

Index

- Abelson, R., 190
Absolute, 57
Accident, *Sfc/Nfc* and, 79–81
Action, *Sfc/Nfc* and theories of, 66–77
“Act of affirming,” defined, 139
“Ad hominem,” self-reference and argument, 132
Adler, M., 6–7, 186, 188, 193, 194, 195
“Affirmation,” defined, 122, 139
Affirmation: kinds of, 141–142; normativity and, 161–163; of *Nfc* inevitable, 169–171; of verifiability criterion, 136–137
“Affirmation, rational,” defined, 142
Alternatives: choice and, 15–17; degree of freedom and, 73–74; deliberation and, 18–20
Analytic philosophy, the present work and, 7
Animals, freedom of, and compatibilism, 31
Anscombe, G. E. M., 189
Appearances, freedom and, 112–117
Aristotle, 31–32, 36, 46, 70, 74, 106, 124, 190, 197
“Argument, self-referential,” defined, 133–134
Attention, choice and, 20
Augustine, St., 38, 188
Aune, B., 186
Austin, J. L., 6 186, 195, 197
Ayer, A. J., 31, 43–44, 80, 105, 188, 189, 190, 193
Beck, L. W., 116
“Begging the question,” defined, 124
Behavior: choice and, 13–14; *Nfc* and spontaneous, 67
Behaviorism, 91–94
Bergson, H., 89
Berofsky, B., 188, 191, 193, 194
Black, M., 147, 198
Blanshard, B., 29, 50–51, 188, 190
Bodies of discourse, compatibilism and distinct, 111–121
Bradley, F. H., 83–84, 194
Bradley, R. D., 29–30, 188
Brand, M., 195
Brandt, R. B., 59, 191
Broad, C. D., 12, 35–36, 186, 188
Brodbeck, M., 189
Brody, B., 192
Browning, D., 187
Brunswik, E., 192
Buridan’s Ass, 75
Cahn, S. M., 190
Calculation, choice and, 17
Calvinists, 28

- Campbell, C. A., 30, 32, 188, 193–195
 “Can”: compatibilism and, 107–110; meanings of, and fatalism, 190
 Candlish, S., 188
 “Capacity,” defined, 24
 Cassirer, E., 192
 Category mistake, A. I. Melden on, 196
 Causality; divine, and *Sfc/Nfc*, 97–103; Kant and, 112–117; of free choice, 12; sufficient reason and, 86
 “Cause”: M. Black on meaning of, 191; meaning of, said of God, 100–103
 Causes, free choices and, 11
 Causes and reasons, 41–46, 110–121
 Chance: free choice and, 12; *Sfc* and, 83–84; *Sfc/Nfc* and, 79–81
 Character: free choice and, 82–83; *Sfc/Nfc* and, 67–72
 Chisholm, R., 12, 87–88, 146–147, 150, 186, 194, 198
 Choice: calculated, 17; deliberation and, 18–20; examples of, 15; experience of, and argument for *Nfc*, 48–51; experience of, and argument for *Sfc*, 178; experience of, described, 13–20; experience of, leads to judgment, 20–23; experienced, 20; freedom of, affirmed, 171–177; negative factors and judgment about, 21–22
 Chomsky, N., 189
 Christianity. *See* Theism
 “Cogito,” self-reference and, 134
 Colodny, R. G., 192
 Commitments, *Sfc/Nfc* and, 69–72
 “Compatibilism”: meaning of, 105; preliminary clarification of, 3–4
 Compatibilism: 104–121, criticized by Suarez, 26; data of consciousness and, 28–30; M. du Bay on, 195; moral argument for *Sfc* and, 30–36; theological, 98–99
 Compton, A. H., 192
 Compulsion, distinct from *Nfc*, 31, 43
 “Conditions,” affirmation and, 143
 Consistency, 123
 “Contra-causal freedom,” defined, 12
 Contra-causal freedom, introspection and, 30
 Contradiction, compatibilism and, 118–121
 “Could have done otherwise”: compatibilism and, 31, 105–110; meaning of, 12
 Creative norms, 157–159
 Creativity, freedom as, 10, 88–90
 Creatureliness, free choice and, 100–103
Critique of Practical Reason (Kant), 165–166
