MORAL OBJECTIVITY AND THE COLD WAR

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Any discussion of the opposition between communized and non-Communist nations presupposes certain categories; the categories most often employed are suggested by the expression “cold war.” In this paper I shall discuss the opposition and examine the notion of cold war and some alternatives to it.

I think we are in an impasse because of a failure of practical wisdom. Moreover, I think our confusion concerning an appropriate category for the situation indicates a lack of solidity in ethical theory which has contributed to our failure of practical wisdom. Many topics in ethical theory ought to be examined; however, our difficulties in categorizing the situation seem to me to arise especially from misunderstandings of moral objectivity. Because of these mistakes moral objectivity is claimed for what is not moral and a non-moral mode of objectivity is expected of what is moral.

Although there are reasons for both choices and moral principles whose meaning and truth do not depend on contingent states of affairs, my thesis concerning moral objectivity is that moral goods do not exist except through our choices and that moral goods receive their structure only in our formulation of contingent states of affairs for decision. I shall defend this thesis first; then I shall examine the notion of cold war and its alternatives.

“Objective” has many meanings. When we use the word in ethics, epistemological meanings are apt to confound us. “Objective” often indicates that cognitive content is distinct from cognitional processes and modes. Cognitional processes are psychological; they are conditioned historically. Cognitional modes are the structures studied by poetic, rhetoric, dialectic, and logic. To call something “objective” indicates that we are aware of our cognitional processes and modes, that we are taking them into account, and that we are distinguishing between them and the cognitive content. Under these conditions we call the cognitional processes and modes “subjective”; we call the cognitive content “objective.” Subjectivity and objectivity are correlative; correlatives are and are known together. Aside from knowledge, nothing is objective; things simply exist. Existence itself is not a cognitive content; existence is that to which cognition is relative.

To call cognitive content “objective” is equivalent to positing it unconditionally. To posit cognitive content unconditionally is to assert a categorical proposition, but that is not to claim unlimited knowledge. Assertions differ depending on how cognitive content is derived. Positing content derived from experience signifies empirical objectivity. Positing content derived from schematic imagination signifies mathematical objectivity. Positing content derived from intellectual reflection signifies metaphysical objectivity.

Additional analyses of these meanings of “objective” are necessary for epistemology. For my present purpose, however, it is sufficient to note that “ob-
jective” in these senses implies something structured independently of knowledge and existing independently of choice.

“Objective” has other meanings, related to technical and esthetic considerations, which may confuse us in ethics. A defined goal, attainable by limited means, is an objective; the means employed are subject—that is, relative—to it. The necessary and sufficient conditions for the attainment of a certain goal are objective; plans for attainment or illusions about attainability are subjective. Something considered apart from use is objective; the use of anything is subjective. There are many other similar pairs.

The many meanings of “objective” in technical and esthetic considerations seem to have no single principle. Nevertheless we call a defined goal “an objective”; since an objective is the principle of all art, technique, appreciation, and use, we may accept this meaning of “objective” as primary. In any case it is sufficient here to observe that “objective” in the meanings presupposes a defined goal attainable by limited means.

Two conditions of moral values are indicated by calling them “objective.” First, moral values are independent of mere inclination; they are obligatory. Second, moral values are good for a man in so far as he is a man. That obligation is a condition of moral values implies that they are attainable by choice. That moral values are a man’s proper good implies that they are not defined by any restricted aspect of a man’s life.

If moral values are attainable by choice, then they do not exist except through choice, for choice is causal. What I choose never is merely given. I did not choose a wife; I chose to marry a woman. What is chosen, in other words, always is a course of action. Moreover, the course of action chosen never is a merely physical action. What is chosen, concretely, is a completely interpreted course of action—that is, it is a course of action to be performed for a purpose. Choice, in short, is of a means in one’s power. It follows that what is attained by choice exists through choice; nothing can be chosen unless its existence absolutely or in some respect can be caused by action subject to choice. In the case of a wife, for example, it is the existence of a marriage—or a maiden’s disillusion—which the choice causes. Beyond that, if one chooses a wife, then the fulfilment of his capacity for fatherhood and marital companionship, his prestige, security, pleasure—one or several such purposes are achieved by his choice.

An organism integrates chemical processes; a psyche, like man’s, integrates organic functions. The organism and the psyche make intelligible order of what otherwise would be merely random. Statistical laws of physical and organic nature admit abnormal variations from statistical norms; this indeterminacy is resolved by a higher integration. In a similar way a human personality integrates psychic factors. Only deliberation and choice organize all the factors in a human psyche; consequently, the personality is determined precisely by the process of making up the mind which is the unity of these two acts. This integration does not occur except through conclusions of deliberation. It is a curious fact, however, that deliberation cannot be terminated except by choice, and that choice cannot be made unless deliberation terminates. This fact is what we call “freedom.” Motives are operative only through deliberation; deliberation is limited only by choice. Therefore, choice is free. If the notion
is paradoxical, consider this analogy. If I walk for my health, then I walk because of my health and I am healthy because of my walking.

