuals? Both as distinct from each other and as designable by the intellect, they are relative to the primary substance. How can the primary substance be discriminated? It can be referred to by being, but it seems to be discriminated only for experience and by a postulated real principle of spatial-temporal determination. However, such principles are themselves within the categorical frame. Perhaps the last thing that can be said about Feeudo-Thomas analysis. then. Is that it cannot be said. but must be seen; when the intellect realizes itself and makes fully explicit the content of being, which it has understood from the first, then perhaps all of the distinctions-including those between subject and object, between essential being and existence. and between what is known and what is possessed-will vanish in being. This seems to me to be the appropriate result of demanding that everything which has not its sufficient reason in itself must be reduced to prior principles, whether it claims to be an unqualified being or not.

## Oakham's Modes of Signifying

For Ockham, the simple elements of a proposition are not primarily objects understood, but are incomplex acts of knowing things distinct from themselves. Of course, these simples can become objects of knowledge themselves, but for that they must be known by another knowledge, distinct from themselves. Consequently, Ockham's treatment of terms could not be an analysis of objects understood; since his terms are acts of understand-

Tr. I, chap. i; cf. chap. v, where he seems to say that the discrimination is by other accidents.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Ockham. <u>Sum. log.</u>, I, chaps. i and xii. Notice that the terms of a linguistic proposition do not signify the terms of the mental proposition to which they correspond, but linguistic terms signify by convention the same things that mental terms signify naturally.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Ibid., cf. supra, p. 48.

ing or signs of objects understood, they cannot be treated as Faculo-Thomas treats terms, reducing them to principles in things and knowledge which jointly cause the object understood. Cokham, rather, examines terms because they are parts of propositions—that is, they are materials from which are constructed the propositions whose construction logic directs. if they are first intentions: or they are the elements from which are formed the rules which are the logician's special province. if they are second intentions. I Consequently, Ookham makes the general distinctions emong terms, the special distinctions among terms of second intention, and the special distinctions among terms of first intention-mainly, the categories-which a logician must know as a basis for the establishment of his legical art.<sup>2</sup> Just an an engineer must have a theoretical knowledge, es a basis for his art, of the available kinds of materials and tools, so the logician must have a speculative knowledge of first and second intentions. and the distinctions exong them, which are relevant to their use as logical materials and tools.

Ockham therefore vigorously rejects the realistic reduction of distinctions of signification and predication to real natures and to the conditions of those natures in the intellect, since there are no such natures. Two careful treatments, that of the distinction between abstract and concrete terms and that of the nature of the universal, make this abundantly clear.

The abstract-concrete distinction, for Ockham, does not rest on different conditions of a real nature, but on differences in what the terms signify and can stand for, or it is sefely verbal. Thus, "white" and "whitenese" are distinct because the former signifies a substance which has an inherent qualitative form, while the latter signifies the quality itself. Similarly, "soul" and "animate" are distinct because the former eignifies a part, while the latter signifies a whole. Similarly, "human," applied to a human work, and "man" are distinct, because they signify quite different things. Except for certain subtle distinctions required by

<sup>1</sup>cf. Moedy, op. cit., pp. 38-45.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Gokham, <u>Sum. log.</u>, I, chaps. i, xiv, xxvi, and xxxviii. Concerning the speculative nature of this part of legic, <u>supra.</u> p. 43.

Ibid., chap. v.

theology, there is no difference in meaning between abstract and concrete terms in the same category, so long as they signify complete individual things; thus, there is no difference between "man" and "humanity," and "quantum" and "quantity," "father" and "paternity." Of course, if one of the forms is taken to include some syncategorematic element—that is, an element which does not itself signify anything, but determines the term to which it attaches to a special use—then it can be distinguished from the other. This is the case with "man" and "humanity" when the latter means "man insofer as he is man."

As for the nature of the universal, the term "universal" itself is a second intention; it is a sign of all the first intentions which signify many individuals. To say that humanity is universal, then, merely means that the first-intentional concept, man, signifies many men. Individuals are more or less alike, merely by themselves, not by any nature which could be posited in the intellect. Universals are not things, they signify things; they themselves, as concepts in the mind, all are singular qualities. As qualities, universal concepts are accidents, although they do not signify accidents. Thus, it is true in a sense that substance is an eccident, for the intention which signifies all individual substances is a quality in the mind; however, when we say that an individual is a substance, we do not mean he is a quality in the mind, since the concept then is being used to stand for the things it signifies, not for itself.

It is important to notice, however, that in treating terms of second intention. Ockhem does not omit to mention first intentions and individual things. Likewise, in treating terms of first intention, he does not omit to mention terms of second intention. The two treatments are distinct in

Thid., chape. vi-vii.

Thid.. chap. viii: chap. iv for "syncategorematic."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup><u>Told.</u>, chaps. xiv-xv. <sup>4</sup><u>Told.</u>, chap. xvii.

This, chap, xiv, he begins his treatment of universal, which itself is a term of second intention, by explaining that the universals—that is, the terms of first intention which "universal" signifies—are such only by signification—that is, inassuch as they are signs of many individual things.

<sup>1</sup>bid., chap. xl, he begins the treatise on the categories by pointing out that the term "category" itself is a second intention, just as

purpose, however, since the treatment of second intentions is directed to distinguishing them from each other, while the treatment of first intentions is directed toward distinguishing them from each other; although in the former case, the distinctions cannot be made without referring to the first intentions signified by the second intentions under consideration, while in the second case the distinctions emong first intentions cannot be made without referring to them by means of second intentions.

Consequently, although Cokhan does not treat second intentions before treating first intentions for the reason Pseudo-Thomas does—that is,
to explain how objects understood are constituted by the intellect, before
explaining how they are organized according to the demands of reality—he
nevertheless does treat second intentions, including the predicables, before first intentions for good reason—namely, that several of the second
intentions are put to use immediately to refer to first intentions.

Ockham is careful, as he begins to treat the predicables, to distinguish the second intentions he is treating from the first intentions they signify, and from the individual things the first intentions signify. Be gives the classic definitions of genus and species, but he explains that the difference between them is in community, and that this consists in how many things the first latentions signify. Be has previously rendered the notion of "substantive" predication innocuous by explaining it so the kind of predication involved when the question: "That is it?" is enswered about something pointed at. Such of the treatment analyses seemingly realistic statements; they turn out to be statements about signs—for example, "genus is a part of the thing," is explained to mean that a generic intention

<sup>&</sup>quot;genus" is.

Thus, the basic treatment of "universal" and "singular" as second intentions is presupposed throughout; "species" and "genus" are used in defining "specific enity" and "generic unity" (Ibid., chap. xxix) "subject of predication" is used in treating substance (Ibid., chap. xlii); and so on.

<sup>2</sup> IDM., chap. m.

A genus is what is predicated substantively of many things differing in species (Ibid.): species is what is predicated substantively of many things differing in number (Ibid., chap. xxi).

AIbid. STuid., chap. xviii.

is part of a definition, which is a complex intention. 1

The other three predicables are treated in similar style. Terms that are differential, proper, or accidental are predicated adjectively of their subjects, since they do not precisely signify whole things. Differences signify an intrinsic part of the thing; properties are convertible with some species but signify something real or in the mind extrinsic to the things, either affirmatively or negatively; and accidents are contingently or non-convertibly predicable.

Since Cokham distinguishes the predicables by references to the predication of the first intentions which they signify, is he not presupposing predication in the treatment of simple terms? I think the answer here—as with Pseudo-Thomas—is that Cokham really means to distinguish the predicables by the ways in which the first intentions which they signify, signify things, not by predication. Thus, his main distinction between substantive and adjective predication rests on a distinction between absolute and connotative terms. Absolute terms signify directly the whole singular things for which they can stand, not signifying anything else secondarily or obliquely. Connotative terms always signify directly something for which they do not precisely stand—for example, "white" signifies a quality but stands for substances having the quality. Many terms signify parts of things, or qualities, or something other than the things they stand for; however, no first-intentional terms can stand for anything but individual things, since there are no other things.

It is, then, a consequence of their basically differing views of logic that Pseudo-Thomas and Ookham do not hold the same primary division of the predicables. Pseudo-Thomas divides the first three predicables, which are essential, from the last two, which are accidental, for he is concerned with whether the nature in the object understood is seen to be in the individuals first or not, and with whether it is compared in them considering causal factors or not. Ookham divides the first two predicables, which signify absolute terms, from the last three, which signify

Ibid., chap. II.

ZDid., chap. zriii.

Ibid. chap. sxiv.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Ind., chap. xxv.

Thid., chap. x; of. Moody, op. cit., pp. 96-106.

compositive terms, for he is concerved with whether the first intentions aignified by the predicables themselves signify individuals directly or compositively.

It is true that Ockham's treatment, like Facudo-Thomas', involves a reduction of the predicables to prior principles, for Ookham explains the second-intentional predicables by the first-intentional signs which they signify and which naturally cause them: this explanation is not only in general, but it also accounts for the distinction of the predicables. for they are distinguished by whether the first intentions they signify are absolute or compotative terms, signifying more or fewer things, and by whether the things signified are signified as to their whole, or as to a part, on inherent quality, or comething extrinsic. Ockhemis treatment thus presupposes real distinctions between whole and part, between substance and quality, and between individual things; it presupposes distinctions in first intentional signs between direct and connotative eignification and between more and loss general signification. However, the two reductions differ from each other. In the first place, Ockhem has not set out to reduce objects understood to prior principles, for he does not treat the predicables as objects understood, but as knowledge of first intentions: in any case, the reduction which occurs is not the objective of the treatment, but happens incidentally while the distinctions among simple elements are being examined as a basis for using them to regulate constructions or in regulated constructions.

