

Notes

1: INTRODUCTION

1. Antony Flew, "The Presumption of Atheism," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 2 (1972), pp. 29-46. Flew makes the common mistake of treating Thomas Aquinas's "Five Ways" as if they were proofs (p. 43). A way (*via*) is a method, not a proof. As scholars on Aquinas have pointed out, Thomas's "Five Ways" presuppose much of Aristotle's philosophy and are completed by other passages in Thomas's own works. The only attempt he ever made to prove that God exists was in his early work, *De ente et essentia*. See Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., *An Elementary Christian Metaphysics* (Milwaukee: 1963), pp. 341-351.

2. Donald Evans, "A Reply to Flew's 'The Presumption of Atheism,'" *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 2 (1972), pp. 47-50.

3. Antony Flew, "Reply to Evans," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 2 (1972), pp. 51-53.

4. Malcolm L. Diamond, *Contemporary Philosophy and Religious Thought: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* (New York: 1974), pp. 286-287, speculates that any cosmological argument which proceeds from the universe as a whole *might* be guilty of a fallacy of composition; he takes this as an adequate reason to prefer a sceptical to a theistic view of the outcome of all such arguments. (The argument I propose in part two does not proceed from the universe as a whole.)

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 60-67, admits there are extraordinary occurrences at Lourdes, but rules out *a priori* a nonnaturalistic explanation on the ground that the admission of such explanations would force scientists to sacrifice their autonomy. He gives no independent reason for supposing that scientists should have the sort of autonomy required by his argument. I answer this argument of Diamond's in the final section of chapter twenty-two.

6. For example, *De potentia dei*, q. 1, a. 2, c. James F. Ross, "Aquinas and Philosophical Methodology," *Metaphilosophy*, 1 (1970), pp. 300-317, makes

several criticisms of Thomas's metaphysical overconfidence with which I would agree. For Thomas's use of *ipsum esse* see John P. Doyle, "Ipsum Esse as God-Surrogate: The Point of Convergence of Faith and Reason for St. Thomas Aquinas," *Modern Schoolman*, 50 (1973), pp. 293-296.

7. Gerald F. Kreyche, "The Soul-Body Problem in St. Thomas," *New Scholasticism*, 46 (1972), pp. 466-484, argues that Thomas's treatment of the soul is incoherent because he fails to synthesize ideas derived from diverse and incompatible sources. In the first part of chapter twenty-three I propose an alternative conception of the human person.

2: A CHILD LEARNS TO TALK ABOUT GOD

1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, ed. Cyril Barrett (Oxford: 1966), p. 59. These lectures are based on students' notes but are generally accepted as representative of Wittgenstein's own views.

2. For example, a child told to be silent in church because "this is God's house" wonders whether the person conducting the service is God. If he asks, he will be told that this is not God, that God is invisible but present. A child's idea of *God* can be built up from such a starting point, but reduction of the concept to its origins does not indicate whether "God" refers to anything transcendent to the immanent domain of religious actions, feelings, and so on.

3. Wittgenstein, *loc. cit.*

3: THE NECESSITY FOR REASONING TOWARD GOD

1. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, 1, ch. 11.

2. See Sylvain Bromberger, "Why-Questions," in Baruch A. Brody, ed., *Readings in the Philosophy of Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1970), pp. 66-87.

3. Norman Kemp Smith, "Is Divine Existence Credible?" in D. Z. Phillips, ed., *Religion and Understanding* (New York: 1967), p. 120.

4. Iltyd Trethowan, "Professor N. H. G. Robinson and Natural Theology," *Religious Studies*, 9 (1973), pp. 463-468.

5. John Hick, *Faith and Knowledge*, 2nd ed. (Ithaca, New York: 1966), p. 115.

6. A classic but somewhat bizarre collection of religious phenomena is William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York: 1929).

7. See R. M. Bucke, *Cosmic Consciousness: A Study of the Evolution of the Human Mind* (New York: 1969), pp. 70-74; Keith E. Yandell, *Basic Issues in the Philosophy of Religion* (Boston: 1971), pp. 124-132.

8. Ronald W. Hepburn, *Christianity and Paradox* (London: 1958), pp. 24-59.

9. E.g., C. B. Martin, *Religious Belief* (Ithaca, New York: 1959), pp. 64-94.

10. Paul Helm, *The Varieties of Belief* (London and New York: 1973), pp. 140-164.

11. George Mavrodes, *Belief in God: A Study in the Epistemology of Religion* (New York: 1970), pp. 70-73, suggests that simple inferences have a role in some people's "experience" of God.

12. James, *op. cit.*, p. 438.

13. William James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy* (New York and London: 1897), pp. 1-31.

14. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, ed. Cyril Barrett (Oxford: 1966), p. 59.

15. The position is summarized and its fidelity to Wittgenstein rejected by Patrick Sherry, "Is Religion a Form of Life?" *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 9 (1972), pp. 159-167.

16. Kai Nielsen, "Challenge of Wittgenstein," *Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses*, 3 (1973), pp. 29-46, argues that Wittgenstein himself was a Wittgensteinian-fideist. James Kellenberger, "The Language-Game View of Religion and Religious Certainty," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 2 (1972), pp. 255-275, builds up the case by using Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*.

17. In addition to Nielsen and Kellenberger, another critic of the position is Michael Durrant, "Is the Justification of Religious Belief a Possible Enterprise?" *Religious Studies*, 9 (1973), pp. 449-455.

18. D. Z. Phillips, *Death and Immortality* (London: 1970), p. 55.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 60. W. Donald Hudson, *A Philosophical Approach to Religion* (London: 1974), pp. 94-99, criticizes Phillips along similar lines.

20. This reformulation is suggested by the position formulated by Hudson, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-105, as his own, but I do not attribute the position I formulate to him.

21. This argument is pressed by Kai Nielsen, *Scepticism* (London: 1973), p. 32 and *passim*.

22. Søren Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, trans. D. F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: 1941), p. 182.

23. Karl Barth, *Credo* (New York: 1962), pp. 11-12.

24. *Ibid.* In chapter five, note 27 and accompanying text, I suggest how the requirements of the faith-position which Kierkegaard and Barth are trying to protect might be satisfied without their extreme antirationalism.

25. Terence Penelhum, *Problems of Religious Knowledge* (London: 1971), p. 47; see also pp. 34-35 and 149-155.

26. This position is basic in Thomas Aquinas; see *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 1, a. 1.

27. For his rejection of natural theology see Rudolf Bultmann, *Faith and Understanding*, trans. Louise Pettibone Smith (New York and Evanston: 1969), pp. 53-65 and 313-331. A brief account of Bultmann's demythologizing is given by Van A. Harvey, *The Historian and the Believer: The Morality of Historical Knowledge and Christian Belief* (New York: 1969), pp. 139-146. Jesus's sole revelation according to Bultmann is that he is the revealer; the content of this revelation is simply its reproof to all human self-assertions and norms. Harvey asks (p. 144) whether this does not render Jesus dispensable. A helpful critique of Bultmann is found in Hugo Meynell, *Sense, Nonsense, and Christianity* (London and New York: 1964), pp. 250-270.