In freely determining his own personality a man acts as a psycho-physical unit. In neither aspect, however, is a man complete by himself; in both he is involved with his physical and social environments. A man's free acts, therefore, are both influenced by his environment and influence it. As for the conditioning environment, the degree of integration of the personality as well as the materials to be integrated may be limited by it. This limitation grounds the phenomena which have been called "cultural relativity." It is the other aspect, however, which interests me here. Free actions establish virtuous or vicious patterns of character. They also establish all types of conventions, the relations which constitute institutions, and alterations in things which, thereupon, are called "works of art" or "products."

Primarily, the personality himself is of moral value. Habits of virtuous and vicious action, because they release or restrict freedom, are of secondary moral value. Conventions, institutions, and products are of tertiary moral value. Still, none of these is inconsiderable, for all of them flow from a man's effort to make himself fully human and all of them react on that effort. One point, however, must be noticed. In relation to any one choice, only what is included in that choice—explicitly or implicitly, as material transformed or as the transformation itself—is of moral value. My whole value rides on each of my acts; I am as good or as bad as the choice I now make, for that choice is my personality. The past is gone; the future is not yet; now alone is.

Moral value, then, exists only through choice; moral value relevant to any single choice exists only through that choice. It follows that moral value is not to be called "objective" in any of the epistemological senses. The moral object is not prepared and waiting, a fruit to be plucked. The morally valuable never presents itself and demands, "Choose me!" Therefore, I reject moral transcendentalism which supposes that moral value is goodness itself, pure freedom, the absolute ego, or some other metaphysical object. I reject moral intuitionism which supposes that moral value is a feeling of approval, a customary way of acting, a given quality of action, or some other empirical object—these views seem to me to lack cognitive meaning. All such theories claim an objectivity for moral value which would exclude it; none of them considers freedom morally constitutive.

If it is agreed that moral values do not exist except through choice, still it will be argued that choice is not irrational. The structure of moral values must be objective; if values are not realized without choice, still they are articulated by a purely rational process. The implication is that moral values are an objective—that is, that they are a defined goal attainable by limited means. One having such a theory of moral objectivity considers ethics an art of solving human problems, an art of living, an art of making human value. Just as a builder's action is conditionally necessary—that is, it is determined by the plan of the house—so man's action is rationally necessitated by his objective. And just as the builder accepts his plan from an architect, the false analogy concludes that man must accept his plan
from the experts, from nature, or from God. If this argument were correct, only the execution of moral value would be in man's power; the design would be another's, and the function of deliberation would be merely to discover what is necessary if man is to be a good thing.

However, this analogy of ethics to art is false. Products do have important relationships to moral values and can be called "morally valuable" in a secondary sense; however, moral value primarily is in a personality himself. And a personality cannot be a product, for he is indefinable and he is not attainable by limited means. To prove this proposition, I distinguish between a man's needs and his capacities and draw a conclusion from this distinction.

In common with other living beings a man has needs which he must satisfy and capacities which he may fulfil. However, a man differs from other organisms, not only in having different needs and capacities on the whole, but also in the ways he satisfies his needs and fulfils his capacities. Let us try to clarify this distinction.

Ordinary language shows a certain wisdom in taking "I could use some money," to mean "I need some money." The satisfaction of a need is the actual use of its object. Now use involves working on something extrinsic, a process which may be as simple as running a glass of water or as complex as building a guided missile. At a certain point of complication we talk about "technique." If the use of the object consists solely in appreciating it, we talk about "fine art." Fulfilling capacities, on the other hand, is the effect of a man's acts on himself.

The point of the distinction is not that a human operation cannot both work on extrinsic materials to satisfy a need and act to fulfil a capacity. The distinction is, rather, like that between a wife and a homemaker. The same woman may be fully both, but we hope that both her husband and the iceman will understand the distinction and take proper account of it.

Every operation freely performed fulfils some capacity, but there also may be another side to the operation. On one side it is a work; on the other it is an act. It is a good or bad work according to whether we accomplish our objective in the matter on which we are working. It is a good or bad act according to whether we are more complete persons for doing it. In both aspects our actions differ from those of all other living beings. Any other organism satisfies its needs with objects which require, at most, simple processing; to the extent that processing is needed, the work is done in an instinctive manner. Man satisfies few of his needs with things at hand. The needs themselves are fairly constant, but the processing is done in a variety of ways which always seem capable of improvement.