Now, it is not difficult to see why this reduction should have cocarred, even though Ockhan was not aiming at it. Ockhan treats knowledge that is, the simples of knowledge—as qualities in the soul, which are caused naturally by their objects. Such qualities, however, are knowledge precisely insofar as they are signs—that is, insofar as they are relative to their causes. It follows that all second intentions, which are signs of signs as such, will have connotative significance themselves, since all relative terms are connotative. In this case, however, for the distinctions between the second intentions to be clarified, they must be

Did. chap. all.

Ibid. chap. xit.

Ibid., chaps. zl and Lii.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., chep. z.

reduced to the first intentions they directly signify and for which they can stand, but they also must be reduced to the things which first intentions signify and which the second intentions commote.

Unlike the cituation for Pseudo-Thomas, however, Ockham's roduction comes to a limit, for the act of knowledge which is the element of discursive thought, is not the object known, nor is the known insofar as it is something known an element of discourse. Consequently, the limit of the reduction is individual things, directly known as individuals—which is the first knowledge—or directly known by common signs which have absolute significance. Thus, the primary distinctions between many individuals, between wholes and their parts, and between substances and qualities, as these are presented in intuition, always remain; they can give a solid basis to distinctions of signification. The logical significance of Ockham's metaphysical treatment of the individual as an absolute, such that there can be no meaning in a problem of individuation, can be seen from this point.

Furtherware, Ockham's treatment of the predicables requires him to designate individual things without determining any particular individual, and without designating individuals by any sign of limited significance; thus, he simply refers to "the things" in an absolutely general way. A similar necessity involved Feende-Themas in a doctrine of being as a nature, a common content of all the natures, and a pervasive ground of individual things. However, Ockham has none of these difficulties, because the concept of being, for Ockham, can saintain its own unity in signifying everything, even including both real individuals and signs, without requiring any community in the things it signifies. The reason for this is that the concept of being is only a most common sign, not a nature. At the same time, Ockham holds the word "being" equivocal when it is used to signify both a conjunction of individuals and a group of individuals dis-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Cf. Moody, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 172-175 and <u>passin</u> with respect to this question.

<sup>21544.</sup> pp. 15-16 and 75-94.

Ockhan, Sum. log., I, chaps. xiv-xxv, reasing for example, in the definitions of genus and species.

AIDid., chap. xxxviii.

junctively, since it is necessary to maintain the possibility of these different ways of considering individuals if there is to be any difference in ways of signifying at all. While Pseudo-Thomas' reduction requires a unity of real being, then, Ockham's requires a multiplicity of real things; while Pseudo-Thomas' tends to the identity of knowledge and known, Ockham's requires the distinction of sign and signified.

"Category," for Cokham, is a second-intentional term signifying sizple first intentions. It also is embiguous, since it means either a most common term in a group, or a whole group of more and less common terms. In the first sense, every category is a simple of first intention. In the second sense, a category includes simples either of first or of second intention. for concepts are included in the category of quality or relation. This doctrine, however, seems to cause a difficulty, since it requires that first intentions be superior to second intentions. Ockham removes the difficulty by pointing out three things. First, being is a first intention. but it signifies second intentions. Second. a first intention can be predicated of second intentions if both are taken for the things they signify. Third, considering them as things known, all the universals are qualities, but considering them as acts of knowing, some universals are of substances, some of qualities, and so on. The distinction between real being and being of reason. then, does not divide them against each other, since all beings are real, but some beings happen to be knowledges of others.2

Clearly, had Cokham considered first intentions to be natures, he could not have solved his problem in this way. Since the categories are orders of more and less common terms, all common terms should be found in one of the categories, with the exception of supremely common terms, like "being" and "one," which signify everything. If Cokham does not wish to posit unreal entities, then, second intentions must be found in one of the categories, and they must signify fewer things than some first intentions. His colution is to consider the second intentions as to their objects and to place them in the category of quality or relation. Ochham's categories

p. 122, n. 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Ookhaa, <u>Sum. log.</u>, I, chap. xl.

include all incomplex signs; consequently, they include as objects known all individual things and all signs.

In beginning his explanation of the division of the categories, Cekham points out that they are not properly divided as diverse supress genera of things. The reason, of course, is that genera, properly so-called, are absolute terms directly signifying individual substances which can be discriminated in intuition. Cokham's way of dividing the categories is by indicating the different words which introduce questions concerning individual substances. Thus, "what," "what-like," "how such," "of what," "when" and so on indicate distinct categories, including in each all the terms which would be suitable as more or less definite answers to each question.

Now, it is obvious that such questions do not ask for an intuitive kneeledge of individuals. The entegories, then, divide general simple knowledges. All the signs in the categories signify real things, since terms in categories can answer questions about demonstrable individuals. To the unity of intuition of individual things, which is the primary knowledge, there corresponds a sultiplicity of common knowledges. The original unity of intuition is not divided by the common knowledges, since then intuition itself would be lost in a series of partial views. The basis of the distinction between the estegories, then, is the different ways in which simple terms can signify individual things-absolutely or compotatively, and if the latter, compoting parts, or searthing inherent, or scaething outside the thing, and so on. In other words, categories differ by the different ways in which the qualities that things cause in the soul are related to the things they vignify; ultimately, what these differences are, can be known by intuition, and it is unnecessary that the differences be explained.

In his discussion of each of the categories, them. Ockhom indicates her the terms in that category signify individual substances, but individual substances are known appropriately by intuition. The division of the accidental categories becomes a division of the ways in which whole

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, chap. xli. <sup>2</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, chap. xviii. <sup>3</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, chap. xli. <sup>4</sup>Cf. Moody, op. cit., pp. 130-133.

substances can be signified indirectly by terms which primarily signify something else, but can stand for the individuals. Thus, in the case of quantity, Ockham points out that a quantitative term connotes the division of individuals into parts, or a collection of individuals taken together, when the whole individuals are considered as discrete elements of the class. Consequently, while there is nothing to signify besides real things, Ockham argues at length that connotative terms in each of the categories do not signify anything really distinct in things.

Gertain qualities—those, namely, which do not come and go merely by local rotion—are permitted to remain as things distinct from the substances. Of course, when these are signified by concrete terms, which are connotative, the things for which they stand are individual substances; however, abstract absolute terms, like "whiteness," directly signify qualities which are realities distinct from substances.

We may wonder why Cokham permitted this exception to his otherwise complete reduction of categorical distinctions to distinctions between modes of signifying. Of course, it is possible to point to the facts of intuition. I do not think that this factor is sufficient to explain why Cokham maintains the reality of quality, however, although it is sufficient to show that within his system, no explanation is necessary. His reservation of the reality of quality, in distinction from substance, seems to seem effort to maintain the permanence of individual substances, in order to permit some real development. The elimination of quality as distinct from substance would destroy Cokham's position, since all acts of knowledge are qualities in a substantial soul, caused by things distinct from themselves. The maintenance of quality, consequently, is essential to Cokham's logic itself, since otherwise there could be no knower to possess knowledge and to manipulate simples to form complexes, as Ockham's knower does.

In sum, Cokham's treatment of the categories provides for distinc-

<sup>1</sup> Oekham, Exp. sur., II, 55v, quoted in Mocdy, op. cit., p. 148, n. 2.

2 Ookham, Dun. log., I, chaps. xlii, xliv-xlvii, 11-liii, lvii-lxii.

3 Thid., chap. lv.

4 Of. Mocdy, op. cit., pp. 161-170.

tions among signs, without grounding them en distinctions in reality, except in the single case of substance—quality. The distinctions among signs can be known by second-intentional signs and they can be reduced to an absolute foundation in intuition, but they do not require to be explained in order to be used. In general, the treatment maintains a firm distinction between any particular knowledge and the things known by it. The treatment does not destroy, but rather is founded upon, the metaphysical absoluteness of the things primarily known, existing individuals.

Pseudo-Thomas' trestment of the categories seemed to me to endanger the subsersion of both natures and individual substances in being, since his discursive reduction seems incapable of coming to an end. Ockhan's treatment does not involve this difficulty. The problem which seems to me serious is how Cokham can achieve the degree of unification in general knowledge-as against intuition—that he does schieve. The fact that he deals with three objections to the possibility of second intentions being subordinated to a first intention above that he was aware of the difficulty, even though he shows no doubts about his own solution. So far as I know. Cokham does not consider the problem in the form in which I think it might be a serious difficulty for him: how does the intention "quality" signify itself: more basically, how does the intention "being" signify itself? These acts of knowing must be reflexive-that is, they must be knowledges of themselves, in the very acts in which they are knowledges of other things. Without this degree of reflexivity, no unification of general knowledge would be possible. for there would be no way to signify anything that could be eignified without eignifying it by a definite eign. and there would be no way of signifying every quality in distinction from substance. Ockhan permits this degree of reflexivity, but I do not see how he can do so.