28. Langdon Gilkey, *Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal of God-Language* (Indianapolis and New York: 1969), pp. 73-106; see especially note

30 on p. 101, in which Gilkey reports the observation that the third generation of neoorthodox theologians find divine transcendence problematic; the paradox is explained by the neoorthodox rejection of objectivity and the younger generation's refusal to accept the category of the noumenal.

29. D. Scheltens, "Reflections on Natural Theology," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 11 (1971), p. 78.

30. The fullest single study is Jonathan Barnes, *The Ontological Argument* (London: 1972); works cited by him (pp. 92-98) lead to a large literature.

31. Hudson, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

4: PROVISIONAL STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT

1. Thomas Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, ch. 4.

2. Peter Achinstein, *Law and Explanation: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science* (Oxford: 1971), pp. 137-138.

3. One finds this sort of criticism in marxists, who attack positions as ideological if they reach the wrong conclusion regardless of the arguments proposed for them; in Dewey, who was always ready to dismiss difficult counterpositions; in positivists, confident in their own dogmas, dismissing metaphysics and theology wholesale. One notes the same tendency in public debate of issues having philosophical aspects. If the philosophical community is to be of any service to society, it must be opposed equally to fallacies regardless of the position they support.

4. J. J. C. Smart, "The Existence of God," in Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre, eds., *New Essays in Philosophical Theology* (London: 1955), p. 46.

5. *Ibid.* The difficulties Smart mentions here will be dealt with in chapter seven.

6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, "A Lecture on Ethics," *Philosophical Review*, 74 (1965), pp. 7-12; cf. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London and New York: 1961), 5.552, 6.432, 6.4321, 6.44, 6.522.

7. Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: 1959), pp. 1-8. Manheim renders "die Seinden" by "essents"; I substitute "existing entities."

8. G. W. Leibniz, *Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays*, trans. Paul Schrecker and Anne Martin Schrecker (Indianapolis and New York: 1965), pp. 84-85; see James Kellenberger, *Religious Discovery, Faith, and Knowledge* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1972), p. 59. Leibniz himself sometimes uses the "something rather than nothing formula"; e.g., "The Principles of Nature and Grace," in T. V. Smith and Marjorie Grene, eds., *From Descartes to Kant* (Chicago: 1940), p. 364.

9. This point is clearly developed by D. M. Armstrong, *Belief, Truth and Knowledge* (Cambridge: 1973), p. 49, who points out that the problem arises from the self-reference of the proposition and so remains regardless of the theory of propositions proposed.

10. See Etienne Gilson, Thomas Langan, and Armand Maurer, C.S.B., *Recent Philosophy: Hegel to the Present* (New York: 1962), pp. 145-150.

11. Smart, *loc. cit.*

12. For the following treatment of the proposition I depend on Richard L. Cartwright, "Propositions," in Ronald J. Butler, ed., *Analytical Philosophy*, 1st ser. (Oxford: 1962), pp. 81-103. Cartwright replied to criticisms in "Propositions Again," *Nous*, 2 (1968), pp. 229-246. Armstrong, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-49, makes a number of the same points, but I do not think he deals adequately with other relevant questions about propositions.

13. Peter Geach, *Reference and Generality* (Ithaca, New York: 1962), pp. 22-46, and *Logic Matters* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1972), pp. 44-61 and 289-301, discusses the inner structure of propositions and makes the distinction between names and predicables. A predicable differs from a predicate in that the former is part of the latter; I prefer to think of the proposition as a systematic unity of any number of names and predicables rather than of any number of names and one predicate. I do not use "concept" in Geach's sense. In general Geach wishes to stay closer to language than I think possible.

14. The theory I am sketching is aristotelian in a broad sense. I worked out Aquinas's theory of the proposition and treated a number of these points more fully in *Basic Oppositions in Logical Theory* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1959), pp. 175-196.

15. Roger Wertheimer, "Conditions," *Journal of Philosophy*, 65 (1968), pp. 355-364, points out that many current uses of "conditions" in philosophy depart from the meanings the word has in ordinary language. I use the word in the sense he clarifies. I also use the expression, somewhat clumsy and redundant, "prerequisite conditions." This expression leads me to use *prerequisites* and *requirements*. If these concepts seem to be begging questions against empiricist and kantian theories of causality, these problems will be taken care of in part three.

16. *Dc* must meet the criterion—in ordinary religious language this means that God's causing anything is not a necessary state of affairs; God creates freely. Not the uncaused cause—God the creator—but the uncaused entity—God—is the necessary being.

17. I am saying that even in the case of God, for him to be what he is is not the same as for him to obtain. This does not mean that God is divided; the real distinction as explained above does not mean that there are two nameable entities or that *x*'s obtaining is a state of affairs. God has what it takes to be known with knowledge like ours; we can know that he is without knowing what he is. If the distinction is given up at this point, either one has no knowledge of God at all or some minimal, positive essential knowledge. Comparison of the position I am developing with that of Thomas Aquinas is not as easy as might appear on the surface, since he works with *esse*; *obtains* is not precisely the same as *exists*.

18. The following objection might occur to a reader. If *Dc* is contingent because it is the cause of a contingent state of affairs, why is *D* itself not also contingent, since *D* is required for *Dc* to obtain. This question will be treated in chapter seventeen.

5: DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARGUMENT

1. Frederick Copleston and Bertrand Russell, "A Debate on the Existence of God," in John Hick, ed., *The Existence of God* (New York and London: 1964), p. 175.