But compare a man as he realizes his capacities with a man in his need-filling role. Any other living being realizes itself to its limit in the satisfaction of its needs and in reproduction. But not so a man! Capacities differ from one person to another, and they surpass any assignable limit. A man is not complete when his needs have been satisfied and he has reproduced. No; he seeks to the ends of the universe and he builds his own universe of imagination. Play he hides under serious titles, ashamed to admit that much of what he does is useless. And a man dares hope he will live forever and perhaps see God.

In satisfying his needs man is presented with a definite problem. In realizing himself it is up to each person to
state for himself what the question is to be. In satisfying needs intelligence is used to discern the objective, to plan action which can attain it, and to direct execution. In realizing his capacities each person adjusts, judges, and chooses possible activities in view of his own personality. Technical problems can be tackled one by one. In each, man tries to find a minimum means. To solve such problems action must be taken; but what is to be done can be calculated, given sufficient information. But in self-realization each person must consider at once himself as a whole. There is no adequate means, much less a minimum one, for each person in his situation is unique, and man is open to an infinite fulfilment. Efficiency has no place here. To be a person, a choice must be made, an action must be taken; yet what is to be done never can be calculated.

That every man ought to realize his capacities as fully as possible, that he ought to integrate himself, that he ought to keep himself open to an infinite fulfilment—this is the axiom of moral reasoning. Yet this axiom does not define an objective; it merely states a condition which any man’s personality should meet. Deliberation cannot be an applied science; research and development in human engineering, confused with deliberation, only do away with morality. On the other hand, I by no means accept irrationalism in ethics as do those who advocate situationalism. The general conditions necessary for the integration of any man’s personality, for the fulfilment of his various capacities, and for the maintenance of his open personality can be stated as absolute moral principles—that is, as natural law. Yet natural law only spells out the axiom of moral reasoning; its dictates are universal. Although necessary for rational morality, the principles of natural law are not sufficient. Practical wisdom, the wit to invent an integration of personality, which is not given, for the concrete materials of personality, which are not yet fully human—practical wisdom alone knows what ought to be done. The decree of practical wisdom is eminently reasonable, but it is not a deduction from prior knowledge for it depends on a unique insight.

Moral value, therefore, has structure only by deliberation; what is to be each man’s moral value is as unique as his personality and as indefinable as his openness to God. It follows that moral value is not to be called “objective” in any of the technical or esthetic meanings. Not only does the existence of moral value depend on a man’s choice, but also the structure of moral value depends on his practical wisdom; each man not only makes his own personality, he determines what that personality is to be inasmuch as he shares the providence of God as well as his power. Therefore, I reject all rationalism. I reject the rationalism of naturalistic ethics which supposes that personality is hopelessly finite. I reject the rationalism of that pragmatistic ethics which supposes that personality is an indefinite series of solutions to an indefinite series of technical problems. I reject the rationalism of that scholastic ethics which supposes that the structure of personality can be deduced from universal principles with metaphysical necessity and that the judgment of practical wisdom can be replaced by casuistry. I reject individualistic ethics which supposes that moral value can be produced automatically by the interplay of individual calculations. I reject socialistic ethics which supposes that moral value is determined adequately by social technology. In resolv-
ing the problem of his own personality each man must consider society, for a man cannot be a person outside his society; the manner in which society will be considered by each man will depend upon his precise social relations. In any case a man cannot keep his personality open unless he cares more for a common good than for himself. The common goods sought by men in societies, on the other hand, can be chosen only by single men and can be realized only in unique personalities.

Having distinguished moral objectivity from the objects contemplated by theories and the objectives sought by arts and techniques, I proceed now to examine the notion of cold war and its alternatives. This examination also will clarify my thesis concerning objectivity itself. I might have considered alternative positions, exposed their difficulties, and argued to my conclusion by showing how it preserves the genuine insights of other positions while escaping their limitations. I have not followed that method; I think that ethics is a practical knowledge. Practical knowledge, incomplete unless it aims at moral value, must concern real situations. It can be illustrated neither by experiments nor by purely hypothetical cases. The first procedure would presuppose that moral value exists without choice; the second, that it has its structure without deliberation. The danger in such suppositions will become clear, I believe, as we examine the opposition which we call "the cold war."

For eleven years it has been obvious that there exists an opposition between the Soviet Union and other communized nations, on the one hand, and the United States and some other non-Communist nations, on the other. Prior to the second world war the Soviet Union was viewed chiefly as a potential competitor or customer for commerce. Occasionally, communism was considered a possibly dangerous movement, a phase in the industrial development of a backward area, or a great socialist experiment. During the Hitler-Stalin pact a small but vocal group of Americans of Eastern European origin considered the Soviet Union an enemy. After Germany attacked the Soviet Union itself, however, for most Americans that valiant nation became our noble ally for the duration and six months.