For both Pseudo-Thomas and Oukham, the treatment of the categories involves reduction. For Pseudo-Thomas, this reduction is the purpose for the consideration; it aims to explain the origin of things understood, and their dictinctions, in acts of the intellect and in similarities, differences, and relationships of things. For Ookham, this reduction occurs accidentally to his purpose, which merely is to survey the materials and tools which the logician has at his disposal. The reduction which does

occur consists in explaining second intentions by first intentions and individual things, and seeing first intentions to eignify individual things in distinct ways. Pseudo-Thomas' reduction threatens to be unending; Ockhar's is limited by the gultiplicity given in primary knowledge.

For both Pseudo-Thomas and Ockham, the distinction of the estegories leaves some of them were fundamentally distinct from each other than the rest. For Pseudo-Thomas, the distinction of objects understood, according to the natures and the factors in things which ground the distinction of the natures, results in a superior reality for substance, quantity, and quality—the absolute categories—and a lesser reality for the remaining respective categories. For Cokham, the distinction of signs according to their modes of signifying things, which are given as a multitude in intuition, results in special distinction for substance and quality, which can be signified absolutely, and a lesser distinction for the remaining categories. Of course, in either case, the categories divide real being or signify all real beinge, but Facudo-Thomas' respective categories are one step further removed from real being than the absolute categories in the reductive order of the natures, while Oakham's commotative terms do not signify any distinct realities which are not signified sore directly by absolute terma.

Finally, for both Pseudo-Thomas and Ockham, the concept of substance is indispensable. For Pseudo-Thomas, individual substances are the things which can exist by themselves and substantial natures are natures which can be understood before other natures. For Ockham, individual substances are the whole individual things which are known in intuition and terms in the category of substance are concrete and absolute. Substance is necessary for Pseudo-Thomas' logical theory in two ways; first, it serves as the subject which makes possible the division between real being, which can be in a subject, and being of reason, which is only an object; second, if it is not lost in being, it makes possible the limit of the metaphysical reduction, since everything is referred to the substantial natures and their real foundations. Substance also is necessary to Ockham's logical theory in two analogous ways: first, it serves as the subject which can have qualities, including knowledge of another; second, it makes possible a limit to indirect signification, since absolute terms can signify it

directly, inassuch as it is complete and personent in itself.

Here, again, then, we have the two opposed positions, sharing considerable common ground. Freudo-Thomas, with his realism of forms, seeks reasons for the distinctions among categories in things; his reduction tends toward ultimate unity. Ockham, with his realism of direct knowledge, distinguishes the categories simply according to the ways in which signs signify things. For Pseudo-Thomas, objects understood are diverse realities, dividing being; for Ockham, understandings are diverse abstractions, dividing signification.

## Aquinas' Modes of Predicating

In examining Aquinas' doctrine on the categories, we are especially conscious of the lack of an <u>ex professo</u> treatise. There is no place in Aquinas' original works in which he discusses the categories in general at length. For this precise reason, the <u>Summary of the Entire Aristote-lien Logic</u> has had great influence in the Thomist tradition; it provided what seemed an ample treatment of points not discussed in Aquinas' genuine work. John of St. Thomas, for example, cites the work forty-two times in his studies of the universal, the predicables, and the categories.

Aquinas positively states that the treatise on categories has first place in logic and that it is concerned with what pertains to the first act of the intellect. These statements are not qualified by any reference to the predicables. Whatever Aquinas' doctrine concerning the categories is, then, it depends neither on treating them as organizations of pre-formed universals, as Facudo-Thomas' does, nor on treating them as a division of signs whose basic ways of signifying are pre-distinguished, as Ockham's does.

Ioannis a Sancto Thoma, op. cit., I, 313-643. These pages are of 800 in the whole work, excluding the appendix, and of 590 in the second part—on material or posterioristic resolution—of which only 89 pages correspond to the <u>Posterior analytics</u> itself.

<sup>2</sup> In Post, anal., Prosm.; In Peri herm., Prosm., lect. 1.

While there are specific references to the <u>Isagogo</u> scattered through Aguinas' works. I have found no place where he calls it a part of logic, nor have I found any place where he refers the categories to the predicables.

Aquinas does sention the five predicables, he treats them as a division of univocal predication. In one place, Aquinas refers to Aristotle's four predicaments or Porphyry's five universals; according to these, he says, "accident" does not signify something divided against substance, but an accidental relation of a predicate to its subject or of a cesson concept to those contained under it. Apparently, Aquinas was quite aware of the significance of Porphyry's Isazoge; he not only noticed that Porphyry had added a predicable, but also that he was ordering conceptions rather than dividing modes of predicating, as Aristotle had done.

In one of his earliest works, Aquinas resarked that "the wise man doesn't care about words," and he was still repeating the remark in his nature works. Apparently, he took this saying seriously, because he followed it with remarkable consistency. "Mature" has many meanings; one of the meanings for which Aquinas eften uses it, is anything that is understood at all—that is, any intelligible aspect grasped by the intellect. Consequently, "nature" is used throughout his works to refer to intelligible aspects in a way that makes Aquinas' position seem ultra-realistic to a careless reader. Similarly, he uses "universal" in several senses; in one of these it denotes every intelligibility attained by the intellect in its first act, since the intellect understands universals. However, in this sense, "universal" is a negative term; it means that the intellect does not understand things as they are experienced—that is, as individuals—but it does not mean that the intellect understands a universal as such. Properly speaking, universality does not belong to anything merely

Cont. gent., I, chap. xxxii; In Fost. anal., I, lect. xi.

De spirit. creat., art. 11, c.: "Alio medo accipitur accidens, secundum quod ponitur ab Aristotle unum de quatuor praedicamentis in I Topicorum, et secundum quod a Forphyrio ponitur unum quinque universalium.

Sic enim accidens non significat id quod commune est novem generibus, sed habitudinem accidentalem praedicati ad subjectum, vel communis ad es quae sab communi continentur."

In Sent., II, diet. 3, qu. 1, art. 1, c.

\*Sum. theol., I, qu. 54, art. 4, ad 2.

\*In Sent., II, diet. 37, qu. 1, art. 1, c.; De ver., qu. 22, art.

5. c.

\*Sum. theol., I, qu. 85, art. 1, ad 1.

insofer as it is understood, but only insofer as that understanding is referred to the things of which it is an understanding. Such reference does not occur in the first act of the intellect, for there is no comparison involved in simple understanding, but only in the second act, when the intellect reflexively becomes aware of its own act. Froperly, then, the intention of universality cannot arise until the second act, nor is it even immediately derived from the first act, since it presupposes a knowledge not attained prior to reflection.

Consequently, when Aquinas says that "universal," as Porphyry uses the word, means what is predicated universally of many, he expresses his own view of logical universality, even if it is not Porphyry's. For this reason, when Aquinas uses "genus" technically, referring to the predicable rather than to an intelligibility predicated, he insists on including predication in the notion of genus. "Substantive," referring to predication, is explained purely by the fact that some terms are a suitable response to a question beginning "what." The predication of a difference is said to be "quale-quid;" it answers a question beginning "what kind." These distinctions are not to be confused with the division of substance and accident.

It is interesting that when Aquines refers to Aristotle's four sodes of predicating or Porphyry's five universals, he seems inclined to limit the predicables to four, rather than to extend them to five. He formally defines genus as what is put in first place in a definition. We see the same distinction made in one of his earliest original works, for he con-

In Sent., II, dist. 3, qu. 1, art. 2, ed 3; De ente, chap. iii; In Feri herm., I, lect. x.

There is no comparison in the first act: De ver., qu. 1, art. 3. c.; the intellect known its act reflexively in the second act: <u>Ibid.</u>, art. 9. c.

The reference of predicate to subject clearly belongs to the second set; moreover, individuals are not known without reflection. (Sum. theol., I. qu. 86, art. i. c.)

In Post. anal., I, lect. xi.

E. g., De ente, chap. iii.

In Meta., V, lect. xxii; In Sent., III, diet. 6, qu. 3, art. 2, c.

In Meta., V, lect. xxii.

De apirit. creat., art. 11, c.

siders species to be universal inassuch as they are likenesses of many individuals, but he defines genus by predication. While he indicates that strictly, an individual is predicable essentially just of itself. Aquinas does admit that the species can be predicated essentially of an individual. The ground on which this can be admitted, however, is that the specific intelligibility of the thing would be included in its definition, if individuals were definable. In other words, the logical notion of universality properly derives from the ways in which predicates can be applied to a specific notion.

Once this is understood, it is easy to see why Aquinas seldom actually refers to "predicables" under that name. In place of the Porphyrian division, he constantly uses the Aristotelian distinction between essential and accidental predication. 5 According to this division, accidental predication occurs when the predicate is not predicated of the subject according to its proper intelligibility, while essential predication coours when the predicate is predicated of the subject according to its proper intelligibility. The latter occurs in two modes, for either the predicate is of the intelligibility of the subject—that is, it would be included in its definition-or vice versa. The former mode of essential predication includes the definition itself, the genus, and the difference; the latter is property. Species does not appear in this classification, because the species is the subject of predication here, rather than being a predicate. Not being related to many. except to many singulars, the least common intelligibility would become universal only by predication of singulars, and such predication cannot occur without the singulars themselves being known as such, nor can these be known without the intellect reflecting further then its own set to the continuity of that set with its experiential foundation.