2. Barry Miller, "The Contingency Argument," *The Monist*, 54 (1970), pp. 368-371, develops this point with unusual clarity.
3. Paul Edwards, "The Cosmological Argument," in Donald R. Burrill, ed., *The Cosmological Arguments: A Spectrum of Opinion* (Garden City, N.Y.: 1967), pp. 114-122.
4. G. W. Leibniz, *Leibniz Selections*, ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York: 1951), p. 539; the version quoted is from the *Monadology*, sec. 32.
5. Richard Taylor, *Metaphysics*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1974), pp. 103-105.
6. See Etienne Gilson and Thomas Langan, *Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant* (New York: 1963), pp. 145-171. Leibniz is talking about names rather than about predicables, but the distinction collapses if either is disposed of. The ultimate implications of Leibniz's position are worked out by Hegel.
7. Adrian Webster, "The Cosmic Background Radiation," *Scientific American*, 231 (August, 1974), p. 31.
8. James F. Ross, *Philosophical Theology* (Indianapolis and New York: 1969), pp. 279-304, made me aware of the problem.
9. Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, *Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument*, forthcoming, discusses the "rule of intelligibility" in chapter six and answers the objection against free choice grounded in it in chapter ten.
10. The phrasing is taken from Edwards, *op. cit.*, p. 118, but the same point is made by many authors.
11. Roger C. Rosenkrantz, "On Explanation," *Synthese*, 20 (1969), pp. 337-340.
12. Many philosophers of science advocate a single model, but they do not all advocate the same model. One author who provides a more generous view of possibilities of explanation even within science is Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation* (New York: 1961), pp. 15-28; Nagel also provides more information about alternatives to his own positions than do most authors writing on this subject.
13. The objection mentioned here is dealt with in chapter seven. Reduction to a single model of explanation is primarily a strategy of positivists. Although discredited or seriously called into question in philosophy of science, the idea that all explanation must be of one sort is freely invoked in philosophy of religion.
14. P. AE. Hutchings, "God and Existence," *Sophia*, 2 (1963), pp. 5-8, makes a useful distinction between "taking for granted" and "accepting as given." Ernest Nagel, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-202, explains how Newton's laws function as principles in classical mechanics; Stephen Toulmin, *The Philosophy of Science* (New York: 1960), pp. 20-25 and 83-86, explains that the rectilinear propagation of light is indefeasible and more like an axiom than an ordinary law in optics; these and other examples are discussed in an illuminating article by John F. Miller, III, "The Logic of Scientific and Religious Principles," *Sophia*, 12 (1973), pp. 11-23.
15. Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago and London: 1962), pp. 110-134, expands on this point.
16. Max Black, *Margins of Precision: Essays in Logic and Language* (Ithaca and London: 1970), pp. 21-22.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 86-88.

18. Henry E. Kyburg, Jr., *Probability and Inductive Logic* (Toronto and London: 1970), p. 78.

19. Michael Slote, *Reason and Scepticism* (London and New York: 1970), pp. 99-100.

20. I will say more about rationality norms in the third section of chapter nine. The necessary normativity of rationality norms is discussed in sections D and E of chapter eight of the work cited in note 9 above. Rationality norms cannot be logically necessary truths or they could not regulate *choices* in thinking; they must be cognitive or they would not ground assertions and exclude counterpositions; they cannot depend upon subjective purposes or they could not be used to settle disagreements among people having different purposes; they cannot be laws of nature or their violation would not be a matter of choice and would be a mere psychological abnormality.

21. "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2," *Natural Law Forum*, 10 (1965), pp. 168-201; coauthored with Russell Shaw, *Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom* (Notre Dame and London: 1974), pp. 64-148.

22. Michael Durrant, *The Logical Status of 'God' and the Function of Theological Sentences* (London: 1973). R. Attfield, "The Individuality of God," *Sophia*, 10 (1971), pp. 20-27, criticizes an earlier version of a number of the arguments Durrant offers, especially pointing out that "God" can function now in one way and again in another.

23. *Midrash Rabbah*, trans. H. Freedman and Maurice Simon (London: 1939), vol. 1, p. 313 (ch. xxxix, 1; commenting on Genesis 12:1). See Abraham Joshua Heschel, *God in Search of Man* (New York: 1955), pp. 113 and 367.

24. Aristotle, *Metaphysica* xii, 1074b1-14.

25. *Ibid.*, 1072b25-29.

26. *Ethica Nichomachea* x, 1177b31-1178a2.

27. Plato not only proposes arguments which lead to the Good, although he does not define it, in the *Republic* (cf. A. E. Taylor, *Plato: The Man and His Work* [New York: 1956], pp. 231-232, 285-289, 441-442, and 489-493), he also argues throughout his works for such a principle, which is the contradictory of *homo mensura*. Of course, "god" is not used by Plato to identify this principle, but it is perhaps significant how often this identification has been made.

28. In chapter three, notes 22-24 and accompanying text, I cited and discussed the position of Kierkegaard and Barth on the absolute priority of faith. I think the present consideration would meet the demands of the faith-position they wished to protect, but without the unnecessary antiration-alism in which they engage.

6: THE EMPIRICIST ALTERNATIVE

1. A Hume bibliography and general introduction to his thought may be found in D. G. C. MacNabb, "Hume," *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 4, pp. 74-90.

2. This reformulation is given by A. G. N. Flew, "Hume," in D. J. O'Connor, ed., *A Critical History of Western Philosophy* (New York, Toronto, London: 1964), p. 257.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 262.

7: CRITICISM OF EMPIRICISM

1. A. G. N. Flew, "Hume," in D. J. O'Connor, ed., *A Critical History of Western Philosophy* (New York, Toronto, and London: 1964), p. 257.

2. A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, 2nd ed. (London and New York: 1952), pp. 35-38 and 114-120.

3. Keith E. Yandell, *Basic Issues in the Philosophy of Religion* (Boston: 1971), pp. 3-42, reviews developments in verificationism.

4. Regarding self-referential arguments see Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., "Self-Referential Inconsistency, Inevitable Falsity, and Metaphysical Argumentation," *Metaphilosophy*, 3 (1972), pp. 26-44.

5. The argument presented here is adapted with slight modifications from one stated in Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, *Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument*, forthcoming, chapter seven.

6. Antony Flew, "Theology and Falsification," in Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre, eds., *New Essays in Philosophical Theology* (London: 1955), pp. 96-99.

7. This point is made by a severe critic of cosmological argumentation, Ronald W. Hepburn, *Christianity and Paradox* (London: 1958), p. 12.

8. In Ayer, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16, which is the second edition of the work, Ayer admits that the verification criterion is a definition; he rejects the idea that it might be a mere empirical hypothesis. He says it is not wholly arbitrary—which means it has some sort of necessity, but Ayer does not say what sort. He still thinks metaphysics can be excluded; however, its arguments must be analyzed in detail. He does not say how this analysis is to be done, but one can assume he intends to use the verification criterion in some form. In a radio debate with F. C. Copleston, S.J. ("Logical Positivism: A Debate," in A. Pap and Paul Edwards, eds., *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy* [New York: 1965], p. 755), Ayer says that the verification criterion "can be derived from an analysis of understanding." But he does not say whether he means by analysis of the word "understanding" or by empirical psychology; obviously neither will do.

9. Jerome A. Miller, *The Irrefutability of Metaphysical Truths* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1973), examines a large number of empiricist authors and finds the unity of their antimetaphysics in their exclusion of extrapositional necessary truths. Miller's work first made clear to me the importance of generalizing from Ayer to take in the whole movement with the stripped-down version of empiricism.

10. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London and New York: 1961), 6.54, 7.

11. Max Black, *A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (Ithaca, New York: 1964), p. 379.

12. *Tractatus*, 6.44, 6.45, 6.522.

13. Antony Flew, *God and Philosophy* (London: 1966), pp. 88-89; Terence Penelhum, *Religion and Rationality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* (New York: 1971), p. 36.