For many Americans the desire to return to normality after the war delayed a recategorization of the relationship until it was forced upon them by the actions of the Soviet Union. Finally, in 1947, the policy of containment was formulated. According to this policy non-Communist nations were to be helped to resist communist revolution and each Soviet use of power was to be countered by opposing power. If Soviet power were contained, it was thought that communism would languish and that the Soviet Union would be transformed into an agreeable and well-behaved nation. An iron curtain, title to which since has become beclouded, was erected. Since the situation required the opposition of power by power, it was called "war"; but, since we did not wish to wage war against the Soviet Union, it was called "cold war."

As the cold war has worn on early hope that the Soviet Union would suffer a magical metamorphosis has faded. Yet the logic of our judgment that we are in a war has continued to dominate our thinking. The notion of war has many implications; a few of them are these. It implies that issues are at the last resort, that negotiation is impossible, and that argument is useless. It implies that
neutrality is possible but that neutrals will be distrusted and, eventually, alienated. It implies that we must be extremely wary of sabotage and treason. It implies that we must forego certain democratic processes until victory and that we must have implicit faith in our generals and give them unquestioning loyalty. It implies that the actual state of affairs must be kept secret and that information may be altered and is to be released or withheld for its psychological effect. It implies the primacy of physical action most perfectly typified by the use of military force. It implies that the conflict must be resolved either in our favor by dint of our power or in favor of the communized nations by dint of their power and that an equilibrium of power is an undesirable stalemate. Finally, since we have categorized the total opposition as a war, we view survival as the stake, and we cannot conceive of a limited war.

It is tempting to consider this opposition in terms of power; this point of view admits an objective, empirico-physical analysis. The objectivity ascribed to an unpleasant situation by such analysis is comforting, because it permits an observer to detach himself and to consider the situation as a specimen. Practical wisdom is a burden; science is clearer, simpler, and pleasanter. Although understandable, this desire for theoretic objectivity paralyzes deliberation, for it abstracts from the moral aspects of political conditions but claims perfect adequacy. The idea that there might be something more to the opposition is likely to be ill-received, since it suggests that the scientific treatment may not be absolute knowledge.

However, no one actually takes a purely scientific view of the conflict as a whole. Such a view would be totally contemplative, totally quietist. It would suppose that everything in the situation is predetermined and that one only need await developments to test whatever hypotheses have been formed. In practice, therefore, the theoretic reduction of a moral opposition becomes subtler than it has any logical right to be. It is admitted that, because the situation is indefinitely complex, a perfect theory is impossible, not only for our present knowledge but even for any future knowledge. It is admitted that there are several forms of power and that force and power are not the same—that, in fact, force is perhaps not even the first analogue of power. It is claimed that although the situation is determined so that we cannot alter it in the short run, still in the long run our choices must make some difference.

Because we lack a moral interpretation of the opposition, however, the notion has become common that what is needed is a break-through—some invention which will solve the problem.

Some have thought that acquainting other people with our high standard of living would solve the problem. The suggestion was made that Sears, Roebuck and Company distribute its catalogue abroad. With more sophistication, some have thought that giving technical assistance to other nations to help them raise their standards of living would be a solution. Foreign aid, the dissemination of information, an increase of cultural exchanges—these and other suggestions have been offered for solving the problem. Each of them is supposed to be a means, or a part of the total means, for solving it.

As in the past, many think that the acceptance of American institutions by other nations would eliminate international oppositions. On this notion it is
hoped that something will cause the Soviet Union to become democratic. Often it is supposed that the desires of the Russian people can limit the actions of the Soviet government. These notions involve what I call "the democratic fallacy." Our own institutions are of unique value to us only because they have arisen through wise choices, which preserved the achievements of earlier times and realized the possibilities of new situations. However, the traditions and problems of other nations are not identical with ours. To think of institutions as an item for export is to consider them from a purely technical viewpoint. The same view is involved in the supposition that the institutions of other nations cannot function in essentially the same way as do ours. On this view alien institutions are degenerate cases—or better, poorly crafted examples—of our one basic design. From a sounder viewpoint it appears not only that it is unnecessary for other nations to follow our pattern but even that they ought not to do so, and that they would attempt it only at the risk of all the value they can achieve. Our institutions are unique; they are not natural law and they should not be considered a universal objective. They should not be imagined as an objective, absolute and unchangeable, even for ourselves.

The fact is that international oppositions are not problems at all. The opposition between nations is not a problematic situation to be examined, experimented upon, and resolved. There is no set of actions which will resolve the state of affairs. Nor, on the other hand, need we act in view of an ideal situation—for example, the fictional normal. Morally there is no normal situation and there is no final resolution, for moral consideration is in view of a personality himself. Moral life is always in crisis; we ought to become accustomed to considering in this light the international dimensions of our lives. There can be no efficient handling of such difficulties, because there is no adequate means.