In contrast with Pseudo-Thomas, Aquinas restricts predicability so

De onte, chap. iii.

Sum. theol., I, qu. 76, ert. 1, c.

That is, "per se" and "per accidenc." See, e. g.: Sum. theol., I, qu. 76, art. 3, c.

De pot., qu. 8, art. 2, ad 6.

In Fost. anal., I, lect. xxxv.

In de az., III, lect. xii; De ver., qu. 10, art. 5, c.

that it could not be fundamental to the categories, since it only is introduced in the second act of the intellect, while the categories derive from the first act. Aquinas carefully consented on Aristotle's remark: "Some things are universal, others individual." He explains that Aristotle is referring to words which signify things by means of the intellect. that he is talking about those insofer as they are parts of sentences, and that in mentioning "universals." he is not referring to reified ideas but to acts of the intellect which are: "to predicate of many or of one." Pseudo-Thomas almost copies part of this lecture for his explanation of how second intentions are formed, but he cuits to mention words and predication, and introduces an emphasis on the real foundation of the intentions instead. Thus, in the true Porphyrian tradition, Pseudo-Thomas used what had been written in a context concerned with predication to explain the simple objects understood before predication. Mcreover, while Aquinas divides predicability into essential and accidental in such a way that properties are essential predicables. Pseudo-Thomas divided universals in such a way that both properties and accidents become accidental. This difference in division is an illuminating one; both positions contrast with Cokham's which treats genus and species together since they signify absolute terms, and the other three predicables together since they signify connotative terms.

To summarize this first point concerning Aquinas' position on the categories: Aquinas' doctrine on predicability is such that he cannot permit the predicables to be placed before the categories and used as principles for the reduction of the categories to prior principles—either in Pseudo-Thomas' fashion of reducing differences among objects understood to natures in the intellect and intentions, applied to those natures by a formation of the intellect founded in a comparative consideration of individual things; or in Ockham's fashion of reducing differences among signs to ways in which intentions, caused by things in the intellect, signify and can stand for individual things, previously known in intaition.

Aristotle On Interpretation, 17277.

In Peri hema., I, lect. x.

Supra., pp. 83-89.

S. t. l., tr. I, thep. 11. Saure, pp. 101-102.

Thile Moody points out the distinction between the Aristotelian

Aquinas' doctrine on the categories is extremely simple. He calls the categories "modes of predicating." This designation seems to me to be the proper one, since it agrees with Aquines' position that the logician considers modes of predicating. 2 He explains that diverse intelligibilities, which are generic, determine diverse modes of denominating. Even sore clearly, he says that diverse modes of predicating are due the diverse senera, but not to their epecies. 4 Now, "genera" here, as may be seen more easily in the place cited first, refers to the intelligibilities themselves, not to generic prodicates as such. In this sense, Aquinas sometimes says that the unity of genus derives from the unity of the intelligibility. 5 for he wishes to point out that the origin of universal predicability is in the unity with which we simply understand many things. Such diverse intelligibilities are what are understood about things in the first act of the intellect. The categories, therefore, are diverse modes of predicating, derived from the primary diversity among the intelligibilities which terminate the first act of the intellect. The modes of predication follow from the modes of understanding here in that the limits of predication, known as "categories," derive from the diverse limits of the intelligible aspects of things which we primarily understand. In accord with this position. Aquinas speaks of the transcendental intelligibilities-such as, being, thing, and true-as not limited to a genus. 8 but

and Porphyrian lists of predicables (op. cit., p. 72) and explains clearly that Ockham is reducing the predicables to modes of signification (p. 99). he seems not to have sufficiently noticed that Ockham treats all five predicables the same (Ockham, Sam. log., I. chap. xviii) so that he too is reducing the categories to prior principles—not, indeed, of predication and discursive knowledge (Moody, pp. 98-100, rightly insists on this point), but of signification and intuitive knowledge.

In Meta., V, lect. ix: In Phys., III, lect. iv.

In Note. VII, lect. zvii.

In Sent., I, 61st. 32, qu. 1, art. 1, c.

Ibid., dist. 8, qu. 4, art. 3, c.

Sum. theol., I, qu. 66, art. 2, ed 2.

In Seat., I, dist. 2, qu. 1, art. 3, c.; cf. Cent. gent., I, chap. lift and In div. non., chap. vii, lect. v.

De not., qu. 7, art. 9, c.: "Secunda autem intellecta dicentur intentiones consequentes modum intelligendi."

Sum. theol., I. qu. 50, art. 3, c.

<u>surrounding</u> all beings; while he speaks of the categories as <u>outlines</u> of predications.

For Aquinas, our understanding proceeds from the most common intelligibilities toward more determinate and restricted ones. According to this order, the first intelligibility we understand is that of being, and the categorical intelligibilities are grasped as the first modes limiting and diversifying being. 4 The categorical intelligibilities, consequently. can be referred to the notion of being first understood; however, they cannot be defined, since their differentiation is primary. and all primany principles of differentiation are different of themselves, not by anything clas. 6 Because of this, Aquinas often sakes use of the categorical division to indicate the meaning of "being" signifying the intelligible espect primarily understood as against the truth of a proposition—that is, the "is" which signifies predication. Moreover, it is because of this priority of the categorical intelligibilities in understanding that Aquinas uses the modes of predicating to discover the modes of being. Because reality is prior to our knowledge of it, some diversity in things is presupposed by the diversity of our understanding; however, because we do not know things without knowing them, the diversity primarily present in simple understanding must be used as a principle for discovering diversity in things, not as a fact which could be explained by anything better known to us.

Aquinas' notion of the categories, them, is that they are diverse sodes of predicating deriving from the initial diversity enong intelligible aspects grasped in the first act of the intellect. The latter diversity has no principle better known to us; although it is grounded in a diversity of sodes of being, the discovery of the diverse modes of being in the metaphysical analysis presupposes the distinction of modes of

De virt. com., ert. 2, ad 8; the word is "circumeunt."

In Nota., V. loct. ix; the word is "figure."

Sum. theol., I. qu. 85, ert. 3, c.

In Semb., I. dist. 2, qu. 1, ert. 3, c.

Ibid., dist. 8, qu. 1, ert. 2, ad 3.

E. g., De ento. chap. i.

Reserved is "circumeunt."

All Nota., qu. 1, ert. 1.

predicating. Fundamentally, this is all I have to say about Aquinas' doctrine of the categories; however, since this explanation can clarify many problems and illuminate many texts—which also might be alleged against it—I now must discuss some of these points.

The first problem is that Aguines almost constantly refers to the categories as general and schetimes so the most general genera. Moreover, although be makes many distinctions in the meaning of "genue," none of these seem to discriminate the categories from the notion of generic predicability. The distinction he often makes between "logical genus" and "matural genus" places the categories on the side of logic. dividing them against natural classes which agree in some real principle—for exemple, in having the same matter. It might seem, then, that Asminas primarily considers the categories to be genera—that is, classifications of beings. The solution to this difficulty is that the categorical intelligibilities are predicated generically; consequently, they can be called "genera." Insofar as they are the primary outlines of definite intelligibilities, the categorical intelligibilities are determined in every definition, one of them is predicated substantively of whatever is defined, and they properly divide into species. 9 However, insofar as the categorical intelligibilities terminate simple understanding, they are not genera. since the notion of genus includes predication. The estegories divide sodes of predicating otherwise than do the predicables. Consequently. the primary consideration of the categories is as modes of predicating. elthough the estegorical intelligibilities, along with many others, are predicated generically and become genera by that fact. This distinction between the categories as nodes of predicating and the categories as genera would not be of great importance except that the first derive from

E. S., De ente, chap. i.

In Post. anal., I, lect. xxxiv; Sum. theol., II-II, qu. 4, art. 1,

E. C., In Meta., V, lect. Exit.

Sum timed., I, qu. 88, art. 2, ad 4.

lect. xIII; In Sets., V, lect. xxii; In de Frin., qu. 6, art. 3, c.

6 De ente, chap. iii.

In Post anal., I, lect. xxxiii.

the first act of the intellect and the second from the second; Pseudo-Thomas' neglect of this distinction led him to reduce the categories to prior principles—an attempt impossible with Aquinas' categorical intelligibilities and modes of predicating, but possible with his genera.

Another problem is that Aquines not only says that the matter treated in the logical trestment of categories pertains to the first act of the intellect. 1 but he also says that this part of logic subserves the first operation of the intellect. It would seem, then, that this part of logic is not directed to the modification of predications according to the categarical intelligibilities. but to the direction of the first act of the intellect itself. The term of the first act of the intellect is a definition. 3 It can be granted that the categorical intelligibilities themselves cannot be defined, but argued that the purpose of a logical dectrine concerning them is that they may better be used as principles in achieving definitions of the species under them. However, I do not believe this notion of the function of the categories has any place in Aquinas' logic. Pollowing Aristotle, Aquines' proper designation for the first act of the intellect is "understanding of simples"-"intellegentia indivisibilium." Now, a definition remaked by directed inquiry procisely is not an incomplex understanding. Moreover, a directed operation of the intellect requires the intellect's understanding of its own act, since the order logic considers. only is inecfar as it is considered, and the intentions logic considers are known only whom the intellect understands itself to understand. However, the first act of the intellect is not reflexive. Tonsequently, the first act of the intellect in itself cannot be directed by legic. and definitions attained by directed inquiry are not in themselves

In Port hors., Proces.