14. A. Michotte, *The Perception of Causality* (London: 1963), p. 265.

15. Jerrold L. Aronson, "Explanations without Laws," *Journal of Philosophy*, 66 (1969), pp. 541-557.

16. See B. A. Brody, "Toward an Aristotelian Theory of Scientific Explanation," *Philosophy of Science*, 39 (1972), pp. 20-31.

17. In Section VII, Part 1, note 3.

18. Richard Taylor, "Causation," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 2, p. 63.

19. Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 282-283, rightly points out that for Aristotle, knowing that something is, is not equivalent to knowing its essence, but is equivalent to knowing that it has an essence. Carried to its conclusion, this means that knowing the essence of something fully would include knowing that it is. Cf. *Posterior analytics* ii, 89b22-94a18. Hegel carries out this line of thought to its ultimate implications.

20. *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, Section IX.

21. For a discussion and critique see Barry Miller, "Making Sense of 'Necessary Existence,'" *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 11 (1974), pp. 47-54.

22. Penelhum, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-41.

8: THE ALTERNATIVE OF A CRITIQUE OF KNOWLEDGE

1. Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: 1951), pp. 108-109.

2. Kant's development can be followed in his early works: *Inaugural Dissertation and Early Writings on Space*, trans. J. Handyside (Chicago: 1929), pp. 52-66.

3. *Prolegomena*, p. 105.

4. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London, New York, and Toronto: 1965), B xix-xxxvii. This and subsequent references to the *Critique* are to the pages of the German editions; the page numbers are carried in the margins of Smith's translation.

5. *Prolegomena*, p. 105.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

7. *Critique*, A 426-532; B 454-560.

8. Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'*, 2nd ed. (New York: 1962), pp. 485-492; P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense* (London: 1966), pp. 175-206.

9. Strawson, *op. cit.*, pp. 200-205. The fact that scientific cosmology is doing what Kant forbade is not insignificant. To what extent can Kant's false assumptions be removed?

10. *Critique*, A 538-558; B 566-586; this section is discussed in detail in Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, *Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument*, forthcoming, chapter five.

11. A 452-455; B 480-483.

12. A 453, 455; B 481, 483.

13. A 559-561; B 587-589.
14. A 584; B 612.
15. A 584-590; B 612-618.
16. A 592-602; B 620-630.
17. A 600; B 628.
18. A 601; B 629.
19. A 603-608; B 631-636.
20. A 609-610; B 637-638.
21. A 614-620; B 642-648.
22. A 639; B 667.

9: CRITICISM OF CRITIQUE AS METAPHYSICS

1. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London, New York, and Toronto: 1965), A 612; B 640.

2. A 203; B 248-249.

3. Robert Paul Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1963), pp. 281-282, suggests that Kant's difficulties with causal sequence might be solved by reducing causality to the functional conception which Kant treats as interaction; however, Wolff's treatment of this conception (pp. 286-287) indicates that this route of escape also is blocked. The suggestion is of course a version of the empiricist proposal to replace causality with correlation.

4. A 546-547; B 574-575.

5. Wolff, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-174, summarizes the problem and seems to think Kant can escape from it, but I find nothing later in Wolff's book which vindicates this hope. Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary on Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'*, 2nd ed. (New York: 1962), pp. 611-638, shows that in his last work Kant was wrestling with this problem, evading it, and moving toward a more complete idealism. H. J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, vol. 1 (London and New York: 1936), p. 422, makes clear that Kant does hold that the unknown thing in itself literally causes its appearances. Paton is the most sympathetic of Kant's commentators.

6. A 592-593; B 620-621.

7. A 601; B 629.

8. A 695-696; B 723-724.

9. Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: 1951), pp. 105-106. Paul Tillich, "The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols," in Sidney Hook, ed., *Religious Experience and Truth* (New York: 1961), pp. 3-11, takes a position strongly influenced by Kant; several others in the same volume criticize this position.

10. *Prolegomena*, p. 106.

11. A 669-702; B 697-730.

12. A 508-509; B 536-537.

13. A 642-668; B 670-696.

14. A 474; B 502.

15. A 642-648; B 670-676.

16. A 651; B 679.

17. A 647; B 675.
18. A 680; B 708.
19. A 682-688; B 710-716.
20. A 644-645; B 672-673.
21. A 689-694; B 717-722.
22. P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense* (London: 1966), p. 267.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 266, illustrates a logical deduction: "e.g., from any assertion to the effect that a certain individual has a certain property there follows an assertion of the existence of something having that property." Such a statement can be read as syntactical. However, to begin to distinguish sense from reference by saying that two expressions having different senses can nevertheless be used to refer to the same *thing* is to use "thing" to refer to extrapropositional entities, but without any accompanying empirical concept. Strawson himself elsewhere makes statements such as: "Since anything whatever can be identifyingly referred to, being a possible object of identifying reference does not distinguish any class or type of items or entities from any other" (*Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* [London: 1959], p. 137). Carnap, of course, attempted to absorb semantics into syntax; Carnap's attempt did not succeed; see Jerome A. Miller, *The Irrefutability of Metaphysical Truths* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1973), pp. 203-208.

10: THE ABSOLUTE IDEALIST ALTERNATIVE

1. *The Logic of Hegel*, trans. William Wallace, 2nd ed. (Oxford: 1892), sec. 44, p. 92.
2. *Ibid.*, sec. 124, pp. 231-232.
3. *Ibid.*, sec. 45, pp. 93-94; sec. 48, pp. 97-101; sec. 119, pp. 219-223.
4. G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J. B. Baillie (New York and Evanston: 1967), p. 80.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 765.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 75-86.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 756-783. On Hegel's transposition of Christian faith into philosophy see Emil L. Fackenheim, *The Religious Dimension of Hegel's Thought* (Bloomington and London: 1967), pp. 160-219; James Collins, *The Emergence of Philosophy of Religion* (New Haven and London: 1967), pp. 330-342.
8. Hegel, *Phenomenology*, pp. 105-107 and 115-116.
9. G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God*, in *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, trans. E. B. Speirs and J. Burdon Sanderson, vol. 3 (London: 1962), p. 188; see Collins, *op. cit.*, pp. 293-310.
10. *Logic*, sec. 50, p. 103.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
13. *Lectures on the Proofs*, p. 195.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 228-230.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 232.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 224-236.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 260.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 261-274.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 281-292.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 303; cf. *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: 1894), sec. 564, p. 176.
21. *Lectures on the Proofs*, pp. 313-327.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 353-367; *Logic*, sec. 51, pp. 107-109.