Critique of Pure Reason (Kant), 112–117
 Davis, W. H., 189
 “Decision,” “choice” and, 13. *See also* Choice
 “Deliberation,” defined, 18–20
 Deliberation, K. Lehrer and, 29
De malo (Thomas Aquinas), 38
 Denial, affirmation and, 140
 Descartes, R., 27–28, 134, 187
 Desire, choice and, 15–16
 “Determination,” various meanings of, 72
 “Determinism,” distinguished from “*Nfc*,” 25
 Determinism: affirmed as hypothesis, 147–148; argument from intelligibility for, 77–90; as heuristic principle, 198; compatibility of morality with, 30–36; data of consciousness and, 28–30; experience as argument for, 48–51; inadequate self-referential arguments against, 40–46; normativity consistent with, 156–161; perennial controversy over, 1–2; physical, 57–66; principle of sufficient reason and, 85–88; psychological, criticized, 66–67; soft, 105–110; theological, 97–103; verifiability and, 192
 “Determinism’s Dilemma” (J. N. Jordan), 41–46
De veritate (Thomas Aquinas), 39–40
 Dewey, J., 89, 90–91, 93, 194, 195
 “The Dilemma of Determinism” (W. James), 37–38
 Disposition, character as, 70
Disputationes metaphysicae (F. Suarez), 26
 Double-aspect theory, 110–121
 Du Bay, M., 195

- Eccles, J., 192
 Edwards, P., 191
 Edwards, R. B., 193
 Einstein, A., 192
 Emergence of novelty, freedom as, 10, 88–90
 Empiricism, naive, and *Sfc*, 84
 “Entail,” defined, 164
 “Epistemically legitimate,” defined, 141–142
 Epistemic principles, 146–150
 Evil, pragmatic argument for *Sfc* and, 36–38
 Excluded middle, fatalism and principle of, 55–56, 190
 “Experience,” meaning of, 20
 Experience: affirmation and, 142; argument for *NFC* from, 49–53; argument for *Sfc* from, 26–30; logic and, 107, of choice and identification of free choices, 78; of choice and judgments based on it, 20–23; of choice and proof of *Sfc*, 171–177; of choice and arguments from it, 178
 Explanation, different conceptions of, 84–85
- “False,” defined, 123
 “Falsification, performative,” defined, 133
 Falsity: reference and, 139; self-referential and, 131–138
 Faris, J. A., 189
 “Fatalism,” defined, 52
 Fatalism: criticism of, 51–57; excluded middle and, 190; *Sfc/Nfc* and, 23–25; Taylor’s argument for, 55; theological determinism and, 97–98
 Feigl, H., 189
 Ferré, F., 12, 186, 187, 192
 Fitch, F., 197
 Five Ways (Thomas Aquinas), 101
 Flew, A., 189, 194, 196
 Foot, P., 79, 82, 188, 193, 194
 Formal truths, affirmation of, 142
 “Framework of expectation,” defined, 21–22
 Frank, P., 192
 Franklin, R. L., 187, 194
- “Free,” meaning of, and compatibilism, 105–110
 “Free choice”: compatibilism and, 30–31, 105; defined, 11–12; preliminary clarification of, 2
 Free choice: argument for, 171–177; argument for, from experience, 26–30; as first principle, 85; as subject of this book, 1–2; controversy about, clarified, 23–25; exclusion of, by compatibilists, 105–110; first formulation of self-referential argument for, 154–156; first summary of argument for, 5–6; intelligibility of, 77–90; J. R. Lucas’s argument for, 46–47; moral argument for, 30–36; normativity entailing, 161–163, 164–166; pragmatic argument against, 90–97; pragmatic argument for, 36–38; psychological arguments against, 66–77; second formulation of self-referential argument for, 163–164; science and, 57–66; self and, 82–83; self-referential arguments for, examined, 40–46; social science and, 94–96; Thomas Aquinas’s argument for, 38–40. *See also* Choice