Sum. theol., I-II. qu. 90, art. 1, ed 2.

E. g., In Post. anal., Procm., itself, Aquines refers to the first act of the intellect with this expression, contrasting it with the composition and division of the second act; he does not mention "definition."

In Nota.. VII, lect. ix: In Phys.. III, lect. i, he speaks of various discursive processes for attaining definitions.

In Eth., I, lect. i; <u>Do pet.</u>, qu. 7, ert. 9, c.

Sum. theol., I, qu. 87, ert. 3, c. end ed 2; of. <u>De ver.</u>, qu. 1,

terminations of the first act of the intellect. Rather, they are achieved in and through demonstration and other rational processes. Thy, then, does Aquinus refer to the term of the first act of the intellect as a definition? Notice that this reference often is absolutely general: however, not every understanding of something is properly a definition, for otherwise it would be impossible to know onything without knowing its essential definition.3 In fact, Aquiess says clearly and often that we do not understand essential differences at all. The solution to the difficulty is simply this: "definition" can signify the term of the first act of the intellect, precisely because the "intelligibility signified by a word is a definition." Now, the source of this saving is Aristotle's argument from the fact that words have some definite meaning to the conclusion that there is comething definite in reality. The significance of calling the term of every simple understanding that is limited at all, a "definition," then, is simply that every simple understanding is of a definfig-that is. limited. as well as determinate-intelligible aspect of reality. The intelligibility signified by a word is the definition of the word. Its definite meaning, and is a definition of a thing, a genuine aspeat of it. From all this. I conclude that, for Aquinas, a logical treatise on entegories cannot subserve the first set of the intellect. by ordering it in itself, since the perported term of the first act-definition-either is a simple intelligibility grasped without reflexive direction or is not attained in the first act at all. So far as the original question is concerned - what Aquises means by saying that the study of the catagories subserves the first act of the intellect—the most likely answer is that categories must be studied because they are modes of predienting, deriving from the first act of the intellect; although simple understanding in itself cannot be guided by logic, it can be served by logic to the extent that its terminations enter into the second act and achieve their orn fulfillment there.

In Post, emal, II, lect. vii-viii.

E. g., Sum. theol., I, qu. 13, art. 1, c. and 6, c.

In Post. smal., II. lect. vili. 45. g., Told., lect. xiii.

Sum. theol., I. qu. 13, ert. 1, c. and passin.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Aristotle <u>Metaphysics</u> iv, 1012<sup>8</sup>23.

Although I wish neither to analyze Aristotle's Categories nor to construct a commentary on that work "luxta menten Divi Thomas." there are certain remarkable facts about that treatise which are intelligible on the basis of Aquinas' position concerning entegories as I understand it. In the first place, Aristotle gives long treatments of the first four categories, but says practically nothing about the last six. Now. if the logical study of the categories is a reduction to prior principles, such a treatment is quite inadequate: however, if it is a study of modes of prodicating, the short chrift given the last six categories is understandable. for there is little difficulty in discerning predications according to these modes from one another, but there can be considerable difficulty in distinguishing substantial from qualitative predication, quantitative from relative predication, and so on. In the second place, Aristotle's divisions of the categories and discussions of their properties are quite inadequate from the point of view of Pseudo-Themas and require carefullydrawn distinctions from the point of view of Ockham. However, if the categories are modes of predicating, the treatments are necessary and sufficient to indicate the means for discerning the modes according to which different predications occur, since they indicate the sorts of predicates which are predicated according to each of the modes, and the conditions under which predication according to each sode occurs. In the third place, the function of the post-predicements in the Categories is intelligible if the categories are modes of predication, since each of the post-predicaments is predicated significantly according to different categorical modes. Many other points of this kind might be indicated: however. I think that these observations are sufficient to indicate that Aquinas' apparent accoptance of Aristotle's <u>Categories</u> as the definitive treatise on categories is not incompatible with the supposition that Aquinas thought of the categories, as they are studied in the beginning of logic, as modes of predicating, not supreme genera of being, principles of definition, or modes of signification.

Another problem of interpretation arises from Aquinas' reference to the categories as the special modes that divide real being. It seems from this that Pseudo-Thomas really does not differ much from Aquinas when

De ver., qu. 1, ert. 1, c.

he divides real being to achieve a knowledge of the categories. I understand Aquinas' position, the difference is considerable.

The first point to be noticed here is that Acuisas insists on the ambiguity of the expression. "being of itself;" he does not treat its division into real being and being of reason as a division of something more common, as Pasudo-Thomas does. In one way, "being of itself" signifies what is divided by the ten categories, it refers only to realities, and it corresponds to the question: "That is it?" In the other way, "being of itself" signifies everything of which a true proposition can be forsed. including megations and relations of reason, as well as real entities. and it corresponds to the question: "Is it?" From the way Aquinas makes his division. it is apparent that he is referring to the terms of the first and second acts of the intellect respectively, since the first act knows what and the second that something is. 4 Now, the first act of the intellect terminates in identity with the thing, insofar as the thing is understood. Consequently, there can be no knowledge in the first act of the intellect which is not knowledge of reality. 6 In reflecting on itself. however, the intellect not only knows limits which do not belong to things, but also knows assetions and the order proper to itself; therefore, what is not understood as a simple intelligibility can nevertheless become the subject of a proposition which is true and affirmative—for example: "Nonbeing is non-being." or. "Non-being is understood by contrast with being." Aguinas, therefore, contrasts "being" which signifies the first intelligible aspect grasped of everything, which is divided primarily by the categorical intelligibilities, which are the first outlines of definite intelligible structures, with "being" which signifies the truth of a proposition; he considers the first to signify reality, but the second to signify truth. Truth is in the intellect and is introduced by the intellect:

S. t. l., tr. II, chap. i. De ente, chap. i; In Sent., II, dist.

De ente, chap. 1; In Sent., II, dist. 34, qu. 1, art. 1, c.

In Sent., II, dist. 34, qu. 1, art. 1, c.

Sum. theol., I, qu. 16, art. 2, c.

<sup>101</sup>d., qu. 87, art. 1, ad 3.

Did., qu. 17, art. 3, c.; De ver., qu. 1, art. 2, 3, 10-12.

De ente, chap. 1.

however, insofar as the true composition of the intellect can be a knowledge that realities are or a knowledge that negations and intentions are understood, "being" signifying truth denotes all that the other meaning denotes and more. In contrast with Pseudo-Thomas' notion of universal being, then, Aquinas' primary division of "being" is a distinction of meanings. In contrast with Pseudo-Thomas' opposition between the real as what can be in a subject and the intentional as what only can be an object, Aquinas primary opposition is between real being as what is simply understood and truth as what is introduced by the intellect. In contrast with Pseudo-Thomas' effort to make the primary division an exclusive one, Aquinas' division is such that the intelligibilities grasped in the first act are included in the truth known in the second act; the being which the intellect introduces is of itself significant, and it signifies realities, negations, and intentions.

To anyone convinced that there is little difference between Pseudo-Thomas and Aquinas, however, this explanation hardly will seem adequate. The following facts about Aquinas' doctrine will be alleged in evidence. First, Aquinas does speak of the ten categories as genera which add to being a determinate mode, founded upon the very essence of the thing. Second, he says that "ens," signifying real being, is derived from "esse," which is the act of being. Third, he refers to negations, privations, and logical intentions as "beings of reason," and he contrasts these with real being. Fourth, Aquinas seems to accept definition of the particular categories by reference to existence. For example, he says that it is of the intelligibility of substance to subsist—that is, to be of itself. Again, he says that the being of a relation is to be to another. Fifth, in two places, he seems to state the derivation and division of the categories, founding them on essence, inherent forms, and extrinsic denominations. There seems, then, to be little difference between Pseudo-Thomas'

In Sent., I, dist. 34, qu. 1, art. 1, c.

De ver., qu. 1, art. 1, c.; qu. 21, art. 1, c.

In Sent., I, dist. 3, qu. 1, art. 1, c. and passin.

In Sent., II, dist. 3, qu. 1, art. 1, ad 3.

In Phys., III, lect. i. Ibid., lect. v; In Beta., V, lect. ix.

position and that of Aquines hisself.

As to the first point: Aguines divides being according to the ten estegories, which edd diverse modes, founded on the very essence of the thing. In the first place. I think I have shown sufficiently that the categorical intelligibilities determine modes of predicating, which derive from the first act of the intellect, but can be predicated generically and become genora through the second act-in other words, that the categories properly and primarily are modes of predicating and are genera only secondarily. Just because of this, Aquines can maintain that se predicate of God according to two estegories—substance and relation—but that God is not in any genus. Now. "essence," eccording to Aquinas, derives from "being" in the first sense; it indicates sesething common to all intelliribilities according to which they are divided into diverse genera and species. 2 "Essence," in other words, refers to a determinate intelligible aspect, such as can be grasped simply in the first act of the intellect; for this reason, he also refers to essence as "quiddity"-since what the thing is, is the proper object of the first ect. According to such a determinate intelligibility, for which the categorical intelligibilities are the first outlines, objects subsequently are classified in genera and species, issofar as generic and specific predications occur. Consequently. Aguinas can call the categories "genera which add to being primarily understood diverse modes founded in the very essence of the thing." since the categorical intelligibilities are the outlines of the determinate structures which "essence" signifies.