11: CRITICISM OF ABSOLUTE IDEALISM

1. *The Logic of Hegel*, trans. William Wallace, 2nd ed. (Oxford: 1892), sec. 119, pp. 219-223.
2. G. R. G. Mure, *An Introduction to Hegel* (Oxford: 1940), pp. 139-141.
3. Aristotle, *Metaphysica* iv, 1005b35-1007a19.
4. *Logic*, sec. 24, pp. 49-52.
5. *Ibid.*, sec. 91-95 and 119-121, pp. 171-179 and 219-229. See also W. T. Stace, *The Philosophy of Hegel* (New York, Toronto, and London: 1955), pp. 297-313.
6. G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J. B. Baillie (New York and Evanston: 1967), pp. 80 ff.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 149-160.
8. *Ibid.*; *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: 1970), sec. 250, pp. 24-27.
9. *Ibid.*
10. G. R. G. Mure, *A Study of Hegel's Logic* (Oxford: 1950), pp. 294-323.
11. G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, trans. E. B. Speirs and J. Burdon Sanderson, vol. 1 (London: 1962), pp. 63-64.
12. This argument against Hegel was worked out by Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, *Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument*, forthcoming, chapter five.
13. James Collins, *God in Modern Philosophy* (Chicago: 1959), p. 213, maintains that Hegel holds the two sides together by sheer resolve.
14. Emil L. Fackenheim, *The Religious Dimension of Hegel's Thought* (Bloomington and London: 1967), pp. 116-159, makes a persuasive case for this thesis.

12: RELATIVISM AS A METAPHYSICAL ALTERNATIVE

1. Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought* (New York, Chicago, and San Francisco: 1964), pp. 53-135.
2. James Collins, *God in Modern Philosophy* (Chicago: 1959), pp. 238-257.
3. *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: 1942), pp. 12-13.

4. I do not know whether Wittgenstein himself indulged in metaphysics. Max Black, *Margins of Precision* (Ithaca and London: 1970), p. 268, says at the end of a chapter which sympathetically expounds Wittgenstein's philosophy of language: "Wittgenstein will not accept the language games of his philosophical predecessors as a form of life that is simply 'given'—he has his own language game, and a better one. But then the *critical* function of philosophical activity needs to be brought into the open—and not concealed behind a curtain of allegedly descriptive neutrality."

13: CRITICISM OF METAPHYSICAL RELATIVISM

1. The topic of fatalism is treated by Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, *Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument*, forthcoming, chapter four.

2. W. Donald Hudson, *A Philosophical Approach to Religion* (London: 1974), p. 104. I refer to Hudson only for the passage quoted. The dialectic which follows is not a point-by-point critique of his view, which I find hard to understand.

3. I am not *trying* to interpret and criticize the *Philosophical Investigations*; therefore what follows ought not to be taken as a misinterpretation of Wittgenstein. I am trying to argue—partly, I think, in agreement with him—against a version of metaphysical relativism widely taken to represent his views. Patrick J. Bearsley, S.M., "Aquinas and Wittgenstein on the Grounds of Certainty," *Modern Schoolman*, 51 (May, 1974), pp. 316-334, interprets Wittgenstein as holding a conception of criteria nearer to that which I am defending than to that which underlies the demand I reject as unreasonable.

14: LIMITS OF REDUCTIONISM

1. Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio in libros ethicorum Aristotelis*, lib. 1, lect. 1.

2. See Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, *Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom* (Notre Dame and London: 1974), pp. 76-149.

3. Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, *Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument*, forthcoming.

16: WHAT CAN BE AFFIRMED OF THE UNCAUSED ENTITY

1. Alastair McKinnon, "'Existence' in 'the Existence of God,'" *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 9 (1972), p. 351: "I cannot say 'God exists' precisely because I cannot think of him as not existing."

2. Mary Hesse, "The Explanatory Function of Metaphor," in Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, ed., *Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science* (Amsterdam: 1965), p. 259.

3. Ian Ramsey, *Religious Language* (New York: 1963).

4. Cynthia B. Cohen, "The Logic of Religious Language," *Religious Studies*, 9 (1973), pp. 143-155.

17: RELATIONAL PREDICATIONS ABOUT THE UNCAUSED ENTITY

1. Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, *Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument*, forthcoming.

2. Max Black, *Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy* (Ithaca, New York: 1962), pp. 219-243. Among other helpful points Black distinguishes between a model and a metaphor, while defending the usefulness of both as means of knowing. See also Mary Hesse, *Science and the Human Imagination* (London: 1954), pp. 134-146; *Models and Analogies in Science* (Notre Dame: 1966).

18: HUMAN FREEDOM IS COMPATIBLE WITH CREATURELINESS

1. See Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, *Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom* (Notre Dame and London: 1974), pp. 76-136.

2. See, for example, Psalm 19:9-11.

3. "Your decrees are forever just; they give me discernment that I may live" (Ps. 119:144); cf. Jn. 14:15-17; Rm. 7:7-12; Gal. 3:24; 1 Tim. 1:5; Heb. 8:10.

4. Rev. 21:1-7; cf. Is. 65:17-25.

5. Jn. 1:12; Rm. 8:14-17; 2 Cor. 6:18; Gal. 4:1-7; 2 Pet. 1:3-11.

19: EVIL IS REAL BUT IS NOT CREATED

1. Roger Trigg, *Pain and Emotion* (Oxford: 1970), p. 60. See also G. H. von Wright, *The Varieties of Goodness* (London: 1963), p. 57: "Pain is evil, I would say, only to the extent that it is disliked or shunned or unwanted."

2. Trigg, *op. cit.*, p. 166, describes the case of a young woman who did not enjoy a normal sense of pain: "As a result she suffered considerable physical damage regularly, and it merely went unnoticed or was regarded with indifference."

3. F. J. J. Buytendijk, *Pain*, trans. Eda O'Shiel (London: 1961), pp. 141-163, offers a suggestive analysis of pain from a phenomenological point of view. He sees its value as existential more than physical; man becomes aware of himself as a person, extends life into what is new, and manifests love by suffering pain. See also John Hick, *Evil and the God of Love* (New York: 1966), pp. 328-372.

4. Edward H. Madden and Peter H. Hare, *Evil and the Concept of God* (Springfield, Ill.: 1968), pp. 4-5.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-34.

6. I have treated the problems of value theory more fully in: "The First

Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2," *Natural Law Forum*, 10 (1965), pp. 168-201; "The Value of a Life: A Sketch," *Philosophy in Context*, 2 (1973), pp. 7-15; with Russell Shaw, *Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom* (Notre Dame and London: 1974), pp. 55-96.

7. However, some theists have appealed to emotivism to solve the problem of evil; see Charles F. Kielkopf, "Emotivism as the Solution to the Problem of Evil," *Sophia*, 9 (1970), pp. 34-38.

8. Terence Penelhum, *Religion and Rationality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* (New York: 1971), pp. 227-228, invokes a subjectivist theory of value against the explanation of evil as privation; he invokes the opinion of "most philosophers"—meaning, of course, most who agree with him—as authority.

9. Mt. 13:19; 2 Cor. 4:4; Jn. 8:44; 1 Pet. 5:8.

10. This very clearly is the assumption of Alvin Plantinga in his various works on the free-will defense; see, e.g., "Which Worlds Could God Have Created?" *Journal of Philosophy*, 70 (1973), pp. 539-552.