 “Free will,” distinguished from “free choice,” 12
 Free will: Freud and, 71–73; perennial controversy over, 1–2
 “Freedom”: L. W. Beck and Kant on, 116; many meanings of, 8–12; uses of, compatible with “*Nfc*,” 105–106
 “Freedom, ideal,” defined, 9–10
 “Freedom, physical,” defined, 9
 “Freedom, political,” defined, 10
 “Freedom as emergence of novelty,” defined, 10
 “Freedom to do as one pleases,” defined, 9
 Freedom: degrees of, 73–74; Kant and, 112–117
Freedom of the Will (J. R. Lucas), 46–47
 Freud, S., 9, 60, 72–73, 77, 193
- Galton, F., 50–51
 Ginet, C., 187

- Ginsberg, M., 189
 Glover, J., 60, 191, 192, 198
 Glymour, C., 192
 God, 7, 27, 38, 40, 87, 168; causality by, and human free choice, 89–90, 97–103
 Gödel's Theorem, 47
 Goldman, A. I., 187
 Goods: incommensurability of, and *Sfc/Nfc*, 75–77; Thomas Aquinas's theory of, 179–180
 Grammar, compatibilism and, 117–121
 Grant, C. K., 124, 143, 197
 Grelling's Paradox, 127
 Grisez, G., 195, 199
 "Groundless affirmation," defined, 141
 Grünbaum, A., 43–45, 189–190
 Gründer, H., 188
- Habit, *Sfc/Nfc* and, 68–69
 Hampshire, S., 196
 Hare, R. M., 197
 Hart, W. D., 197
 Hartmann, N., 30, 188
 Hasker, W., 189
 Haslett, A. W., 189
 Hegel, G. W. F., 37, 57, 197
 Heisenberg, W., 63–64, 192
 Hempel, C., 62, 192
 Hintikka, J., 198
 Hobart, R. E., 82, 83–84, 87–88, 194
 Hobbes, T., 1–2, 3, 97, 105, 109, 191, 192, 195
 Honderich, T., 188, 189, 196
 Hook, S., 186, 188, 190, 191
 Hospers, J., 71, 186, 193
 Hughes, G. E., 193
 Humanism, the present work and, 7
 Hume, D., 27–28, 31, 81–82, 105, 106, 109, 187, 188, 194
 Hypnotism, free choice and, 68
 Hypothesis: affirming of a, 122; *Nfc* affirmed as, 147–148; use of a, 198
 Hypothetical imperatives, 160–161
- "Ideal freedom." See "Freedom, ideal"
Idea of Freedom (M. Adler), 6–7
 "Illegitimate totalities," self-reference and, 127–128
- Imperatives, categorical and hypothetical, 160–161
 Imputability, compatibilism and, 105–110
 Indeterminism, *Sfc/Nfc* and physical, 61–62
 Induction, argument by, for *Nfc*, 48–51
 Inevitable falsity, self-reference and, 135
 Instrumentalism, argument from, for *Nfc*, 90–97
 Intelligibility, diverse theories of, 84–86
 Interest, choice and, 13–16
 Irrational affirmation, 141
- James, W., 36–38, 93, 105, 146, 177, 181, 188, 194
 Jauch, J. M., 192
 Jones, E., 71, 72, 193
 Jordan, J. N., 6, 41–46, 132, 177, 189, 190, 193, 198
 Jordan, P., 61
 Jørgensen, J., 197
 Joseph, H. W. B., 189
 Judaism. See Theism
- Kant, I., 110, 112–117, 118, 149, 165–166, 179, 180, 196, 199
 Kelsen, H., 30, 188
 Kenner, L., 42, 45, 189, 190, 198
 Kenny, A., 196
 Kim, J., 59, 191
 Knight, M., 189
 Knowledge, divine, 97–98
 Knox, M., 42, 189
 Körner, S., 192
- Laird, J., 189, 190
 Lande, A., 192
 Language, levels of, 127–130; two domain theory and, 111–121
 Laplace, P., 57, 63, 64, 86, 185, 190, 194
 Laws, *Sfc/Nfc* and natural, 63–64
 "Legitimate epistemically," defined, 141–142
 Lehrer, K., 29–30, 186, 187, 194

- Leibniz, G. W., 57, 86, 88, 194, 195
 Lewis, C. I., 196
 Lewis, C. S., 45, 189, 190
 Liar Paradox, 126, 127, 130
 Liberty, compatibilism and, 105, 110
 Locke, J., 105, 109
 Logic: experience and, in conflict, 57;