However, Aquines semetimes speaks of the relation between being and the estegories in a stricter way:

The equivocal, the analogous, and the univocal are not divided in the same way. The equivocal is divided according to the things signified; the univocal is divided according to diverse differences; but the analogous is divided according to diverse sodes. Therefore, since being is predicated analogically of the ten genera, it is divided into them according to diverse sodes. Therefore, to every genus is due a proper mode of predicating.

In Sent. I. dist. 8, qu. 4, art. 2, c. and art. 3, c. Aquinas explicitly excludes logical genera: Sun. theol., I, qu. 88, art. 2, ad 4.

Pe ente, chap. 1. Ibid.; Sun. theol., I, qu. 85, art. 5, c.

In Sent., I, dist. 22, qu. 1, art. 3, ad 2: "Ad eccundum dicendum,

In other words, the division of being by the categories occurs in predication; the categorical intelligibilities add to and determine being primarily understood when it is predicated of them; from this determination and limitation of being, it follows that each of the categorical intelligibilities becomes a proper limit of predicating. Because the categorical intelligibilities limit being, they limit predication when they are predicated generically or when anything of which they can be predicated, is predicated. As for the first point, then, Aquinas does divide being according to the ten categories, which add diverse modes, founded on the very essence of the thing. This does not occur by an analysis of simple intelligibilities, however, but by using these in a predication. What Pseudo-Thomas treats as a fact to be explained—the natures dividing the nature of being—Aquinas treats as the explanation of a fact—being divided in predication according to intelligibile aspects simply grasped in the first act of the intellect.

As to the second point: Aquinas says that the expression "ens" referring to real being, is derived from "esse," which signifies the act of being. It sight seem from this point that for Aquinas, as for Pseudo-Thomas, the division of the categories must be derived from the distinction of existential habitudes—in other words, that the categories should be modes, distinguished by the intellect, on the basis of relationships in things existing cuteide. However, Aquinas considers the intelligibility of being, which is the first intelligibility grasped in simple understanding, to be the most simple of all our conceptions; he holds that all definitions resolve to it as an absolutely first principle of definition. It follows that it is absolutely impossible to offer any definition or clarification of this intelligibility. However, since "being" is said embiguously, it is possible and necessary to indicate when it is used to signify the intelligibility first-grasped; Aquinas often does this by saying: "the being which divides into the ten categories."

quot aliter dividitur acquivocus, analogus, et univocus. Acquivocus enis dividitur secundus res alguificatas, univocus vero dividitur secundus diversas differentias; sed analogus dividitur secundus diversas sodos. Unde cus ens praedicetur analogice de deces generibas, dividitur in ca secundus diversos sedos. Unde unique generi debetur proprios sedos praedicandi."

De ver., qu. 1, art. 1, c. E. g., De ente, chap. 1.

Then Aquinas points out that "ens" in the first sense is derived from "esse," he typically is contrasting it with "res." which refers more to the escence. In such derivations, the point is that the various trunscendental intelligibilities do not add any real determination to the intelligibility of being princrily-grasped, but only some regation or relation of reason. Such additions, of course, can be made only through a second act of the intellect. since there is no direct understanding of snything not real. In the second act of the intellect, however, intelligibilities which are not conditioned by intellectual comparison and contrast are posited unconditionally. "Every absolute positing signifies something existing in the nature of things." Consequently, we take the word we use to signify the primary intelligibility from the act of being. Since, however, that intelligibility is predicated of the categorical intelligibilities and is limited thereby, as we have seen, we can add to the initial intelligibility the relation to determinate essential structures: thus, we form the transcendental notion signified by "thing." Aguinas' statements to the effect that we derive "ene" from "ease," therefore, explain etymology, not the cognitive process. Just by itself, without any addition, the first act of the intellect is ordered to the second; in the second act, we know that things exist; therefore, the simple intelligibility of being, without any addition, is a common knowledge of existent things, although these are not known to exist by simple understanding. "The second operation is in respect to a thing's act of being." Unlike Pseudo-Thomas, then, Aquinas does not allow cognitive priority of existence to being; consequently, he does not permit cognitive priority of existential habitudes to the objects understood in the first set of the intellect. For Acuines, we do not know things without knowing them in order to ground our knowledge in the things themselves; rather, we begin to know things, and proceed to know them more-first understanding intelligible espects of them, then knowing that they are.

As to the third point: Aquinas refers to negations, privations, and logical intentions as "beings of reason;" he contrasts these with real be-

De ver., qu. 1, art. 1, c.; <u>In Sent.</u>, I, dist. 8, qu. 1, art. 1, c.

De ver., qu. 1, art. 1, c.

<u>Thid.</u>, qu. 21, art. 1, c.

<u>In de Trin.</u>, qu. 5, art. 3, c.

ing. "Being" in the first sense divides into the ten categories: it always eignifies comething existing in the nature of things. "Being" in the second sense signifies the truth of a proposition. An unconditioned proposition signifies something existing in the nature of things. 2 The contrast between beings of reason and real being-Aguines often says "in rerum nature"—is twofold. First, those entities formed in the second act of the intellect. which are not simple intelligibilities of real things. such as are grasped in the first act of the intellect, are beings of reason. Second, these entities cannot be posited unconditionally, as can the things called "beings" in the first cense. The opposition, therefore, is not exclusive if one considers the relation between the second act and the first: it becomes exclusive if one considers the relation between something posited unconditionally and something whose effirmation has significamee only for the intellect itself. Pseudo-Thomas' division. by contrast. was in the first act of the intellect: it presupposed a distinction between the stability of what can be possessed by a subject and the instability of what only can be an object of thought. Pseudo-Thomas' division also rested on his supposition that the nature of being and the other natures could be known to be in things outside by intuition. For this reason. Pseudo-Thomas grants full reality and some essential actuality to essences, and considers actual existence to be an addition to essence as thing to thing and individual to common being; Aquinas does not.

As to the fourth point: Aquinas seems to accept definition of particular categories by reference to existence. The basic answer to this point can be seen from the explanation already given in respect to "ens" and "esse." Just as the primarily-grasped intelligibility of being is completely indefinable, the categorical intelligibilities properly cannot be defined; consequently, they may be indicated by existential differences discovered by the second act of the intellect, presupposing them. Aquinas, therefore, does not attempt to explain substance by anything better known to us, although he often indicates it by the difference it makes in subsequent knowledge. It is particularly interesting that Aquinas explicitly rejects the purported definition of substance—"being existing by it-

In Sent., II, dist. 24, qu. 1, art. 1, c.

Re ver., qu. 21, art. 1, c.

Supra. pp. 59-60.

self." He allows that a substance is an essence to which it is due to be not in another, providing it is clear that the determination is purely negative and that substance in no way includes existence. Aquinas procedure here is in direct opposition with Pseudo-Thomas attempt to define substance by reference to the self-determined existence of individual things, since Aquinas considers that the understanding of substance is prior to our knowledge of individual subsistence, just as he holds in general that the individual is known only by an extension of reflection to the experiential foundation of intellectual knowledge. Our ability to discern substantial individuals, therefore, rests on our understanding of substances; it cannot be made a basis for discriminating that intelligibility from others.

Stance, for Aquinas, is that they include a determination to the intelligibility of substance such that they cannot be defined nor posited through predication without reference to it, although they are grasped separately and categorized independently. According to this, Aquinas distinguishes between the existence and the intelligibility of an accident; every accident is in its subject, but the precise intelligibility of the accident does not include the subject. Semetimes, Aquinas expresses this point by saying that accidents have a double intelligibility, one as an accident, the other according to their particular genus; at other times, he distinguishes between the existence and the intelligibility, pointing out that the accident is in the subject, but has its own intelligibility. Relations, for instance, have their being in their subjects, but their intelligibility is wholly in reference to another; the apparently existential definition of relation be constines gives is a reference to its intelligi-

Cont. gent., I. chap. xxv.

Told.

In Sent., I. dist. 23. qu. 1. art. 1. c., ad 2.

In Meta., VII, lect. i; De ente, chap. vi.

In Sent., I, dist. 8, qu. 4, art. 3, c.; dist. 18, art. 2, ad 3; IV, dist. 12, qu. 1, art. 1, qu'la. 3, ad 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;u>lbid.</u>, I, dist. 8, qu. 4, art. 3, c.

Ibid., dist. 20, qu. 1, art. 1, c.

bility, which he divides against existence. So far as this point is concerned, then, there is no basis in Aquinas, other than his loose terminology, for Feeudo-Thomas' attempt to define the categories by reference to existential conditions; moreover, there is no possibility in Aquinas' doctrine for grounding intelligibilities and their distinctions in experience by intelligible reduction, since there is no intellectual intuition apart from simple understanding.