It has been suggested lately that the appropriate categorization for the opposition between communized and non-Communist nations is competition. This topic is attractive to us; for competition suggests athletics and business and we consider ourselves well-qualified in both. Moreover, Soviet leaders have expressed a desire to consider the situation in this way; supposedly, to accept this view would lessen the danger of war.

Examined more closely, however, competition will appear a defective categorization of the opposition. Competition has certain implications the chief of which is that the competitors' achievements must be in relation to a single, definite objective. There can be competition in business, since there are sales for which to compete; there can be competition in sports, since there are goal lines to be crossed. If we accept competition as the appropriate category, then some definite attainment is required of us. If this attainment is not merely superiority in power—which immediately would reduce competition to cold war—then it must be superiority in technology and production itself. Yet why should we accept such an attainment as the criterion for judging our position? The side which achieves sufficient technical superiority probably will become power-dominant; we never should forget the likelihood that this is the case. Nevertheless, technical attainments are not equivalent to moral achievements. Human life is more
than the satisfying of needs although the satisfying of elemental needs is a condition of moral life. Communists can accept the equivalence of technical superiority with moral value because communism supposes that man has an objective. We do not accept this supposition; consequently, we ought not accept a categorization of the situation suitable only to our opponents.

Competition also has presuppositions. For competition to occur, not only must there be something definite for which to compete, there also must be rules to determine how competition will be conducted and which actions will be allowed as fair play. Competition, in other words, presupposes law. Obviously it is impossible to play a game in which anyone can change the rules whenever he wishes. This difficulty leads us to consider the place of absolute principles in international relations.

I suppose it will be granted immediately that there are no principles we may expect communized nations to follow which we ourselves can accept as a framework for competition. There may be reasonable expectations concerning the behavior of unregulated opponents, but these expectations are not to be called "rules" in the present sense; they are mere theoretic hypotheses. As such, they fall under the consideration of opposition as war rather than as competition.

It is often argued, however, that although communized nations will not play fair, still we have our own absolute principles and we must act according to them. To renounce our principles, it is said, would be to yield everything for which we are fighting.

Now if the principles in question can determine with rational necessity what is to be done, then they are technical rather than moral principles. We may, for example, hold as a principle that the living standards of all nations should be equalized. We may think that we must never recognize governments whose actions we disapprove. We may hold that we must provide essential leadership for non-Communist nations. We may think that communism should be obliterated and that we should never surrender to military force, or even inquire what surrender means. We may think that international oppositions always should be resolved by negotiation, by international law, or by a world organization. The last notion also is an instance of the democratic fallacy. There are many such notions in the minds of most Americans. Although ill-defined and seldom expressed, fundamental principles always are mentioned. Some of these are very general, some are more specific. Collectively they are what is indicated by the vague phrase, "the firm principles of our foreign policy."

If mistaken as absolute and as moral, principles of this sort only impede practical wisdom. They so greatly limit understanding of developments that some aspects of the opposition cannot be examined at all. They tend to oversimplify issues, for they encourage a technical neatness in thinking which cannot consider anything as having more than one characteristic. Worst of all, they promote death-like rigidity of judgment. Moreover, just as engineers claim flexibility in their thinking since they use technology to solve many different problems, so policy-makers incumbered with such principles always claim flexibility without ever realizing what flexibility in deliberation is.

Of course, no one can act in such a strait jacket for long; the absolute
principles become more and more matters for lip service as one after another is compromised in fact until no rational view of the situation is possible at all. The dilemma is like that of an engineer who knows how to build forts, but who begins one which turns into a tunnel while he is working. Knowing nothing but forts, he would insist that he did not need airlocks for building a fort, and he would be vehement in upholding the bastions of his structure.

If the opposition between communized and non-Communist nations can be categorized neither as cold war nor as competition then how can it be categorized? What single idea, appropriate to the whole state of affairs, will enable us to form an adequate fundamental insight into it?

The difficulty is that choices we judge we ought to make and choices we expect Communists to make would be incompatible in their effects. Moreover, there does not appear to be any commonly accepted moral principle by appeal to which we can resolve this incompatibility. The situation on the whole, then, is a moral conflict. Such conflict is primarily opposition of judgments and wills; consequently, neither force nor competition can eliminate it. Judgment cannot be forced and willingness cannot be won or bought; even if we had power much greater than all the communized nations together and even if we attained every conceivable technical objective, still communism would not be overcome, for Communists would be martyred but unconvinced, beaten but defiant.