 fatalism based on, 51–57; rationality
 norms as rules of, 145–146
 Logical norms, 157, 159
 Logical paradoxes, 127–130
 Logical relations, causal relations and,
 43–46
 Logical truth, 142
 Lucas, J. R., 6, 42, 46–47, 58, 80, 117,
 180, 187, 189, 190, 191, 193, 194,
 195, 196, 197
 Luther, M., 71–72
- Mabbott, J. D., 189
 Mach, E., 192
 MacIntyre, A., 79–80, 189, 191, 193,
 194
 MacKay, D. M., 196
 McKim, V., 190
 McTaggart, J. M. E., 28, 187, 189
 Mainx, F., 61, 192
 Malcolm, N., 189
 Mansel, H., 99–100, 188, 194
 Margenau, H., 192
 Martin, R. L., 197
 Marx, K., 10
 Mascall, E. L., 189
 “Meaningless,” meaning of, 123
Meditation IV (R. Descartes), 27
 Melden, A. I., 111, 196
 Metaphysics, legitimacy of, 184–185
 Mill, J. S., 28, 48–51, 97, 99–100, 105,
 187, 190
 Modal logic, fatalism and, 54
 Molinism, 195
 Monism, 87
 Monod, J., 62, 192
 Moore, G. E., 105, 198
 Moral blindness, arguments for *Nfc* and,
 72
 Morality: argument for *Sfc* from, 30–36;
 choice and, 16; psychological deter-
 minism and, 75–77; rationality norms
 and, 178–179; Thomas Aquinas’s ap-
 peal to, in argument for *Sfc*, 38
 Moral responsibility, compatibilism and,
 105–110
 Morgenbesser, S., 190, 192
 Motives, determinism by, 66–77; in-
 commensurability of, 75–77
 Murphy, A. E., 147, 196, 198
- Naturalism, determinism and, 1
 Nature: Kant on, 112–117; laws of, and
 free choice, 57–66
 Necessity, self-reference and, 135
 Negative factors, judgment and, 21–22
 Nesbitt, W., 188
 “*Nfc*,” meaning of, 4, 141
Nfc: affirmation of, 144–152; compared
 as thesis with *Sfc*, 6; self-reference of,
 139
Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle), 188
 Normativity, modes of, 156–163; *Sfc*
 and, 164–166
 “Norms, rationality,” defined, 144–145
 Norms, rationality, 144–152, 199
 Northrup, F. S. C., 192
 Noumenal world, freedom in, 112–117
 Nowell-Smith, P. H., 67, 69, 105, 193
 “Null,” defined, 143
 Nullity, rationality norms and, 151–152
- Operationalism, argument from, for
 Nfc, 90–97
 Ordinary language: argument from, for
 Sfc, 30–36; compatibilism and, 109;
 double-aspect theory and, 111–121
 “Ought,” meanings of, 35–36,
 156–161, 178–179
 “Ought implies can”: argument from,
 for *Sfc* criticized, 35–36; Kant on,
 112–117; meaning of, 164–166, 179
 “Own,” many meanings of, 82
- Pap, A., 191
 Paradigmatic norms, 156–158
 Paradox, self-reference and, 127–130
 Parmenides, 56–57, 84
 Parsimony, principle of, 65

- Paul, St., 9
- “Performance of a statement,” defined, 123
- “Performative self-reference,” defined, 125
- Phenomenal world, freedom and, 112–117
- Philosophy: physics and, 63–66; question-begging in, 40–41; rationality norms and, 168–171; remarks on, 181–185; science and, 193; theories in, 123
- Physical determinism, 73, 147–148
- “Physical freedom,” defined, 9
- Physical freedom, compatibilism and, 106–107
- Physics, determinism and, 60–62
- Pictures of world, compatibilism and, 118–121
- Plato, 66–67, 74, 124, 170, 182, 197
- “*PNfc*,” meaning of, 4
- “Pointlessness,” defined, 124
- Pointlessness, performatively self-referential, 131–133
- Popper, K., 94–96, 186, 192, 194
- Practical reason, rationality norms and, 146–150
- Pragmatic argument, 181
- “Pragmatic implications,” defined, 124