11. The point is shown by Dewey J. Hoitenga, Jr., "Logic and the Problem of Evil," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 4 (1967), pp. 114-126. It must be noticed that traditional Christian doctrine held that in heaven the blessed will be confirmed in goodness without loss of their freedom of choice. Thus it is not clear why God could not have created rational creatures preserved by grace from all sin—as Roman Catholics believe he did in the case of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Christians believed that the sin of Adam was a "happy fault" insofar as God brought out of it the greater good of the redemption.

12. See Nelson Pike, "Hume on Evil," *Philosophical Review*, 72 (1963), pp. 180-197; Keith E. Yandell, *Basic Issues in the Philosophy of Religion* (Boston: 1971), pp. 43-52.

13. Madden and Hare, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

14. Penelhum, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

15. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 25, a. 3. Thomas tries to argue that since God is *ipsum esse*, his power extends to whatever can be. I think this argument assumes that one can treat a metaconcept as if it were a first-level predicable.

16. These arguments are developed more fully by Peter Geach, "Omnipotence," *Philosophy*, 48 (1973), pp. 7-20.

17. Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia dei*, q. 5, a. 4.

18. I am taking for granted the even more basic point of Jewish and Christian faith that God has no obligations to anyone, since there is no one prior to creation to whom he might have obligations; those who make a point of evil often evidence a sort of resentment, as if they might have existed to enjoy the best of all possible worlds if they had not actually been created by God in this one. This point is developed by Robert Merrihew Adams, "Must God Create the Best?" *Philosophical Review*, 81 (1972), pp. 317-332. See also John King-Farlow and William Niels Christensen, *Faith and the Life of Reason* (Dordrecht, Holland: 1972), pp. 131-135.

19. David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, X (New York and London: 1966), pp. 61-70, treats the problem of evil in the context of a

refutation of an argument from design. Obviously if one appeals to order in the world to argue that God exists—which I do not—then one must admit that disorder in the world argues that God does not exist.

20: RELIGION NEED NOT CONFLICT WITH HUMANISTIC VALUES

1. Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, *Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom* (Notre Dame and London: 1974), pp. ix-137 and 190-200.

2. *Summa contra gentiles*, 3, chs. 121-122; *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 19, aa. 9-10. Contrast this position with that of William of Ockham; see James Kevin McDonnell, *Religion and Ethics in the Philosophy of William of Ockham* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1971), pp. 74-115.

3. The doctrine of the fall is not peculiarly Christian; the chief difference between Jewish and Christian doctrine is the remedy—viz, Torah or Christ. See William D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*, 2nd ed. (London: 1958), pp. 31 ff.

4. Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. George Eliot (New York, Evanston and London: 1957), p. 226.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

6. *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2; q. 2, a. 2, ad 1; q. 62, a. 5, c.; on divine law and natural law: 1-2, q. 90, a. 2, ad 1.

7. A critical examination of this point with references to relevant texts and various interpretations is in my article "Man, the Natural End of," *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 9, pp. 132-138.

8. *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 94, a. 2; see my essay: "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2," *Natural Law Forum*, 10 (1965), pp. 168-201.

9. Vatican Council II, *The Church in the Modern World*, section 22.

10. Feuerbach, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

11. Feuerbach identifies what he takes to be Luther's position with the Christian position. The Council of Trent had a different idea; see Denzinger-Schönmetzer, *Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*, 34th ed, secs. 1520-1583.

12. Konrad Lorenz, *On Aggression*, trans. Marjorie Kerr Wilson (New York: 1966), pp. 236-274, describes the phenomena in question, although he does not take a religious perspective on them.

13. The days of the Messiah and of the world to come were distinguished from each other; see, e.g., Berakoth 34a, *The Babylonian Talmud: Seder Zera'im*, trans. I. Epstein (London: 1948), p. 215.

14. Vatican Council II, *Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity*, section 5.

15. Vatican Council II, *The Church in the Modern World*, section 39.

16. Vatican Council II, *Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity*, section 7. By citing a council of the Roman Catholic Church, I do not mean to suggest that this is not a view shared by most Christians, but rather that a fairly conservative Christian body has officially embraced the position.

21: DEVELOPING CREATURES AND A PERFECT CREATOR

1. Aristotle, *Metaphysica* xii, 1071b3-1072b29, argues to the reality of a primary principle of motion which he calls "God." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, 1, ch. 13, and elsewhere, maintains Aristotle's argument with some modifications. I think Thomas was inconsistent with his own best thought in this regard and that the use of the argument to an unmoved mover leads to an inadequate way of negation, one biased in favor of stability. At the same time Thomas is clear on the fact that creation is no change (*ibid.*, 2, ch. 17); he also maintains (ch. 30) that there is absolute necessity in created things. The last point was lost sight of by many later scholastic philosophers who emphasized the contingency of creatures as if this were on an immanent cause.

2. Raymond J. Nogar, O.P., *The Wisdom of Evolution* (Garden City, N.Y.: 1963), develops more fully many of the points I make in the following few pages.

3. Philip J. Donnelly, S.J., "Saint Thomas and the Purpose of Creation," *Theological Studies*, 2 (1941), shows (pp. 53-67) that Thomas Aquinas and Suarez exclude "extrinsic glory to be acquired" as the ultimate purpose of creation; note Donnelly's summary on p. 83.

4. See James F. Ross, *Philosophical Theology* (Indianapolis and New York: 1969), pp. 280-290.

5. *Summa contra gentiles*, 2, ch. 44.

6. Philip J. Donnelly, S.J., "The Doctrine of the Vatican Council and the End of Creation," *Theological Studies*, 4 (1943), pp. 21-29, shows that the "glory of God" of which Vatican Council I speaks can be identified with the goodness of creation itself.

7. *Summa contra gentiles*, 3, ch. 70.

8. *Ibid.*, ch. 69.

9. Thomas Aquinas, *ibid.*, ch. 21, cites with approval a statement of Pseudo-Dionysius: "Of all things, it is more divine to become a co-worker with God." He also uses with accommodated sense a statement of St. Paul (1 Cor. 3:9): "We are fellow workers with God."

10. *Summa contra gentiles*, 3, ch. 69. This sort of thinking has been endorsed by Vatican Council II, *The Church in the Modern World*, section 34: "... far from thinking that works produced by man's own talent and energy are in opposition to God's power, and that the rational creature exists as a kind of rival to the creator, Christians are convinced that the triumphs of the human race are a sign of God's greatness and are the flowering of his own mysterious design."

22: MIRACLES AS SIGNALS FROM THE CREATOR

1. This question is pressed by Alastair McKinnon, "Miracle and Paradox," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 4 (1967), p. 313.