Nevertheless, if such a conflict can develop, it also can be resolved. Nothing in our true interest is incompatible with the true interests of Communists, because, in the last analysis, there is no absolute contradiction of human interests. I claim this on metaphysical grounds which include the affirmation of an absolute source of value and the denial of an absolute source of disvalue. I cannot develop the necessary metaphysical argument here; however, all social processes presuppose that there is no irremediable conflict of human interests. To lead moral oppositions to resolution, we have the process of persuasion. Persuasion, when it deals with fundamental moral oppositions, becomes rational argument—that is, dialectic rather than rhetoric, as Plato would say. The appropriate categorization for the process of oppositions between us and Communists, then, is argument.

Argument as a basic category has certain implications. It implies the priority of rational to material conditions. This priority is directly contrary to the Marxist doctrine that rational considerations only can be superstructure. However, the position has a weakness at this point; like any theory it must be defensible to itself or it cannot be maintained.

Argument implies the possibility of agreement. Inasmuch as common reason is a presupposition of argument, there is a possibility of a common conclusion in any argument. That we can arrive at a common conclusion, however, does not mean that we will do so. It does not mean, in particular, that Communists will accept our positions. It may be that to some extent we will accept theirs.

I do not suggest we compromise with communism. Moral arguments cannot be resolved by compromise; compromise presupposes moral agreement and only facilitates the solution of technical problems. Where there is moral opposition—that is, a conflict of choices—compromise is impossible. Technical principles always can be compromised; most moral principles sometimes can be
compromised; concrete moral judgments never can be compromised. If a moral argument is resolved, it is because the opposing positions develop toward a common good which is implicit in both but included in neither. The suitable outcome of a moral argument is a transcending of conflicting positions in a common higher viewpoint which neither of the opponents would or could have adopted at the outset.

Argument, as such, is total; it implies its own non-limitation. At the same time it implies the limitation of every other topic. If conditions are agreed upon in advance, limiting the outcome of an argument, then the argument cannot be genuine; it is a mere scholastic exercise. In actual arguments opponents may wish to make reservations, but the reservations of one are challenged by another and thus come under argument willy-nilly.

Argument permits power to be considered as an important but subordinate topic in the opposition. Of itself, the use of power is unreasonable since it cannot resolve the fundamental opposition. Reflexively, however, the use of power becomes reasonable in so far as it is necessary to preserve the possibility of argument. To be prepared to repel force if necessary, to be prepared to fight limited wars, to be ready to accept limited victories, and even to consider a power stalemate valuable—these are implications of categorizing the opposition as argument. Moreover, all techniques become relevant in so far as they are necessary to make argument possible, to maintain it, and to prove points within it.

Categorizing the opposition as argument also has more specific implications. If we initially adopt positions clearly incompatible with precisely those aspects of communism which most who are not communized judge unreasonable, then neutralism will be eliminated immediately. It is impossible to be neutral in a moral argument which concerns one's self, if the issues are defined properly. I do not mean that we immediately will make allies of all non-Communist nations; it would be better to say that we will ally ourselves with them. To be more accurate, however, I must say that argument tends to fragment as each individual seeks as best he can a resolution of the opposition as it appears to him. This tendency of argument is not to our disadvantage for we are willing to proceed on this basis. It is, however, immediately to the disadvantage of the Stalinist position, which requires complete agreement on all questions.

Of course, my suggestion will be attacked as unrealistic. I will be asked if I think that syllogisms can replace guided missiles and what I suppose would have happened had we adopted so farfetched a view in 1947.

Certainly the Soviet Union had to be opposed and we can sympathize with the naive hopes for the containment policy. At that time, too, the categorization of the situation as a cold war had a certain rhetorical value because it aroused enough concern to make possible some action. Yet the categorization of the opposition as a war exactly conformed to Marxist predictions; according to their theory we should react to the extension of the Communist revolution by resorting to the use of power.

Now we have no reason to be sanguine about the power of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. I think it foolish to suppose that they are less likely to use force than we; I think it dangerous stupidity to suppose that they would not launch an all-out war—regardless of expected de-
struction—if they ever were convinced that the outcome would conduce to the triumph of communism. Such a supposition is stupid because it assumes that the Communists would not do what we would not do; it is the fallacy of underestimating the sincerity of an opponent in a moral argument.

We must attempt to maintain means, adequate in variety and extent, to deter or counter every type of power which may be used against us. Those who say our limited-war capabilities are inadequate are probably correct; if they also say that our arsenal has too many big bombs, they are probably incorrect. We should not be enamored of disarmament, since it is unlikely at this time that disarmament is possible except at our disadvantage. We must, therefore, prepare much greater and much more diversified force; we must be willing to utilize it if necessary; we must be prepared to maintain it and develop it indefinitely. This is to say nothing about dispersal and shelters, problems which we never have faced seriously. The logic of the coldness of the cold war prevents us from taking nearly adequate precautions against the power of the communized nations.