Once these points have been gresped, the passages in which Aquinas. commenting on Aristotle, apparently derives the categories and their distinction by reference to the essence, inherent ferms, and external denominations, present no great difficulty. The point of these analyses is to show that things are in various ways. It is not to reduce some of the ways in which we think of things to prior principles, but to discover the various modes in which things are, working from the different ways according to which we predicate, and presupposing the diverse categorical intelligibilities which determine these modes of predication. Consequently. when Aquinas points out that we predicate according to relation by the reference of one thing to something else, he is not reducing relations to absolute principles. but he is showing that things are by reference to other things, not merely by what they definitely are in themselves and by what inheres in them as a form. Moreover, when he points out that we predicate according to the last six categories by extrinsic denomination. he is not reducing all these modes of being to different ways of looking at or signifying the same things, but he is pointing out that things are, in part, by the way other things act on them, limit them, and are related to them. Unlike Pseudo-Thomas' universe of individuals and natures-which threatens, when forced, to collapse into absolute unity-end Ockham's universe of absolute individuals. Asuines' world is a society of things. distinet according to what they are in themselves, but also inter-dependent, and continuous with one another in their being. Pseudo-Themas uses existential relationships of individuals intuitively-known to explain simple objects understood; Ockham uses the things and the concepts intuitivelyknown to distinguish modes of signifying things; Aquinas uses the distinc-

Ibid., dist. 33, qu. 1, art. 1, ad 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>The passages are: <u>In Phys.</u>, III, lect. v; <u>In Meta.</u>, V, lect. ix.

tion of modes of predicating which arises from the primary diversity of intelligibilities simply-understood to discover various ways in which things are. It is a consequence of this that Aquinas maintains both that it is never the case in a creature that there is real identity between what belongs to diverse genera, and that motion is the same according to substance, although it is action for the agent and passion for the patient. Insofar as action and passion are diverse modes of being, the diversity is real, even though the process only is in the patient as in a subject. Consequently, every created reality belongs to a predicament; nothing which is not real is in a predicament; and the categories are completely exclusive of one another. Aquinas considers the last six or seven categories no less real and no less really distinct than substance, quantity, and quality.

In sum, Aquimus considers the categories to be modes of predicating deriving from the primary diversity of simple intelligible aspects grasped in the first act of the intellect. For Aquimas, these modes of predication are prior to the distinction of predicability, which derives from the actual relation of a predicate to a subject in the second act of the intellect. The categories are neither common natures, nor are they different modes of signifying. They cannot be reduced to principles prior in our knowledge for their diversity, and they can be used as principles for their common understanding. However, they can be used as principles for the discovery of diverse modes of being and they function in shaping our intelligently-ordered experience of the world, making distinctions in it, not being distinguished by it.

## Cenelusion

I have examined three distinct doctrines concerning the categories their nature and function in the three opposed logical theories.

For Pseudo-Thomas, the categories are genera—that is, classifications of the objects understood in the first act of the intellect. These

In Sent., I, dist. 53, qu. 1, art. 3, ad 4.

In Note., XI, lect. ix.

In Sent., II. dist. 3, qu. 1, art. 5, c.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>De pot., qu. 7, art. 9, c. <sup>5</sup>In Post. anal., I, lect. xxvi-xxvii.

genera are divided from each other according to differences which things themselves make to the constitution of objects understood, by their provision of natures which ground various habitudes in existing things. Because natures are merged in things, their discrimination in the intellect requires a complex analysis in which several degrees of removal from the individuals existing by themselves are distinguished. The most significant discrimination is between substantial natures. which are directly existent under spatial-temporal limits in individuals, and accidental natures, which only exist with and by means of substantial natures; the next important discrimination is between absolute natures, which are grounded in absolute individuals, and the relative natures, which are grounded in the absolute natures and references enong individuals. Pseudo-Thomas' treatment of the categories presupposes a treatment of the predicables. The treatise on the predicables explains how objects suitable for classification originate by the forming and applying to raw natures of the secend-intentional determinations. The surpose of this part of logic is to explain the origin of objects understood by reducing them to the conditions of existent things and intellectual acts from which they were constituted. Such a reduction is essential to Pseudo-Thomas' logic, since without it the object of complex knowledge could not be transformed into a possession of the intellect by being made continuous with the intellect's original possessions.

For Ockham, "category" itself is a second-intentional sign of certain simples of first intention, or groups of first and second intentions whose signates those simples signify more generally. These simples of first intention are divided from each other because they signify things in different ways. Because the different ways of signifying things do not correspond to different natures or different individual things, an analysis of these ways of signifying is necessary to discriminate them from each other for the constructive logician, who regulates the use of the simples in the formation of complexes. The most basic distinction is hetween absolute signs of individual things, which fall in the category of substance, and connotative signs of these seme things, which fall in the other categories. However, Ockham also distinguishes a certain group of abstract qualitative terms which are absolute signs of qualities distinct from and inherent in individual substances; concrete qualitative terms are

connotative signs of the substances themselves. Substances and the really distinct qualities, signified by absolute terms of one kind or the other, thus are real and really distinct from each other; other distinctions among the categories are reduced to different modes of signifying. This treatment of the categories presupposes an examination of the differences, grounded in modes of signifying, between the groups of intentions signified by such second intentions as "individual," "universal," "genus," "species," and so on. The purpose of this treatment is not to explain the origin of the simple signs, but merely to clarify the meaning of the second intentions and the distinctions among the first intentions; however, in making the required clarifications, a reduction to a few basic metaphysical and cognitive distinctions, known by intuition, occurs. The treatment, which involves this reduction, is essential for Ockham's logic, since without it the legician would not have a suitable knowledge of his materials and tools.

For Aquinas, the logical treatment of the categories does not involve a reduction to prior principles, since the estegorical intelligibilities are simple, directly rederstood, diversified of themselves, and principles of diverse modes of predicating. Predicable relationships are not presupposed by the categories, nor is an intuition of individual things presupposed by the distinction of the categories. The logical function of treating the categories is to observe how predications are diversified by the primary diversity of simple intelligibilities; in such a treatment, means are indicated for discerning cases in which predication is occuring according to the various modes. The primary intelligibility of being is divided by the categories, since it is measured by them in being predicated of them and according to them. Thile Aguires, while Ockhan, considers the intelligibility of being first-grasped to be a condition of the definite understanding of things and a principle for disoriminating what can be posited unconditionally from what cannot be posited except for knowledge, he does not treat being as a common nature participated in and divided by other natures and individuals, nor does he divide reality from intentional being according to a difference within simple understanding. For Aquinas, none of the categories is less truly real or less truly distinct them another, although the modes of being, discovered by the examination of instances of predication according to the different categories, have a certain order and graduation. In predication and definition, substance is first; it functions both as a limit of definition and as a means for discriminating definite objects in experience. Aquines' position seems to me to avoid dangers of unlimited reduction, which I think are inherent in Pseudo-Thomas' work, and dangers of unlimited disorganization, which I think are inherent in Cokhan's work. I do not find a comparable difficulty in Aquinas' position, although I have not examined these points with sufficient care to justify definite conclusions.

However, I think this exemination of the three destrines on the categories is sufficient to show that the opposition concerning the nature and purpose of logic makes significant differences in the actual destrines on the categories. To suppose that these three logical treatments of the categories do not significantly differ-acrely because they all refer to substance, quantity, relation, quality, and so on-seems to me to suppose that all three positions are merely verbal. The three positions do differ in their notions of what the categories are, in their treatment of the presuppositions and consequences of the logic of the categories, in what is relevant to an edequate logic of the categories, in the function of the treatment in the legic, in their division of the categories, and in their relation of them to individuals and to being. Of course, it might be argued that this entire disagreement has nothing to do with logic—that it is a metaphysical and psychological debate with no bearing on the real issues of logic. To such an objection, I can respond only by pointing out that the disagreements have considerable significance for logic as these instances define "logic;" moreover, the disagreements have been shown to be implicated in the basic opposition between these three positions. To make good the point that disagreements concerning the categories are irrelevant to logic, some other definition of "logic" must be given; however. any treatment of different logics should examine the oppositions between the various positions, not merely assume that one of them defines "logic" and that the others can be measured by its standards.

It seems to me that there are certain respects, which would be significant for bases of opposition other than the one I am considering, in which the three doctrines on the categories agree. All three are more

concerned with knowledge than with language. reality, or operation. All three are efforts to determine a significant primary for the first act of the intellect-in other words, to establish some ground for diversity and definite significance prior to the complex which can be true or false. Although their notions of substance differ greatly, all three try to assign it a function as a limit of understanding and a ground of discursive thought. Pseudo-Thomas and Ockhem are directly concerned with the reference of objects understood or first intentions to existing individuals: Aguinas also is concerned with the reference of categories to existence, although the relationship between logical distinctions and setaphysical assertions is reversed in his case-modes of being are prior to the categories, certainly, but our knowledge does not follow the same order. The remarks I made in the conclusion of the last chapter concerning the differences between the three positions in metaphysics and theory of knowledge also are applicable here; moreover, the different views of reflexivity involved in the three positions explain why the procedures used in treating the categories must be different.

Concerning the relevance of my conclusions to John of St. Themas' logic, little needs be said. If I am understanding Aquinas, it is clear that John of St. Thomas does not; however, since I am not engaged in a primarily historical study, I shall not assert a definite conclusion in this matter.

John holds that the study of the categories is necessary to find the necessary and essential matter—that is, significant terms—for ecientific discourse. He considers the categories to be classes, ordering these significant terms. He treats the properties of the categories as real properties, and he is forced to distinguish the logical treatment from the particular sciences by logic's superior generality. Finally, he thinks the examination of the predicables, which he understands as essential and accidental modes of predicating, to be presupposed by the consideration of the categories themselves.