- Pragmatism: argument from, for *Nfc*, 90–97; argument from, for *Sfc*, 36–38
- Pragmatism* (W. James), 36–37
- Predictability, argument from, for *Sfc*, 23
- Prediction: free choice and, 12; *Nfc* and, 62; psychological determinism and, 67–70; social sciences and, 94–96
- Priestley, J., 28, 187, 193
- Principia mathematica* (B. Russell and A. N. Whitehead), 127
- Principle, free choice as, 85
- Principles, rationality norms as, 146–152
- Principles of Philosophy* (R. Descartes), 28
- Principles of Psychology* (W. James), 36
- “Proposition,” defined, 123
- Proposition: self-referential, 126; verifiability criterion as a, 136–137
- “Propositional act,” defined, 122
- Propositional acts, 140
- Propositional knowledge, compatibilism and, 118–121
- “Propositional self-reference,” defined, 125–126
- “*PSfc*,” meaning of, 4
- Psychoanalysis, *Nfc* and, 70–74
- Psychological determinism, sufficient reason and, 86–87
- Psychology, argument from, for *Nfc*, 66–77; physical determinism and, 60
- Punishment, compatibilism and, 32–33, 107
- Quantum physics, determinism and, 60–62
- Question-begging: avoidance of, 170; self-referential arguments need not be, 136–137; why, prevalent in philosophy, 181–182
- Quine, W. V. O., 90, 147, 150, 194, 197, 198
- Random events, *Sfc/Nfc* and, 79–81
- Rankin, K. W., 193
- Rational affirmation: conditions for, 143; defined, 142; normativity needed for, 161–163; required in philosophy, 168–171
- Rationalism, *Nfc* and, 85–88
- “Rationality norm,” defined, 144–145
- Rationality norms, 199; affirmation of *Nfc* and, 144–152; importance of, 183–184; morality and, 178–179; normativity of, 161–163; *Sfc* affirmed by, 171–177
- Rationalization, arguments for *Nfc* as, 51
- Reason, rationality norms and, 146–150
- Reasons and causes, 41–46, 110–121
- Reasons for action, *Sfc/Nfc* and, 18, 75–77
- Recognition, problem of, and free choice, 77–79
- Reconciliationism, 105–110
- “Reductio ad absurdum,” paradox and, 128
- Rée, P., 58–59, 191

- Reference: meaninglessness and, 123–124; semantic paradoxes and, 128–130; truth and, 139
- Reflexivity, self-reference distinct from, 47
- Regulative principles, 199
- Relativism: compatibilism and, 118–121; operationalism as, 93–94: R. Trigg on, 197
- Responsibility: compatibilist theory of, 32–36, 105–110; pragmatic argument for *Nfc* and, 90–91; principle of sufficient reason and, 88–90
- Richman, R. J., 197
- Ricoeur, P., 186
- Roberts, L. D., 193
- Rorty, R., 196, 198
- Ross, A., 197
- Ross, W. D., 34, 36, 75, 180, 193
- Rudner, R., 190
- Russell, B., 12, 30, 32, 127–128, 186, 188, 194, 197
- Ryle, G., 197
- Sartre, J. P., 88
- Schiller, F. C. S., 188
- Schlick, M., 28–29, 31, 32, 187, 188
- Schrödinger, E., 61, 192
- Sciama, D. W., 192
- Science, arguments for *Nfc* from, 57–66
- Scientia media*, 195
- Scientific worldview, free choice and, 59–66
- Scriven, M., 63–64, 192
- Searle, J. R., 143, 198
- Self-deception, arguments for *Nfc* and, 51, 72
- Self-defeat: *Nfc* and, 166–168; possible truth and, 137–138
- “Self-evident,” meaning of, 142
- Self-identity, *Sfc* and, 82–83
- “Self-reliance”: defined, 125; preliminary clarification of, 2
- Self-reference: inadequate arguments for *Sfc* based on, 40–46; of *Nfc*, 139; paradox and, 127–130
- “Self-referential argument,” defined, 133–134