It should be clear that I do not underestimate the importance of power in our situation. We must maintain parity; we ought, if possible, to attain dominance. Nor do I disregard forms of power other than military force; we also must have a decent respect for all other forms of power of which economic power probably is the chief. I do not object to calling the opposition a war on the grounds that it makes us take account of certain realities; I do object to it as a general categorization on the grounds that it blinds us to moral issues.

Like children confronted with the intricacies of life, who revert to an image of human relations as a matter of pure power, who strike out ineffectually with flailing limbs, and who weep in frustrated rage, we have encountered a situation complicated beyond the ready competence of our reason, we have categorized it as a cold war, we have prepared to strike only ineffectual blows of massive retaliation, and we have sought scapegoats on whom to vent our frustrated rage. How pitifully eager have we been to reduce our thinking to the simplistic terms of power and its prime analogue, force, in order to avoid the responsibilities of reasonable judgment and choice. We would rather view our problems as wholly predetermined and totally beyond our choice than to accept them as a moral challenge.

Some seek refuge in amoralism, so anxious are they to escape the demand for practical wisdom. They will argue that any attempt to consider the situation morally is ideological. They will claim that it is necessary to consider the situation in exclusively scientific and realistic terms, because it is impossible for the United States to have any official moral position. Such an argument interprets democratic pluralism as equivalent to moral nihilism. Just as anti-metaphysical positivists are blind to their own metaphysical dogmatism, so those who argue in this manner do not realize that they themselves are taking an ethical position, though a highly defective one, and are trying to foist on us a narrow orthodoxy under title of objectivity. A policy-maker holding such a position would cloak his stupidity in science, would make choices which he could not explain in any words having cognitive meaning, and would presume to deprive us of information essential to any intelligent discussion of foreign policy on the ground that such
matters require the special skills of his own elite circle.

Even so, we must respect our friends who are mistaken realists. Their blunder is preferable to that of viewing the situation through the small and clouded glass of a technical moralism. For those in this position, any thought about the situation is agonizing, because it is a portent of the collapse of their carefully constructed dream-forts of "moral principles." They talk peace, prosperity, and balanced budgets, while ignoring both the realities of power and the realities of moral life. Having neither the courage for democratic leadership nor the shrewdness for autocratic dictation, they make the worst of both. Undirected, we are driven by the inexorable logic of our categories to a choice between total destruction and total surrender, for we lack the wit to seek alternatives beyond our present inadequate framework.

What difference would a new category make; what problem would it solve? The question can have several senses.

If what is asked is a set of deductions concerning current problems, then the answer is that a suitable categorization of the opposition does not of itself settle anything. No decision can be deduced from the idea that we are in an argument rather than in a war or a competition. Nevertheless, the categorization of a situation is not irrelevant to decisions. It shapes the entire process of deliberation which is necessary for any decision. Still, there is no substitute for a single informed and responsible man when it comes to making decisions. Only I can make my own choices; each other man must make his. A private citizen can decide what policies to advocate; he cannot decide what policies shall be adopted.

If the question is whether this idea of the opposition will be effective, again the point is missed. Subordinated to power, argument becomes propaganda or psychological warfare. Subordinated to technical considerations, argument becomes information. In neither case is argument being considered the basic category. Taken as basic, argument is neither a form of power nor a technical means. Quite possibly there will be no resolution through argument, for argument does not assure the agreement to which it tends. Even so, categorizing the opposition as argument cannot be less effective than other categorizations. Whatever would be reasonable under alternative categorizations is required by argument, but the categorization of the opposition as argument permits an accurate moral view, which any other notion, taken as basic, does not allow. We do not agree; we do not wish to fight; therefore, we must argue.

It is said that we cannot negotiate with Communists since we have no common ground with them. Their professed desire for peaceful coexistence, it is urged, must be suspected. Their expressions of humanistic ideals either are insincere or depend on equivocations, because words like "justice," "freedom," "peace," and "culture" have different meanings in Marxist dialectic than they have in our thinking. It is pointed out that even the desire for survival is not mutual; for although everyone may desire his own survival, there is ample evidence that some Communists are not concerned about the survival of non-Communists.

I think that this judgment of the opposition is, unfortunately, correct; for the present, at least, there is no possibility of negotiation nor even of fruitful discussion of the basic issues. The fundamental moral opposition which
exists renders impossible true co-operation or general practical agreement; expressions of agreement either are merely technical or are vitiated by ambiguity. Nevertheless, argument can be conducted without a moral commitment to a common good. Argument has no presuppositions except the fact of communication, the fact of disagreement, and the necessity to justify oneself. True, to argue in the absence of common fundamental values is fruitless. However, to demand that argument be fruitful is to treat it pragmatically. Argument does tend to resolution; but resolution, if it should occur, will be neither the product of argument nor of any other instrument.