2. David Hume, *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Charles W. Hendel (Indianapolis and New York: 1955), p. 122.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 122-123.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 124-130.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 136. Hume's statement here is, of course, a factual claim. One wonders how he knows it to be true. However, since it is an allegation which does not involve testimony for a miracle used to support religion, one can trust the testimony. Hume, of course, was unacquainted with modern advertising. Richard Swinburne, *The Concept of Miracle* (London and Basingstoke: 1970), accepts Hume's terrain for the argument and answers these points in more detail than I shall.

7. Hume, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

8. Antony Flew, *Hume's Philosophy of Belief* (London: 1966), pp. 207-208.

9. McKinnon, *op. cit.*, pp. 308-310.

10. Patrick H. Nowell-Smith, "Miracles," in Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre, eds., *New Essays in Philosophical Theology* (London: 1955), pp. 252-253.

11. Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, *Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument*, forthcoming.

12. Hume, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

13. In this paragraph I have summarized what I take to be the kernel of truth in William James's concept of the *will to believe*. The trouble with James is that he does not limit the grounds.

14. Generally Hume stresses the revisability inherent in all empirical claims which go beyond immediate perception. Michael Scriven, "Explanations, Predictions, and Laws," in Baruch A. Brody, ed., *Readings in the Philosophy of Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1970), p. 100, states a view far removed from that of Hume: "The examples of physical laws with which we are all familiar are distinguished by one feature of particular interest for the traditional analyses—they are virtually all known to be in error. Nor is the error trifling, nor is an amended law available which corrects for all the error. The important feature of laws cannot be their literal truth, since this rarely exists. It is not their closeness to the truth which replaces this, since far better approximations are readily constructed. Their virtue lies in a compound out of the qualities of generality, formal simplicity, approximation to the truth, and theoretical tractability."

15. Hume, *op. cit.*, p. 122. Terence Penelhum, *Religion and Rationality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* (New York: 1971), pp. 272-273, proposes a similar criticism of Hume.

16. Werner Heisenberg, *The Physicist's Conception of Nature* (London: 1958), pp. 180-181.

17. Robert Young, "Miracles and Epistemology," *Religious Studies*, 8 (1972), pp. 115-126, develops a view close to that which I propose here, but Young supposes (p. 122) that if one identifies the unknown cause with God, one must be assuming that God is not the cause of all states of affairs generally. See also C. S. Lewis, *Miracles* (London: 1964), pp. 59-66. John King-Farlow and William Niels Christensen, *Faith and the Life of Reason* (Dordrecht, Holland: 1972), pp. 45-77, propose a view of miracles in many ways close to mine, but do not clarify sufficiently the signal aspect of

miracles, which is central in my view; they do provide useful historical information on the background of the definition of *miracle* as "violation of a law of nature"; they also comment on Tillich's extreme position.

18. O. Costa de Beauregard, "Irreversibility Problems," in Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, ed., *Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science* (Amsterdam: 1965), pp. 313-346; notice note 19, p. 319, in which the opinion is cited that reversal of the ripples would be a "miracle."

19. Malcolm L. Diamond, *Contemporary Philosophy and Religious Thought: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* (New York: 1974), pp. 64-67.

20. Alexis Carrel, *Man: The Unknown* (New York and London: 1935), p. 149; note also the footnote on p. 148: "Miraculous cures seldom occur. Despite their small number, they prove the existence of organic and mental processes that we do not know. They show that certain mystic states, such as that of prayer, have definite effects. They are stubborn, irreducible facts, which must be taken into account." Carrel goes on to add some facts about Lourdes. This objective approach contrasts with the dogmatism of Diamond and others. In effect, they hold that if miracles do occur, it is scientific to pretend that they do not.

21. Alexis Carrel, *Prayer* (New York: 1948), pp. 44-45.

22. Charles A. Lindbergh, "Preface," in Alexis Carrel, *The Voyage to Lourdes*, trans. Virgilia Peterson (New York: 1950), p. vii.

23. Diamond, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

24. The reference is to the allegations with respect to the shrine at Lourdes, France. See Louis Monden, S.J., *Signs and Wonders: A Study of the Miraculous Element in Religion* (New York, Paris, Tournai, and Rome: 1966), pp. 194-250, for an introduction, with references to works on both sides. On the compatibility of the definition of "miracle" I have given with Catholic teaching on the subject see John A. Hardon, S.J., "The Concept of Miracle from St. Augustine to Modern Apologetics," *Theological Studies*, 15 (1954), pp. 229-257; Liam S. Bréartúin, O.C.D., "The Theology of Miracles," *Ephemerides Carmeliticae*, 20 (1969), pp. 1-51 and 351-402. Hardon shows (p. 243) that "violation of the laws of nature" is not essential; Bréartúin shows the importance of the signal aspect of miracle in the theory of Thomas Aquinas. For the question of the supposed universality of miracles see Robert D. Smith, *Comparative Miracles* (St. Louis and London: 1965), pp. 106-163.

23: THE HUMAN PERSON AND THE HUMAN COMMUNITY

1. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, 2, chs. 56-78, argues cogently against many forms of dualism.

2. See P. F. Strawson, "Persons," in G. N. A. Vesey, ed., *Body and Mind* (London: 1964), pp. 403-424; Gabriel Marcel, *The Mystery of Being*, vol. 1, *Reflection and Mystery* (Chicago: 1960), pp. 127-153.

3. The argument is developed in Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, *Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument*, forthcoming.

4. This position is argued cogently by Richard Taylor, *Action and Purpose* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1966).

5. J. R. Lucas, *The Freedom of the Will* (Oxford: 1970), pp. 114-172, develops a somewhat similar argument; his argument does not prove freedom of the will, but does seem to refute physicalism. H. D. Lewis, *The Elusive Mind* (London and New York: 1969), pp. 68-226, provides extensive critiques of various versions of the identity thesis.

6. Aristotle, *De anima* iii, 429a10-430a25, proposes his views on thinking mind in such ambiguous terms that his meaning has been debated ever since. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, 2, ch. 68, holds that the soul of a person is both an immaterial substance and the substantial form of the human body. He also thinks Aristotle held the same view (ch. 78). I do not see how the soul could be a substance if it were a substantial form. Thomas reaches his conclusion by elimination; his arguments against the alternatives he attacks are cogent. But I do not find his own solution satisfying.

7. Richard Taylor, *Metaphysics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1963), pp. 24-29, argues the case well so far as the body/sentient mind is concerned; he does not take into account in this argument aspects of the human person irreducible to sensory awareness.

8. P. F. Strawson, *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* (London: 1959), pp. 87-116.

9. Hegel, however, erred in trying to treat bodiliness dialectically. The natural world cannot be mere nought. To treat it as such is to confuse its way of being with man's way of knowing it to be.

10. This theory of propositional knowledge is derived from Thomas Aquinas; see my *Basic Oppositions in Logical Theory* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1959), pp. 175-197.