John interprets passages in which Aquinas refers to universality in the first act of the intellect in accordance with Facudo-Thomas' doctrine

<sup>1</sup> Icamis a Sancto Thoma, op. cit., I, 250 15-251 52.

of abstraction. 1 He thinks there is formal universality in the first act of the intellect by a comparison carried out in that act. For this point, he cites certain authentic works of Aquinas, but he depends principally upon the commentary on On Interpretation, interpreted in accord with Pacude-Thomas. 2 As a definition of substance, John gives: "being existing through itself." He explains that this is not a strict definition, since substance is a supreme genus, but he claims it to be a positive intelligibility nevertheless. Be interprets "existing" in the definition of substance as a reference to the being of actual existence, quoting Pseudo-Thomas. 4 John explains Aquinas' authentic texts concerning the distinction of relations from their foundations in relate in expensent with Pseudo-Thomas, who denies their distinction. Seany more points of this kind could be indicated; however, I think these are sufficient to show that if I am not mistaken in my historical analysis. John of St. Thomas is not proceeding "iuxta mentem Divi Thomae," as he claims to be. What the value of his logic then might be, is another question, to which my ar-Ament is not directly relevant.

Something may be said here also about the relevance of my investigation to at least one form of the debate concerning the relationship between conventional logic and modern logic.

Father Clark writes a revealing sketch of how he thinks the history of logic should appear. It has two parts: ancient and medieval Aristote-lianism, on the one hand, and modern mathematical systems as a whole, on the other. He thinks that logic began with a study of language, proceeded

Ibid., 544<sup>6</sup>29-<sup>5</sup>28. He refers to authentic works, which I interpret to indicate only negative universality, but he quotes <u>De Universalibus</u> (which is certainly spurious) and <u>S. t. l.</u>, tr. I, chap. I. to establish his position.

Thid., 350° 30-626. The reference to S. t. 1. is explicit and immediately follows a quotation from Aquines' In Revi herm., I, lect. x.

Thid., 523 31-524 20. He refers to S. t. 1., tr. II, chap. ii for the definition, interpreting an authentic passage in agreement with it; he treats Aquinas' rejection of the definition (Cont. gent., I. chap. xxv.) as no denial that perseits is constitutive guiddlistic substantiae.

<sup>4</sup>Thie 526 26-11.

Thid., 594°27-19. It is here that John makes his remarkable statement in defense of the authenticity of S. t. l.; of. supra. p. 12.

temology, metaphysics, and psychology. Such a logic involved the philosophic sciences and was involved in them; it revolved upon itself and failed to be pure or formal. A change began when traditional epistomology yielded to empiricism, metaphysics was dissolved by phenomenology, and rational psychology was abandoned because experimental techniques could not find a psyche. A new logic was necessary, and it developed by successively de-emphasising psychology, knowledge, and content until a pure, formal and uncommitted logic was achieved.

The body of Father Glark's book consists in a very selective history of logic, beginning with Archytes, Plato, and Aristotle, and proceeding through Boethius, Cassicdorus, Capella, Peter of Spain, Albert the Great, Aquinas, and Ockbam. Father Clark's technique consists in showing that these authors made statements which, when suitably selected and interpreted, can be fit into the modern calculi. His conclusion, which he says is inescapable, is that one cannot be an exponent of scholastic logic and a repudiator of the propositional calculus at the same time, and that anyone who says he is "does not know statements, does not know the logical priority of statement calculus to the theory of the syllogism, and above all does not know scholastic logic." His general conclusion about logic seems to be that there really is no difference between traditional and modern logic excepts 1) in what does not pertain to logic, and 2) in the such greater completeness, technical perfection, and overall satisfactoriness of the modern brand.

It seems to me that Pather Clark in his outline of the history of logic, conceives all traditional logic to be of my first type. At the same time, he himself seems to consider logic really to be syntax. While there is too little evidence in his work to be certain, I suspect his own position is of my second type—logic is an art. So far as I can find, Pather Clark does not mention the categories in his entire book, although the three logicians I am examining treat them as an essential part of logic. Rather, he treats as logically relevant only those parts of tradi-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Clark, op. cit., pp. 87-99.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 1-2, 60, 85 (comment on and quotation from Miller).

tional logics which can be formulated as theorems in the modern calculus. In selecting this approach, he reveals his own assumption that logic is mainly concerned with validity, rather than with truth, and that the first elements with which logic deals are propositional forms, rather than categories.

Now, such a difference from what the three positions I am examining have in common is sure to lead to a definition of "logie" quite distinct from any of theirs. I am not concerned with this difference in definition; what I am concerned with is that Father Clark does not seem to realize that any conception of logic is possible other than the one he accepts. Consequently, he ignores the relevance of most of medieval logic; be ignores the possibility that the characterization he gives of traditional logic as such is not appropriate to every traditional logic. but might apply to come modern logic; and he reaches a conclusion not borne out by the material he considers. For the last point, consider that Father Clark concludes that the statement calculus is prior to the theory of the syllogism, but does not mention that the syllogism is treated by Ockham, whom Pather Clark praises more highly than the other medievals. in a part of his logic before that in which are found the formulae Pather Clark does mention. Since Ockhan was not performing a regressive analysis of validity, it seems strange that he did not know enough about what was prior in his own logic to treat it first. More important, however, is the fact that Father Clark has begged the main question in his analysis of the relations between traditional and modern logic-namely, whether all traditional logic that does not translate into theorems of the calculus can be disregarded as logically irrelevant. Whether it can or not depends upon how one defines "logio;" however, if it is the case that traditional logicians such as those I am examining would not agree with Father Clark's committeent on this point, his conclusion that it is time for the sponsors of conventional logic to effect a transition to modern logic<sup>2</sup> is not supported by his argument. What Father Clark perhaps has shown is that it would be useful for contemporary logicians. whose logical

The texts cited are from <u>Sum. log.</u>, III-III; the cyllogism is treated in III-I.

<sup>&</sup>quot;Clark, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 60.

theories coincide with those of the ancient and medieval logicians he mentions, to learn the techniques of the various modern calculi. It seems to me that Pseudo-Thomas, Cokham, and Aquinas all could have put these techniques to use, although the parts of logic in which they would be used would be only "e smell and relatively insignificant portion of the whole of logic."

Professor Veatch, by contrast, recognizes some of the dangers involved in making categorical assertions about logic. He does not claim to present Aristotelian logic; he knows that there is multiplicity in the tradition and he wishes only to set forth a logic suitable to the requirements of philosophical realism. In his preface, there is one book which he mentions, a book on which he relied heavily—John of St. Thomas' Are Logica. He seems to take the position that metaphysics is prior to logic, and that logical entities must be known by a metaphysical reduction. His position is that intentional logic is the real logic; mathematical logic is perhaps mathematics, but it is not really logic. An intentional logic is one which considers intentions, rather than real things; intentions are formal signs—that is, things whose whole being is in being significant of something other than themselves.

Professor Veatch's objection to mathematical logic being called "logic" is that it is non-intentional—that is, it deals with real entities or relations, not with formal signs. He builds his argument by examining Hussell's realistic treatment of propositional forms. He realizes that there are mathematical logics which are constructive; however, he argues that these too deal with real—as against intentional—relations, even though those relations are only possible, not actual. Professor Veatch does not mention Dewey's logic, or any similar system, doubtless because he takes mathematical logic as such to be his opponent. He does indicate that he considers the less of the categories, including substance, in mathematical logic, to be very objectionable.

lvestoh, op. cit., pp. viii-ir.

<sup>21010.</sup> F. 5: "and yet if a logic is to be an instrument of knowledge, the only way its adequacy as an instrument could be appraised would be in terms of the real which was known through such an instrument."

Thid., pp. 393-395. (Ibid., pp. 20-20. (Ibid., chap. iii.

on the basis of these few points, I do not presume to render judgment on Professor Vestch's argument. It does seem to me that he has perhaps not developed the type of logic he wanted, because he has made the logical entities into terms of knowledge in themselves and has put himself in the position of requiring a metaphysical reduction. The question is:
"Is Professor Vestch's logic intentional?" Well, it may be, but "intention" is highly embiguous, and it may turn out to be non-intentional in very much the same way that Russell's logic is non-intentional—but with respect to concepts, rather than propositions. I wonder, in other words, whether Professor Vestch has given sufficient attention to the different positions possible concerning the relation of a logic to its subject matter and has firmly established himself in the one he wants.

Another question concerning Professor Vestch's work is whether he is not mixing two distinct sets of opponents, with ill effect for his own argument. On the one hand, all of the medievals I am studying agree on the priority of the categories to the proposition and on the necessity of substance as a limit. On the other, none of the moderns to whom I have referred seems concerned with simples prior to the simplest propositions, or at least, none of them is concerned with using anything like substance as a limit of significance. I suspect that some broad differences between traditional logic and modern logic might be clarified by investigating the relation of both to substance, and by trying to detoraine the significance of the apparent shift in emphasis from truth to validity and from the primacy of terms to the primacy of propositions. By own investigation does not concern this question; however, it would be relevant to such an investigation to avoid confusing two distinct sets of oppositions. I suspect that Professor Vestch has fallen into such a confusion; however, I admire his work and respect his breadth of vision and modesty.