To object that Communists will not accept this categorization of the opposition is to miss the point once again. In one sense they have a choice; they need not accept argument as their basic category. Yet the fact is irrelevant to us. We must formulate the situation for our own decisions; we cannot formulate it for theirs. To discuss policy is to discuss what we will do, not what anyone else will do. In another sense Communists have no choice; they must argue. If their position is effectively challenged, then in their own minds they must argue or yield. Perhaps their replies will be mere rationalizations; yet rationalizations are inherently unstable. Human nature is common; human nature has its own dynamism which cannot be denied.

One can act against natural law and one can deny freedom; one cannot ignore the basic principles of natural law nor negate the fact that choices are free. For this reason, although negotiation and co-operation now are impossible, still argument is possible and resolution is not absolutely impossible. Although there is no unanimity, still discord presupposes dynamic human nature; this common presupposition implies a common good, although no common good is being sought. One can act against the demands of his own nature; one cannot avoid being inconsistent in doing so. Such inconsistency can be fatal in argument even to a system which is intellectually consistent.

Nevertheless, there is a legitimate meaning to the question, "What difference would a new categorization of the opposition make?" If we cannot take decisions, still we must choose which policies to advocate and which to criticize if we are to make wise choices in elections and in the other ways we influence our officials.

Communism should be viewed primarily as a set of ideas and as a human moral position—defective like any other proposed by man and more defective than some, but including much that is valid and important. Primarily we should look for the validity in communism and we should be ready to develop our own position. I think our attitude toward communism should be that, if it is the antithesis of liberal democracy, then the synthesis will be neither communism nor liberal democracy but something transcending the limits and saving the values of both.

Contemporary communism can be attacked; it is utopian and in need of revision in order to reunify its own theory and practice. We should point out that earlier authors of Communist doctrine—Stalin and Lenin, especially—were not themselves immune from the conditions of their own times, and that policies which might have had some validity when the Soviet Union was dealing with fascism have no validity when the communized nations are dealing with us. Communism must be revised continuously if it is not to become idealistic.
There is no single occasion on which this argument should be conducted. We should study communism as thoroughly as we can and we should be prepared to argue with any Communist whenever the opportunity offers. Our officials ought to be prepared to treat each issue as it arises in an argumentative way. They should not expect—or, for the present, even seek—business-like settlements or agreements. They should be willing to meet indefinitely at Geneva, Warsaw, New York, and any future Panmunjon. When proposals are made by communized nations, they should be accepted in the contexts of larger counter-proposals which are completely acceptable to us. Meanwhile we should act according to our own conceptions of what is worth-while in the areas of foreign aid, technical assistance, the increase of foreign trade, and cultural exchanges. These activities should be carried on because they have a value in themselves, not as pure means to a technical objective.

We should not live for the indefinite future. We must do the best we can in the present as it is; whatever value is possible to us must be achieved now. If the opposition continues for a thousand years we need not be ruined morally although it certainly can be the occasion of our perdition. Finally, we must remember that, no matter what may happen, there always is a right choice and nothing can compel us to make a wrong choice except our own wilful stupidity.

If civilization is at stake in the present situation, still civilization always is at stake. Moreover, the distinction between barbarism and civilization is not a line dividing two political camps any more than it is the division between those who wear beards and those who shave. Civilization either is not something which already exists, whole and finished, or it is something which is already dead and not worth even a decent burial. Civilization develops; any tradition worth receiving is worth cultivating and transforming. Barbarians as well as Romans, Moslems as well as Christians have made contributions. When the contribution of another group has been rejected, when a group has been decultured forcibly and morally destroyed—as were American Indians and Negroes imported as slaves in our own history—then civilization has suffered the loss.

Certainly civilization will never be the same after the present era, but it conceivably could be better rather than worse. I do not agree with communism by any means; but I do not think it totally false, nor do I wish to take it upon myself to judge Communists morally depraved. If, because of the stern demands which communism is making on us, we come to a higher moral self-consciousness, to greater reasonableness, to a clearer conception of right and a more willing practice of it, to some degree of courage and self-restraint, then communism will make its contribution to civilization, although in a way quite unlike that of the Communists' dream.

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

NOTE

1. This paper was presented at a meeting of the Washington Philosophy Club in December, 1958. I am indebted to participants in the discussion for criticism from which I profited. Only editorial revisions have been made since January, 1959; although events since that time—especially the death of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles—would lead me to change the wording in some sections, I believe the substance of my argument is still pertinent.