- Self-referential argument: first summary of, 5–6; our use of, 7, 182–185; question-begging in, 40–41;
- Self-referential statements, 124–138
- Sellars, W., 146–147, 149, 150, 196, 198
- Semantic difficulties, 59–60, 123
- Semantic paradoxes, 127–130
- “Semantic self-reference,” defined, 125–126
- Sense, meaninglessness and, 123
- “Sense of freedom,” defined, 20–23
- Sense of freedom: compatibilism and, 28–29; Freud on, 71–73; identification of free choices and, 78
- “Sentence,” defined, 123
- “Sentential self-reference,” defined, 125
- “*Sfc*,” meaning of, 4
- Sfc*, compared as thesis with *Nfc*, 6
- “*Sfc/Nfc*”: as formulation of controversy, 23–25; meaning of, 4
- Sfc/Nfc*, defended as formulation, 104–121
- Sidgwick, H., 58, 67, 69, 191, 193
- Silber, J. R., 196
- Simon, Y. R., 186
- Simplicity rule; argument for *Nfc* and, 64–65; as rationality norm, 145
- Sin, free will and, 30
- Skepticism: proof of *Sfc* compared with refutation of, 176–177; self-reference and, 127–130
- Skinner, B. F., 60, 91–92, 93, 189, 194
- Skinner, R. C., 187
- Slote, M., 176–177, 199
- Smart, J. J. C., 64–66, 81, 89, 191, 192, 193, 194
- Smythies, J. R., 189
- Snyder, A. A., 42, 189, 190
- Social science, *Sfc/Nfc* and, 90–97
- Socrates, 66–67
- “Soft determinism,” defined, 105
- Soft determinism, 105–110
- Spinoza, B., 1, 3, 28, 38, 57, 187, 195
- “Statement,” defined, 122
- Statements, self-referential, 124–138
- Statistical laws, determinism and, 61–62
- Suarez, F., 26–27, 31, 187
- Sufficient reason: compatibilism and, 105; *Nfc* and, 85–88, 149

- Survival, argument for *Nfc* based on, 91–94
- Taylor, A. E., 42, 44, 189, 190
- Taylor, R., 12, 55, 86, 105, 149, 190, 191, 194, 195, 198
- Technical norms, 157–160
- Theism: argument within, for *Nfc*, 97–103; free will and, 1; moral argument for *Sfc* and, 30–31; present work and, 7; psychological determinism and, 75
- Theory, rationality norms and, 146–150
- Thomas Aquinas, St., 38–40, 74, 100–101, 146, 177, 179–180, 181, 189, 193, 195
- Tillich, P., 189
- Trigg, R., 197
- “True,” epistemic sense of, and fatalism, 55–56
- Truth: affirmation and, 141–144; reference and, 139; self-referential falsity and possible, 135
- Two-domain theory, 110–121
- Tylor, E. B., 91, 194
- Types, theory of, 127–130
- Unconscious motives, *Nfc* and, 70–74
- Unintelligibility, argument for *Nfc* based on, 77–90
- Universal determinism, compatibilism and, 105
- Urban, W. M., 189
- Urmson, J. O., 186
- Utility, argument for *Nfc* based on, 90–97
- Vacillation, deliberation distinct from, 19
- Vagueness, 123
- Validity, rationality norms and, 151–152
- Van Inwagen, P., 186, 190
- Verifiability criterion, falsification of, 134–138
- Verificationism: criterion for identifying free choices and, 78; physical determinism and, 60
- Vesey, G. N. A., 196
- Viewpoints, compatibilism and, 110–121
- Voluntariness: Aristotle on, 31–32; compatibilism and, 105–110; not same as free choice, 46
- Waismann, F., 196
- Walsh, J., 190
- Warnock, G. J., 186
- Weiss, P., 42, 189
- White, M., 77, 79, 193
- Whitehead, A. N., 127, 128; 197
- Wick, W., 189, 190
- Wiggins, D., 132, 189, 190, 198
- Will, Thomas Aquinas’s argument based on nature of, 38–40
- “Wishing,” meaning of, 13
- World hypotheses, *Nfc* as part of, 64–66
- Young, R., 187