11. See Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, *Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom* (Notre Dame and London: 1974), pp. 1-41.

12. Many controversies, such as the is/ought controversy, arise from this problem. One cannot reason from a natural "is" to an existential "ought"; this was Hume's point and he was right about it, though he himself proceeded to try to reduce morality to natural factors. The argument of the following eight or nine paragraphs was worked out by Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen in preparation for *Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument*, forthcoming, although the argument will not appear in the published book.

13. Thomas Aquinas regarded the soul, insofar as it is a substantial form, as part of the body; he denied that the soul is the self: ". . . anima mea non est ego"; from this he concluded that the person is not saved unless the body rises from the dead: *Super 1 Corinthos lectura*, 15, lect. 2. See Peter Geach, *God and the Soul* (New York: 1969), pp. 17-29, who argues that without resurrection of the body hope of life after death is illusory.

14. Terence Penelhum, *Survival and Disembodied Existence* (New York: 1970), presents many of the arguments to which I refer, and he refers to other relevant authors in his bibliography, pp. 109-111. There is a more compact version in the same author's *Religion and Rationality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* (New York: 1971), pp. 345-355. H. D. Lewis, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 227-248 and 324-325, criticizes many of these same arguments. See also John Hick, *Philosophy of Religion*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1973), pp. 97-117.

15. H. M. McElwain, "Resurrection of the Dead," *New Catholic Encyclo-*

pedia, vol. 12, pp. 419-427; Lucien Cerfaux, *The Christian in the Theology of St. Paul* (New York: 1967), pp. 176-202.

16. This point is argued effectively by Richard Purtill, "Disembodied Survival," *Sophia*, 12 (1973), pp. 1-10.

17. Purtill, *loc. cit.*, rejects the demand for a logically sufficient condition. I would maintain that this demand cannot be met even now; bodily continuity is *not* such a criterion; see C. B. Martin, *Religious Belief* (Ithaca, New York: 1959), pp. 97-102; also see John Hick, "Mr. Clarke's Resurrection Also," *Sophia*, 11 (1972), pp. 1-3, for a neat rejection of a demand for a logically sufficient condition of identity.

24: MEANING, REVELATION, AND CHRISTIAN MYSTERIES

1. For a position which denies cognitive meaning to ethical statements see A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, 2nd ed. (London and New York: 1961), pp. 108-109; C. L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language* (New Haven: 1944). I have treated this question in "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2," *Natural Law Forum*, 10 (1965), pp. 168-201.

2. See Terence Penelhum, *Religion and Rationality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* (New York: 1971), p. 353; see P. F. Strawson, *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* (London: 1959), p. 116; Peter Geach, *God and the Soul* (New York: 1969), pp. 1-29.

3. See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, 4, ch. 1.

4. *Ibid.*, 1, ch. 22.

5. John L. McKenzie, S.J., *Jerome Biblical Commentary*, 77:12; Robert W. Gleason, S.J., *Yahweh. The God of the Old Testament* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1964), pp. 113-123.

6. *Jerusalem Bible*, Exodus 3:14, note h.

7. McKenzie and *Jerusalem Bible*, *loc. cit.*

8. William Foxwell Albright, *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: 1957), pp. 257-266.

9. McKenzie, *op. cit.*, 77:13. Cf. Raymond Abba, "The Divine Name Yahweh," *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 80 (1961), pp. 320-328.

10. A point stressed by Vatican Council II, *Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation*, section 2; cf. Dt. 18:21-22, where the combination of words and events marks the true oracle from God.

11. Cf. McKenzie, *op. cit.*, 77:8, 20, 106.

12. *Ibid.*, 77:21.

13. See an article along these lines by D. M. Mackay, "Language, Meaning, and God," *Philosophy*, 47 (1972), pp. 1-17.

14. This translation is taken from *The Church Teaches: Documents of the Church in English Translation*, trans. J. F. Clarkson, S.J., J. H. Edwards, S.J., W. J. Kelly, S.J., and J. J. Welch, S.J. (St. Louis and London: 1955), p. 172.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 135-136.

16. See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1, qq. 39-42.

25: WHY CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE, IF TRUE, IS IMPORTANT

1. E. L. Peterman, "Redemption (Theology of)," *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 12, pp. 144-158.

2. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 12, a. 1; 1-2, q. 3, a. 8.

3. Vatican Council II, *The Church in the Modern World*, section 39.

4. This paragraph is based on the First Epistle of St. John.

5. See P. de Letter, S.J., "Sanctifying Grace and Our Union with the Holy Trinity," *Theological Studies*, 13 (1952), pp. 38-41, for some inadequate explanations proposed by Catholic theologians; most Christians probably tended to be even less realistic about the meaning of union with God.

6. The Greek church fathers spoke freely of the divinization of the Christian; they regarded the uncreated grace of the Spirit as prior to created grace. Some of them even argue that the Word and the Spirit are divine *a fortiori*, because these divine persons cause the divinization of human persons, which would be impossible were they not divine themselves. See Robert W. Gleason, S.J., *The Indwelling Spirit* (Staten Island, N.Y.: 1966), pp. 21-37.

7. See St. Augustine, *Expositions on the Psalms*, Ps. 49:2, in J. P. Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 36, c. 565; St. Athanasius, *Four Discourses against the Arians*, Or. 2:59, in J. P. Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 26, c. 273.

8. The theologians who have accepted the theory of created actuation by uncreated act (see article of P. de Letter, S.J., cited in note 5 above, for references) approach the position I am suggesting, although they seem to assume that the uncreated act is the divinity of the Persons of the Holy Trinity; my suggestion is that the uncreated act is a divinity communicated to the created person as his own, not by procession, but by gift, in some way especially by the Spirit who is sent. See also Karl Rahner, S.J., "Scholastic Concept of Uncreated Grace," *Theological Investigations*, vol. 1, *God, Church, Mary, and Grace*, trans. Cornelius Ernst, O.P. (Baltimore: 1961), pp. 334-346.

9. Thomas Aquinas's theory of the beatific vision demands not only that in it one know God but that one know by means of the divine nature itself; see Rahner, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-333, for relevant texts and discussion. If the act of knowing is to be one's own, then it seems to me that the principle by which one acts also must be one's own. Many theologians beginning with Thomas himself have talked of "formal" or "quasi-formal" causality here; I think this is a mistake, since no relation involving creature and creator should be modeled on immanent modes of causality. What I am suggesting is that the analogy of the Christian to Christ be taken rather more seriously than it has been. I do not suggest that all Christians are *hypostatically* united to the divine nature; the human person remains human but is *dynamically*—in the power to act, not in the person—united with a divine nature which is freely communicated by the Trinity and which one who receives it has as one's own. There is no mixing, however, because God-the-Trinity-creator and God-the-adopted-creature remain distinct by opposition of relationships. This subject obviously requires an extended study, which I hope to undertake at a later date.

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